

## 第6回 核兵器廃絶-地球市民集会ナガサキ

核兵器のない世界をこの手に ～禁止条約と ICAN ノーベル平和賞を力に～

### 講演集

## The 6th Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Realizing a world without nuclear weapons; with the power of  
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and ICAN's Nobel Peace Prize.

### Speechs



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## 基調報告

### 核兵器廃絶地球市民長崎集会実行委員会

委員長 朝長 万左男



「第6回核兵器廃絶—地球市民集会ナガサキ」にご参加の皆さまに、心より感謝申し上げます。原稿にはありませんが、ここで特に言及したいのは、今回初めて海外から大学生の諸君が参加してくれているということです。アメリカから2名、マレーシアから5名、中国から5名、韓国から5名です。

Please stand up, foreign students. 私たちのこの集会に参加していただき、本当にありがとうございます。

2013年の前回、第5回の集会以来、5年が経過しました。世界の核兵器廃絶の潮流は劇的な展開を遂げ、核兵器の非人道性の議論が繰り広げられ、国際世論を喚起してまいりました。多国間交渉の結果、この核兵器の非人道的脅威に立脚した核兵器禁止条約が、2017年7月7日、ついに国連において採択されました。10月初め現在、69カ国が署名し、19カ国が批准するに至っています。核禁止条約の早期の発効が心から待たれます。

さらに、これまで多大な貢献をしてきた ICAN に対して、昨年12月、ノーベル平和賞が授与され、ヒバクシャと共にその一翼を担ってきた長崎市民は、大きな喜びと新たな勇気を与えられました。

しかしながら、核兵器保有国とその同盟国である日本や NATO 諸国など、30カ国の国家集団が、紛争の絶えない世界的安全保障の混迷を理由に、今なお核兵器による戦争抑止政策を継続し、禁止条約交渉を拒絶し、署名もせず、禁止条約推進国側を圧迫さえしております。

このような二つの大きな流れは、核廃絶へのアプローチの分断の兆候を見せており、NPT 条約第6条にうたわれている「核なき世界の実現」という崇高な共通目標に関し、核軍縮の停滞を招いており、被爆地長崎の市民は深刻な状況と捉えております。

今年に入り、日本が位置する北東アジアでは、核兵器をめぐる情勢に大きな変化が訪れています。すなわち、朝鮮半島の平和構築と北朝鮮の非核化を目指す、南北朝鮮と米国と北朝鮮の間の首脳による対話が連続して行われ、大きな転機が生じ、昨年来、この地域の核兵器の脅威を背にした激烈な対立の構図は、一転して、平和と非核化の方向性に変わりつつあります。われわれはこの新しい情勢を歓迎し、期待を持って見守っております。対話から生まれる信頼醸成こそが、核抑止依存策を克服する唯一の方策であると、私は信じています。

今回の「地球市民集会ナガサキ」のメインテーマは、核禁止条約の力と ICAN のノーベル平和賞受賞に象徴される市民社会の力を発揮して、新たな方向性を模索するものであります。核問題の研究者、核政策の専門家、NGO の代表、市民、長崎市民、学生さん、子どもたちが一堂に会して、73年間、最後の被爆地であり続けている長崎が「核兵器は二度と使用できない兵

器である」という国際規範の象徴として、この分断を克服し、現在朝鮮半島において進みつつある対話と信頼醸成による非核化がもたらされることによって、日本を含む北東アジアの非核化もまた現実の追求すべき政策となる議論が進むことを心より願いたいと思います。

核兵器禁止条約の発効にはまだ一層の努力を要しますが、皆さまの3日間の議論によって、これがNPT体制に対する強力な補完的条約として、新たな核なき世界を目指す国際規範となることがこの会議で確認されることを願って、基調報告を終わります。ご清聴ありがとうございます。

## **Keynote Report**

**Masao Tomonaga**

**Chairman of the Organizing Committee,**

**Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**

Thank you for attending "the 6th Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons." This is not in the manuscript, but I particularly want to say here is that college students from overseas are participating for the first time. We have 2 from the United States, 5 from Malaysia, 5 from China and 5 from South Korea.

Please stand up, foreign students.

Thank you very much for taking part in this assembly.

Five years have passed since the last and the 5th assembly in 2013. The world tide of the elimination of nuclear weapons has dramatically developed, spreading discussions about the inhumanity of nuclear weapons, and evoking international public opinion. As a result of multilateral negotiations, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was formed against the inhumane threat of the nuclear weapons, was finally adopted by the United Nations on July 7, 2017. As of the beginning of October, 69 countries have signed and 19 countries have ratified it. The early entry into force of the TPNW will be awaited.

Furthermore, in December of last year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the ICAN, which had made a great contribution in the past, and the Nagasaki citizens who have played a part of its activity with *Hibakusha* were given great pleasure and new courage.

However, the nation group of 30 countries, including nuclear-weapon states and their allies such as Japan and NATO countries, is still continuing the war deterrence policy by nuclear weapons, refusing negotiation of the TPNW, and even oppressing the TPNW promoting side, without signing, referring to the worldwide security confusion.

Such two major trends show signs of the division of approaches to nuclear elimination, and in relation to the sublime common goal of “realizing a world without nuclear weapons” that is stated in Article 6 of the NPT Treaty, the nuclear disarmament is forced to be stagnating. The citizens of Nagasaki, an atomic bombed place, regard this as a serious situation.

This year, in Northeast Asia where Japan is located, there is a major change in the situation regarding nuclear weapons. That is, the dialogs by the leaders between North and South Korea and the United States and North Korea, aiming at the peace-building of the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization of North Korea, have been carried out successively, and have produced a major turning point. From last year, the composition of the violent confrontation against the backdrop of the threat of nuclear weapons in this area is suddenly changing to a direction of peace and denuclearization. We welcome this new situation and are watching it with expectation. I believe that confidence building arising from dialogs is the only way to overcome measures depending on nuclear deterrence.

The main theme of this “Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly” is to explore a new direction by unlocking the civil society’s power, which is symbolized by the power of TPNW and Nobel Peace Prize Winning by ICAN. Together with nuclear armament issue researchers, nuclear policy experts, NGO representatives, citizens, Nagasaki citizens, students and children here, I sincerely hope that the debate will progress towards a policy to be actually pursued for denuclearization in Northeast Asia including Japan through the possible denuclearization brought about by the dialog and confidence building which are currently proceeding on the Korean Peninsula and through Nagasaki - the last atomic bombed place for 73 years - overcoming this division as a symbol of international norm that “nuclear weapons are never again to be used.”

Although it is still necessary to make further efforts for the entry into force of the TPNW, I would like to conclude this keynote report wishing that your three-day discussions at this assembly will confirm that the TPNW becomes an international norm, as a strong complementary treaty for the NPT regime, aiming at a new world without nuclear weapons.

Thank you for your attention.

## 基調講演

大阪女学院大学教授

黒澤 満



ただ今ご紹介にあずかりました、大阪女学院大学の黒澤です。

(以下スライド併用)

#1 長崎大学の顧問もしており、長崎にはしばしばお邪魔させていただいております。

本日はこのような重要な集会の基調講演者として指名されましたことは非常に大きな名誉なことであり、大きな喜びであり、感謝申し上げます。まず、朝長万左男先生を委員長とする実行委員会の皆さま方にお礼を申し上げますとともに、田上富久長崎市長および中村法道県知事にも心からお礼を申し上げます。

#2 本日の基調講演ですが、三つの大きな内容について話をします。まずは「核兵器をめぐる現在の状況」。先ほどからあいさつでもいろいろありましたように、さまざまな問題が動いているわけで、それについて触れます。2 番目は「人道と安全保障」という問題を広く捉えてみて、人道と安全保障をどう考えるかという話をします。3 番目には「核廃絶への二つのアプローチ」、今、核兵器禁止条約で言われている stigmatization、核に悪の焼き印を押すという意味と、それから非正当化するという二つのアプローチについて話をさせていただきます。この三つの大きな中で三つずつ、全部で九つ話をしますので、整理しながら聞いてください。

#3 まず「核兵器をめぐる現在の状況」、第1の大きな問題の中で、三つの問題の話をします。最初は先ほどから出ている、またこの集会のサブテーマにもなっている「核兵器禁止条約の成立」。これはどういう意味を持つのか。2 番目に「北朝鮮の核問題」。そして3 番目には、NPT 条約からの脱退の話もありましたし、それを含む核兵器不拡散条約の50周年という、核軍縮全体の話をさせていただきます。

#4 まず1-1、これは先ほど言いましたように「核兵器禁止条約の成立」ですが、条約は2017年7月7日に、国連総会で賛成122、反対1、棄権1で採択されました。そして同年9月20日に、条約の署名のために開放されています。そして、10月6日にはICANがノーベル平和賞を受賞しています。このICANは条約のアイデアから条約採択まで積極的に活動したということで、ノーベル平和賞が授与されました。

私の最新の情報では、署名が69。間違っていたら言ってくださいね。批准が19という形で、徐々に進展しているのですが、発効には50カ国の批准が必要であるということです。

この条約の成立は、核兵器廃絶に向けての非常に大きな前進だと私は理解しております。これは核兵器不拡散条約第6条の履行であって、高く評価すべきであると。だから、NGOはさら



にこの条約の早期の発効に向けて、さまざまな側面から努力すべきであるというのが 1-1 の問題です。

#5 1-2 は「北朝鮮の核問題」で、これは分科会もありますけれども、今年に入って南北首脳会談が 3 回開かれて、それで 4 月 27 日には「板門店宣言」が合意され、9 月 19 日には「平壤共同宣言」が北朝鮮と韓国の首脳の間で合意されています。

また一方で、アメリカと北朝鮮との間で、6 月 12 日にシンガポールで初めての首脳会談が開催され、トランプ大統領と金正恩委員長の共同声明が出されております。この声明では、中心の合意は北朝鮮への安全の保証の提供を行うと。それに対して朝鮮半島の非核化の決意を示し、完全な非核化をするということで今のところ進んでおり、来年の初めに第 2 回目の首脳会談が予定されています。

今後の課題としては、この二つの問題、北朝鮮への安全の保証の提供、それと朝鮮半島の完全な非核化をどう実施していくかということになるわけで、これからの交渉において、そして米朝間の信頼関係を築きつつ、最終的な解決に至ることが期待されています。しかし、現実には、さまざまな困難や難問が存在しております。そういう意味で関係諸国の前向きな努力が必要ですし、特にまた NGO もこの点についても、国際的にも、あるいは各国においても平和解決に努力すべきであると考えております。これが現在の核をめぐる第 2 の問題ですね。

#6 第 3 の問題は「核不拡散条約の 50 周年」ということで、2020 年に条約発効から 50 年になります。そこで再検討会議も開かれます。核軍縮の現状は非常に厳しいものであって、実際には核兵器保有国は核軍備競争を続けておりますし、核兵器は近代化しており、そして米ロ間では INF 条約の違反が議論され、アメリカが条約から脱退する意思を表明しています。

もう一つの長期の課題としては、新 START 条約、これが延長するかどうか。そうでないと失効してしまうということ。あるいは新たな削減交渉を始めるのかということで、米ロの首脳会談が今度の G20 で開かれることになっているので、そこで議論されることになると思います。

それで第 2 の問題は、核兵器禁止条約をめぐる条約支持国と条約反対国が鋭く対立し、分裂状態が生じていることです。両者の間に懸け橋を築くことは、先ほどもありましたように日本政府も賢人会議の開催などをしてしておりますが、これは必要不可欠でありまして、これをどう進めていくかというのは非常に重要な問題です。これに関しても NGO はいろいろな知恵を働かせて、助けていくべきではないかと考えております。

最後に、2020 年の NPT 再検討会議の展望ですが、現在の状況が続くならば、私は、会議は失敗に終わるだろうと思いますし、核軍縮に向けての新たな進展も望み得ないのではないかと考えております。ですから、ここでは特に INF 条約の脱退をめぐるアメリカとロシアの間の交渉、あるいは和解、それから核兵器の役割の低減などの措置を核兵器国がどこまで取るかという形で具体的な成果が必要とされております。

#7 大きな 2 番目の問題に行きます。ここで「人道と安全保障」で、「人道」の後に「人類」と付けているのですが、そういうことをお話ししながら、それぞれのアプローチはどういうも

のか、人道的なアプローチと安全保障のアプローチはどう違うのか。それから2番目に、安全保障という概念は、最近ずっと非常に広がってきているわけです。それがどういう形になるのかということです。

そこでセキュリティとヒューマニティを合体させて、「人類の安全保障」、Security of Humanity というのが考えられるのかどうかという話をし、そして、こういう「人類の安全保障」というところを基本的な考えに取り入れるべきだという提案をさせていただきます。

#8 まず2-1ですが、「人道的アプローチと安全保障アプローチ」、これは伝統的にずっとあって、そこでまず人道的アプローチは、核兵器の使用は壊滅的な影響を与える。だからそこを中心に置いて、核兵器の廃絶を追求するもので、核兵器禁止条約はまさにその考え方ですね。

それで2015年のNPT再検討会議で、159の国による共同声明が出され、この人道的なアプローチを支持しています。次に、安全保障と人道の両方の側面を考慮すべきだという考え方は、2015年の再検討会議で、核の傘の下にある諸国により、26カ国共同声明として主張されています。日本政府はこの両方に賛成しています。そういう状況で、さらにもう一つ、核兵器国の立場は、安全保障が核軍縮の前提条件であるというもので、完全な安全保障アプローチです。伝統的な人道的アプローチと安全保障アプローチは、こういう形でそれぞれの国が主張しているというのが、1の問題であります。

#9 2の問題は、安全保障の概念は最近国際政治において拡大しており、その場合にどう考えていくべきかという問題です。まず伝統的には、非常に狭い意味での安全保障は、国家の軍事的な安全保障を意味してきました。ですから、国の安全を軍備によって守るという考え方です。しかし、最近の動きでは、垂直的には国家というナショナルのレベルからインターナショナル、国際的な安全保障、それがグローバルの安全保障という形で、上に広がっていています。

そして、下には人間の安全保障という形で広がっていています。それが垂直関係ですが、水平的には、今までは軍事的な安全保障だったのだけれども、今では環境安全保障、エネルギー安全保障、食糧安全保障、水安全保障、経済安全保障という形で、安全保障の概念が非常に拡大して用いられています。

これはどういうことかということ、国の軍事だけではなく、このような新しいさまざまな問題が、国の軍事と同じぐらい重要なのだと。だから、昔は軍事がハイポリティクスといわれて、ローポリティクスもありますが、それも今は安全保障の概念で語られています。

#10 そういう傾向を踏まえ、第3に、ここで私はセキュリティとヒューマニティを引っ掛けた形で「人間の安全保障」、それで新しい代替的な核軍縮の目的を設定したい。そして、人道的アプローチと安全保障アプローチを乗り越えて両者を合体させて、新たな目的は「人類の安全保障」ですね。これは日本語で聞いていると非常におかしいのだけれども、日本語では「人道」と「人類」は異なる言葉なのです。

けれども、英語のhumanityという言葉は「人道」の意味と「人類」の意味、両方の意味を持っているわけです。それで“Security of Humanity”というのは「人道的な安全保障」とい

う意味になります。この概念は、その内容は非常に協力的なものであって、全ての人、人類全体を含んで、人間の安全保障も重要なだけけれども、人間の安全保障は個々の人間をターゲットにしているわけです。けれども、核兵器が使われたら人類が減びるかもしれないという、人類を単位として考えるべきではないか。ちょうどこの会議が地球市民という集会であって、これは人類そのものでありますので、この会議のタイトルでも同じような考え方があると考えております。

#11 3 番目に、核兵器の廃絶へのアプローチに関するもので、二つあると先ほど申し上げましたが、一つは「核兵器に悪の烙印を押す」、stigmatize するのですね。もう一つは「核兵器を非正当化する」、delegitimize、この二つのアプローチはどういうものか、関係はどうかという話を順番にいたします。

#12 まず「核兵器に悪の烙印を押す」。これは人道的なアプローチで、それでオーストリアが行った人道の制約、ご存じだと思いますが、そこでは核兵器に悪の烙印を押す、禁止し、撤廃するという形で述べられております。

そしてまた、核兵器禁止条約がまさにこのアプローチを取っているわけであり、条約第1条では核兵器に関する活動が広く禁止されています。だから、これは核兵器の廃絶を直接規定するものではありませんけれども、核兵器は禁止すべきであるという法的規範の形成の大きな役割を果たしております。

#13 それで、2 番目の「核兵器を非正当化する」、delegitimize するということですが、これも核廃絶への人道的アプローチを基本というか、数年前に日本とオーストラリアが中心になって出した、「核不拡散・核軍縮に関する国際委員会（ICNND）」の報告書は2009年に出された提案です。

そしてもう一つは、ジェームズ・マーティン不拡散研究所の2010年の報告書で提案されています。内容は核兵器の役割の低下を進めることで、核兵器の削減、第一不使用、警戒態勢の低下あるいは解除などの措置が主張されております。それから、核抑止論への批判、それから核兵器の持つ正当性・価値・名声を減少させ剥奪するという内容の主張が、この非正当化の話になっております。

#14 3-3 で、それではこの二つのアプローチがどのように関係するのか、お互いに対立するのかという話です。比較検討してみると、両者の目的は核兵器の廃絶というところで、同一なのです。しかし、両者のそれぞれの核廃絶の理由、その手段、その有効性、また安全保障への考え方や核抑止に対する考えは異なります。

従って、両者のアプローチは具体的にはさまざま、異なる方法・手段を取るわけですが、目的が同一であるという点から考えて、両者は対立的、あるいは相互排除するものと考えてるのではなくて、補完的なものと考えてべきです。ですから、この二つのアプローチを同時に追求すべきです。それぞれのアプローチがあるわけですが、他を排除するのではなくて、核兵器廃絶

に向けてさまざまなアプローチが並行して追求されるべきであると考えています。

#15 今の話の結論に入りますが、今の三つの大きな話で、核兵器をめぐる現在の状況は、核兵器禁止条約の成立という非常に成果がある半面で、北朝鮮の核問題は進行中の重要な問題であり、核軍縮の進展に関しては全く楽観できない状況です。そういう意味でぜひ議論していただいて、NGOの一層の努力が必要であると思います。

そして2番目の核軍縮の推進に関しては、新たな概念として「人類の安全保障」という概念を基礎に置いて、人道的アプローチを基礎として地球市民の安全保障を考えるべきであると考えます。

そして核兵器のアプローチとしては、核兵器に悪の烙印を押すアプローチと、核兵器を非正当化するアプローチの両者を共に採用すべきで、両者の相乗的な効果を生み出すべきであろうと考えます。

ご清聴どうもありがとうございました。

## **Keynote Speech**

**Mitsuru Kurosawa**

**Professor, Osaka Jogakuin University**

**Founding President of the Japan Association of Disarmament Studies**

Thank you very much for kind introduction. I am Kurosawa of Osaka Jogakuin University.

(Slides are used below)

#1

I am also an advisor to Nagasaki University and I am a frequent visitor to Nagasaki.

It is a great honor to be nominated as a keynote speaker of such an important assembly today, and I am grateful for this opportunity and appreciate it. First of all, I would like to say thank you to the executive committee members chaired by Dr. Masao Tomonaga, and I would also like to thank Mr. Tomihisa Taue, Mayor of Nagasaki, and Mr. Houdou Nakamura, Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture, from the bottom of my heart.

#2

As for today's keynote speech, I will talk about three major themes. The first is the “Current Situation Surrounding Nuclear Weapons.” As other speakers have referred to so far, there are various problems moving, so I will touch on them. Secondly, I will broadly view the problem of “Humanity and Security” and talk about how to think about humanity and security. Thirdly, I will talk about “Two Approaches to Nuclear Abolition,” which contains the stigmatization now stated in the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a meaning of marking an evil brand on the nuclear weapons as one approach, and making nuclear weapons non-justifiable as the other approach. I will talk about a total of nine themes with three in each of three major themes, so please listen carefully with the

ordering in mind.

#3

Regarding the first major theme, the “Current Situation Surrounding Nuclear Weapons,” I will talk about three problems. The first is “the formation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” which has sometimes been referred to in the preceding speeches and is also taken as the sub-theme of this assembly. What is the meaning of this? Secondly, I talk about “North Korea's nuclear problem.” And thirdly, as there was talk of withdrawal from the NPT Treaty, in addition to this, I will talk about the entire nuclear disarmament of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

#4

Regarding 1-1, “the formation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” as I have mentioned it earlier, the treaty was adopted by a vote of 122 in favor, 1 against and 1 abstention at the General Assembly of the United Nations on July 7, 2017. It was opened for signature of the treaty on September 20 of the same year, and ICAN received the Nobel Peace Prize on October 6. ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize owing to its prominent work from the idea of the treaty to the adoption of the treaty.

There are 69 signatures by my latest information. Let me know if this is wrong. Nineteen states have ratified it, and ratification is gradually progressing, but it is necessary that 50 states ratify it for the Treaty to enter into force.

I understand that the formation of this treaty is an extremely large step towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. This is the execution of Article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and should be highly evaluated. Therefore, 1-1 shows the problem that NGOs should make further efforts from various aspects towards the early enforcement of this treaty.

#5

Next, 1-2 is “North Korea's nuclear problem,” and there is also a workshop for this. The summits between North and South Korea were held three times this year, and the “Panmunjom Declaration” was agreed on April 27, and the “Pyongyang Joint Declaration” was agreed between the leaders of North Korea and South Korea on September 19.

Meanwhile, the first summit was held between the United States and North Korea on June 12 in Singapore, and a joint statement between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un was issued. In this statement, the major agreement was to provide security guarantees with North Korea. For this, the determination to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula was expressed and it is understood that they are currently proceeding towards complete denuclearization, and the second summit is planned at the beginning of next year.

As a future task, there are two issues: the provision of guarantee of safety to North Korea, and how to implement the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Regarding the future negotiations, it is expected that while promoting trust between the United States and North Korea, final solutions will be brought about. However, in reality, there are various difficulties and challenges. In that sense, forward-looking efforts are required for the countries concerned, and especially in this regard, I think that NGOs should also make efforts for a peaceful solution internationally or in each country. This is the second problem surrounding the current nuclear issue.

#6

Regarding the third problem, 2020 will see the 50th year from when the treaty came into force, that is, the “50th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” A review meeting will be held. The current status of nuclear disarmament is very hard. In fact, nuclear-weapon states are continuing with nuclear armament races, nuclear weapons have been modernized, violations of the INF Treaty are discussed between the United States and Russia, and the United States has expressed its intention to withdraw from the treaty.

Another long-term task is whether the new START treaty is extended or not; otherwise, it will expire. Since the summit of the United States and Russia will be held at the next G20 on whether to start a new reduction negotiation or not, I think that will be discussed there.

So the second problem is that the treaty-supporting states and the treaty-opposing states are confronted sharply and divided over the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Although the Japanese government is holding the Group of Eminent Persons etc., as explained in the previous speech, it is indispensable to build a bridge between them, and how to progress this is an important issue. In this regard, I think that NGOs should help support the development by using their wisdom.

Finally, with respect to the prospect of the NPT Review Conference in 2020, if the current situation continues, I think that the conference will end in failure and we will not be able to hope for new progress towards nuclear disarmament. Therefore, concrete results are required here, especially for matters such as the negotiations or reconciliation between the United States and Russia over the withdrawal of the INF Treaty, and how far nuclear-weapon states take measures such as the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons.

#7

I will proceed to the major second problem. In “Humanity and Security”, I have attached “human beings” after the “Humanity.” While talking about such things, I also talk about what each approach is, and how the humanitarian approach is different from the security approach. Secondly, the concept of security has been expanding very much recently. We need to consider how it will be formed.

So I combine security and humanity to talk about whether we can think of “Security of Humanity

(human beings),” and I will make a suggestion that such the “Security of Humanity (human beings)” should be incorporated into the basic idea.

#8

First, regarding 2-1, there has traditionally been the “humanitarian approach and security approach.” From the viewpoint of the humanitarian approach, the use of nuclear weapons has a devastating effect. Centering on that, it pursues the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons just rides on that idea.

At the NPT Review Conference in 2015, a joint statement was issued by 159 states, supporting this humanitarian approach. Then, the idea that both security and humanitarian aspects should be considered was argued as a joint statement by the 26 states under the nuclear umbrella at the Review Conference in 2015. The Japanese government is in favor of both of them. Under such circumstances, another position is the one of nuclear-weapon states, where the security is a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament, a complete security approach. The problem of 1 is that the traditional humanitarian approach and the security approach are claimed by each country in this way.

#9

The problem of 2 is that the concept of security has recently expanded in international politics and how it should be understood in that case. Traditionally, security in a very narrow sense has meant the military security of the state. Therefore, it is the idea of defending the safety of the country by armaments. However, in recent developments, the idea is spreading vertically from the level of a nation state to international security and up to the form of global security.

And it is spreading downward in the form of human security. It is a vertical relationship. Horizontally, the concept of security had been of military security in the past; however, now it has expanded and used widely in the form of environmental security, energy security, food security, water security, and economic security.

This means that the military of the country is important, but various such new problems are as important as the military of the country. It was said in the past that military affairs were high politics. So, there was also low politics, which is now also told in the concept of security.

#10

Based on that trend, thirdly, here, I would like to set a new objective for alternative nuclear disarmament by “human security,” in the form of combining security with humanity. The humanitarian approach and security approach can be overcome, and both are united to form a new objective of “human security.” This is very funny when you are listening in Japanese, because “humanity” and “human beings” are different words in Japanese.

However, the word humanity in English has the meaning of both “humanity” and “human beings.”

So “Security of Humanity” means “humanitarian security.” This concept is very cooperative in its content, including all persons and human beings as a whole, and human security is also important, it is targeting individual human beings. However, should we think about human beings as a unit that may be ruined if nuclear weapons are used? This conference is an assembly called a global citizens’, which means human being itself, so I think that a similar idea is included in the title of this conference.

#11

Thirdly, regarding the approaches to the abolition of nuclear weapons, as I have mentioned earlier that there are two, one is to stigmatize nuclear weapons or “to mark an evil brand on them.” The other is to delegitimize nuclear weapons or “to make them unjustifiable.” I will talk about what these two approaches are and what the relationship is, in order.

#12

First, I talk about “marking an evil brand on nuclear weapons.” This is a humanitarian approach. I think that you know the humanitarian restrictions Austria has done, where they stated that nuclear weapons should be stigmatized, prohibited, and abolished.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is conforming exactly to this approach, and activities related to nuclear weapons are broadly prohibited in Article 1 of the Treaty. Therefore, although this does not directly regulate the abolition of nuclear weapons, it plays a major role in the formation of a legal norm that nuclear weapons should be prohibited.

#13

Next, regarding delegitimizing nuclear weapons or “making them unjustifiable,” this is also based on the humanitarian approach to nuclear abolition, which is the proposal in the report of the “International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND)” issued in 2009 and sponsored by Japan and Australia.

Another proposal was made in the 2010 report by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. In the report, they advocated measures such as the reduction of nuclear weapons, no first use, and lowering or releasing the alert situation, by promoting lowering the role of nuclear weapons. In addition, arguments for criticism against the nuclear deterrence theory, reducing and depriving the legitimacy, value and fame of nuclear weapons compose a story of making them unjustifiable.

#14

In 3-3, I talk about how these two approaches relate to each other and whether or not they conflict with each other. When comparing and examining them, the objective of abolishing nuclear weapons is the same. However, they are different in the reason for eliminating nuclear weapons, its means and effectiveness, the way of thinking about security and nuclear deterrence.

Therefore, although both approaches specifically take different methods and means, considering



from the point of view that the objectives are the same, you should consider them to be complementary, not to be confrontational or mutually exclusive. So, these two approaches should be pursued at the same time. Although each has its own approaches, I think that various approaches should be pursued in parallel for eliminating nuclear weapons, without excluding others.

#15

I will now conclude this talk. Based on the three major themes, while there is a very successful result of the formation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the current situation surrounding nuclear weapons does not allow us to be optimistic in terms of the progress of nuclear disarmament because the ongoing nuclear problem of North Korea is critical. In that sense, I think that more discussion is needed and NGOs are required to make further efforts.

Regarding the promotion of the nuclear disarmament of the second, I think that we should think about the security of global citizens on the basis of a humanitarian approach, based on a new concept of “human security.”

As for the approach to nuclear weapons, we should adopt both approaches to stigmatize nuclear weapons and to make nuclear weapons unjustifiable, producing their synergistic effects.

Thank you very much for your attention.

第6回核兵器廃絶—地球市民集会ナガサキ  
6th Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly  
for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

基調講演 黒澤 清  
大阪女学院大学 教授  
長崎大学核兵器廃絶研究センター 顧問  
Keynote Speech: Mitsuru Kurosawa  
Osaka Jogakuin University Professor  
Nagasaki University RECNA Advisor

講演の三つの内容  
Three Contents of the Speech

- 1 核兵器をめぐる現在の状況  
Current Circumstances surrounding Nuclear Weapons
- 2 人間(人類)と安全保障  
Humanity and Security
- 3 核廃絶への二つのアプローチ  
Two Approaches toward Nuclear Abolition

1 核兵器をめぐる現在の状況  
Current Circumstances surrounding  
Nuclear Weapons

- 1-1 核兵器禁止条約の成立  
Adoption of Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
- 1-2 北朝鮮の核問題  
Nuclear Issues of North Korea
- 1-3 NPTの50周年  
50th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

1-1 核兵器禁止条約の成立  
Adoption of Treaty on the Prohibition of  
Nuclear Weapons

- 2017.7.7 国連総会で賛成122, 反対1, 棄権1で採択  
adopted by 122-1-1 at the UN General Assembly
- 2017.9.20 条約の署名のための開放  
Treaty was open for Signature
- 2017.10.6 ICANにノーベル平和賞授与  
Nobel Peace Prize was given to ICAN
- 条約の署名69国、批准19国（発効には50国が必要）  
signature 69, ratification 19 (50 needed for EIF)
- 核兵器廃絶への大きな前進。NPT第6条の履行である  
big step for nuclear abolition, implementation of Art.6 of NPT

1-2 北朝鮮の核問題  
Nuclear Issues of North Korea

- 南北首脳会談 Inter-Korean Summit  
2018.4.27 板門店宣言 Panmunjom Declaration  
2018.5.18 平壤共同宣言 Pyongyang Joint Declaration
- 米朝会談 US-DMK Summit  
2018.8.22 トランプ大統領と金正恩委員長の間接会談  
Joint Statement of President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un at the Singapore Summit
- 北朝鮮への安全の保証の提供  
Provision of security assurances to DPRK
- 朝鮮半島の完全な非核化  
Complete denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

1-3 核兵器不拡散条約の50周年  
50th Anniversary of the NPT

- 核軍備競争、近代化、INF条約からの撤退  
Nuclear Arms Race, Modernization, Withdrawal from INF  
新START条約の延長、新たな交渉  
Extension of New START, New Negotiation
- 核兵器禁止条約をめぐる対立と分裂  
Prohibition Treaty: Confrontation and Division  
両者の間の懸け橋 Building Bridge
- 2020年NPT再検討会議の展望  
2020 NPT Review Conference: Prospect

## 2 人道(人類)と安全保障 Humanity and Security

- 2-1 人道的アプローチと安全保障アプローチ  
Humanitarian Approach and Security Approach
- 2-2 安全保障概念の拡大  
Expansion of the Concept of Security
- 2-3 人類の安全保障  
Security of Humanity

### 2-1 人道的および安全保障アプローチ Humanitarian and Security Approaches

- 人道的アプローチ Humanitarian Approach  
核兵器禁止条約、159カ国共同声明(2015)  
Prohibition Treaty, 159 State Joint Statement(2015)
- 安全保障および人道的の両方の次元  
Security and Humanitarian Dimension  
26カ国共同声明(2015)、核兵器依存国  
26 State Joint Statement(2015), Nuclear dependent states
- 安全保障が核軍縮の前提条件 核兵器廃絶  
Security is the precondition for nuclear disarmament

### 2-2 安全保障概念の拡大 Expansion of the Concept of Security

- 伝統的概念 国家の軍事的な安全保障  
Traditional one: National and Military Security
- 垂直的拡大: 国際的、グローバルな、人間的  
Vertical expansion: international, global, human
- 水平的拡大: 環境、エネルギー、食糧、水、経済  
Horizontal: environment, energy, food, water, economy

### 2-3 人類の安全保障 Security of Humanity

- 伝統的な核軍縮の目的: 国家間の戦略的安定、対立的  
Traditional purpose of nuclear disarmament  
Strategic stability among states, confrontational
- 新たな代替的な核軍縮の目的: 人類の安全保障  
New and alternative purpose of nuclear disarmament  
Security of Humanity (human race, human kind)  
人道的アプローチ Humanitarian approach  
協力的かつ包括的 Cooperative and inclusive

## 3 核廃絶への二つのアプローチ Two Approaches toward Nuclear Abolition

- 3-1 核兵器に悪の烙印を押す  
Stigmatizing Nuclear Weapons
- 3-2 核兵器を非正当化する  
Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons
- 3-3 二つのアプローチの関係  
Relations between the Two Approaches

### 3-1 核兵器に悪の烙印を押す Stigmatizing Nuclear Weapons

- 核廃絶への人道的アプローチ  
Humanitarian Approach to Nuclear Abolition
- 人道の誓約 核兵器に悪の烙印を押し、禁止し、廃絶する  
Humanitarian Pledge: stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate
- 核兵器禁止条約 Prohibition Treaty  
核兵器に関連する活動の禁止  
Prohibition of nuclear weapon-related activities  
核兵器禁止に関する法的規範の作成  
Legal norm against nuclear weapons

### 3-2 核兵器を非正当化する Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons

- 核不拡散核軍縮国際委員会の報告書 2009  
International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), Report 2009
- ジェームズ・マーティン不拡散研究所の報告書 2010  
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report, 2010
- 核兵器の役割の低下、削減、第一不使用、警戒態勢低下・解除  
Reduction of the Role of Nuclear Weapons  
核抑止論の批判、正当性、価値、名声を減少、攻撃する  
Criticize Nuclear deterrence, legitimacy, value, prestige

### 3-3 二つのアプローチの関係 Relations between the Two Approaches

- 両者の目的は、核兵器の廃絶であり同じである  
Purpose which is nuclear abolition is the same
- 両者の核廃絶の理由、その手段、その有効性、安全保障の考え、核廃止に対する考えは異なる  
Their Reasons for, means to, and effectiveness to nuclear abolition differ, and their understanding of security and nuclear deterrence differ
- 両者は対立し、相互排他的なものではなく、補完的なものである  
They are neither confrontational nor mutually exclusive, but complementary

## 4 結 論 Conclusion

- 核兵器をめぐる現在の状況  
Current Circumstances surrounding Nuclear Weapons  
核兵器禁止条約、北朝鮮、NPT50年、INF脱退  
Prohibition Treaty, North Korea, 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of NPT
- 人道(人類)と安全保障 Humanity and Security  
人類の安全保障 Security of Humanity
- 核廃絶へのアプローチ Approaches toward Nuclear Abolition  
悪の烙印を押す、非正当化する Stigmatize, Delegitimize

## 分科会 1

### 朝鮮半島の平和と非核化の進展 北東アジアの核なき未来

#### Workshop I

#### Progress in peace talks and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula –the future of Northeast Asia without nuclear weapons

##### コーディネーター Coordinators

梅林 宏道 Hiromichi Umebayashi	日本：NPO 法人ピースデポ特別顧問、長崎大学 RECNA 客員教授 Japan, Special Advisor, Peace Depot and Visiting Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition Nagasaki University (RECNA)
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##### パネリスト Panelists

ピーター・ヘイズ Peter Hayes	アメリカ：ノーチラス研究所所長 USA, Director, Nautilus Institute
シェン・デンリー Shen Dingli	中国：復旦大学国際問題研究院副院長(教授) China, Professor, Institute of International studies, Fudan University
アントン・フロプコフ Anton Khlopkov	ロシア：エネルギー安全保障研究センター (CENESS) センター長 Russia, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies(CENESS)
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ジャルガルサイハン・ エンクサイハン Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan	モンゴル：ブルーバナー (NGO) 会長、元モンゴル国連大使 Mongolia, Chairman of Blue Banner(NGO), Former Mongolian Ambassador of United Nations
イ・テホ Tae-Ho Lee	韓国：参与連帯政策委員会委員長 Korea, Chairman, Policy Committee of People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD)
鈴木 達治郎 Tatsujiro Suzuki	日本：長崎大学 RECNA センター長 Japan, Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)

「朝鮮半島の非核化から北東アジア非核兵器地帯へ：この機会を逃すな」

## **Towards Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ): Don't Miss This Opportunity**

長崎大学核兵器廃絶研究センター（RECNA）センター長

**Japan, Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)**

鈴木達治郎

**Tatsujiro Suzuki**



### 概要

2018年4月29日の南北首脳会談、そしてこれに続く6月12日の米朝首脳会談は、朝鮮半島の平和と非核化に向けて、大きな歴史的転換点となった。しかし、それ以降の米朝交渉が遅延として進まないことから、非核化交渉の行方に懸念が表明されるようになった。一方、南北首脳は9月19日に3回目の会談を終え、事実上の朝鮮戦争終了と非核化に向けての具体的措置を公表して、さらなる前進を見せた。日本をはじめ、周辺諸国は、この動きを逆戻りさせることなく、朝鮮半島の非核化を実現させ、その流れに沿って日本も加えた「北東アジア非核兵器地帯」の設立を目指す絶好の機会ととらえるべきだ。「非核兵器地帯」がもたらす「核兵器国による非核兵器国への核攻撃・威嚇の禁止（消極的安全保証）」と「非核化の検証措置制度化」が最も重要な要素であり、これにより「核抑止（核の傘）」に依存しない安全保障の確立に大きく近づくことができる。さらに、通常兵器を含めた軍縮や他の安全保障問題を議論できる「北東アジア安全保障会議」（仮称）の設置に合意することで、北東アジアの平和と安定に向けた「平和の制度化」が実現することとなる。日本をはじめ周辺諸国はこの絶好の機会をとらえて、北東アジアの非核化と平和に全力で取り組むべきだ。

### 南北首脳会談と米朝首脳会談のもたらす意義

平昌オリンピックを契機に大きく動き出した南北対話は、4月29日の「板門店宣言」、そして第3回目の首脳会談後の「9月平壤共同宣言」と、着実に進展してきた。「板門店宣言」では、「朝鮮半島の非核化」と「朝鮮戦争の終結」を柱に、13項目について合意し、特に双方による「一切の敵対行為の全面停止」を通じて、緊張緩和と信頼醸成に大きな進展があった。一方で「朝鮮半島の非核化」については具体的道筋が見えない点が課題として残されていた<sup>1</sup>。「9月平壤共同宣言」では、事実上の「朝鮮戦争終結宣言」ともいえる「板門店宣言の

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<sup>1</sup> RECNA, 「『南北朝鮮首脳会談と板門店宣言』に関する見解」、2018年5月1日。

<http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/eyes/no13-jp>

履行に向けた軍事分野合意書」に署名し、陸海空におちて軍事的な緊張につながる敵対行為を中止し、軍事境界線一帯での大規模な演習や兵力の増強なども中止することに合意したことは、朝鮮半島の緊張緩和に大きく貢献すると期待される。また、トンチャンリ（東倉里）のミサイル発射台とエンジン試験場を関係国専門家の立ち合いの下で永久廃棄すること、ヨンビョン（寧辺）の核施設は「米国が相応の措置をとれば」という条件付きではあるが、永久廃棄に応じる考えがあること、などを明言した。このように、ミサイル並びに核施設の廃棄について、具体的な措置に言及したことは一歩前進と評価できる<sup>2</sup>。

少しさかのぼるが、6月12日の米朝首脳会談による共同声明は、どう評価できるだろうか。4つの宣言内容の中で、1）米国と北朝鮮は、平和と繁栄を求める両国民の希望通りに、新たな米朝関係の構築に向けて取り組む 2）米国と北朝鮮は、朝鮮半島での恒久的で安定的な平和体制の構築に向け、力を合わせる、の2点は、昨年未まで核のボタンを押す勢いでいがみ合っていた両国が、外交により朝鮮半島の恒久的な平和を目指すことに合意したことは極めて重要な意義を持つ。さらに、「板門店宣言」の内容を確認したということは、朝鮮半島の非核化にも合意したということであり、初めての首脳会談としては、まず共通目標に合意したことが大きな意義として挙げられる<sup>3</sup>。

しかし、このような意義ある共同声明も、今後実のある成果が少しずつでも出てこない、と、再び不信の逆連鎖に戻ってしまう恐れがある。これまでの対話の成果を無駄にしないためにも、性急な結果をもとめることなく、かつ着実に段階的な成果を相互に出し続けていくことが極めて重要だ。

#### 大きな課題：検証措置と平和の制度化

北朝鮮の非核化を一気に成し遂げようとする要求は現実的ではないが、非核化へのコミットメントを段階ごとに検証していくことが、相互の信頼関係を醸成していくうえでも、また国際社会に対する信頼確保の面でも、きわめて重要である。今のところ、ミサイルについては一部「関係国専門家の立ち合い」という表現が使われているものの、「検証措置」については、一切触れられていない。確かに、核兵器を保有した国の「非核化」を検証する国際的な制度はまだ存在しない。

米ロ間の核軍縮交渉で、検証措置の義務付けを明文化したのが、現在話題となっているINF（中距離核戦力）全廃条約であった。特に、相互の現地査察を取り入れるなど、今回の北朝鮮の非核化検証措置にも参考になると思われる。というのも、国際原子力機関（IAEA）の保障措置も当然ながら重要な役割を演じることになるが、核兵器に係る機微な情報が伝わる可能性のある核兵器の解体作業などについては、IAEAの査察では限界がある。核兵器国が参

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<sup>2</sup> RECNA, 「『9月平壤共同宣言』についてのRECNA見解」、2018年9月20日。

<http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/eyes/no15>

<sup>3</sup> RECNA, 「『米朝首脳会談と共同声明』に関する見解」、2018年6月13日。

<http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/eyes/no14>

加した検証措置とする必要性がどうしても出てくるだろう。

また、北朝鮮だけではなく「朝鮮半島の非核化」ということになると、韓国における「非核化」についても検証措置が必要となる。例えば、ブラジル・アルゼンチン核物質計量管理機関（ABACC）のように、地域における相互査察制度なども参考になるかもしれない。

いずれにせよ、一度核保有した国の「非核化」の検証は、新たな国際的枠組み（制度）を必要としており、この制度化に成功すれば、「核兵器禁止条約」の検証制度を議論する際にも非常に参考になると思われる。

一方、「平和の制度化」については、米国の動きが鈍い。「朝鮮戦争の終結宣言」については、上記のように南北朝鮮の間で事実上の戦争状態が終結する方向で実質的な進展を見ているが、米国側からは現時点では一步も進んだ形跡がない。これでは、せっかくの米朝共同声明の価値が薄れてしまう。北朝鮮の非核化を進めるのと同時に、朝鮮戦争の終結に向けて、米国側から具体的な政策を見せることが必要である。軍事的緊張を緩和する行動や、経済制裁の緩和も含めて、朝鮮戦争の終結にむけての動きを進めていくことが重要であり、この点で朝鮮戦争に関与してきた周辺諸国も同様に戦争終結に向けての動きを進めていくことが必要だ。将来的には、米朝関係だけではなく、地域全体の安全保障を向上させる枠組みを構築するなど、「平和の制度化」を目指すことが望まれる。

#### 朝鮮半島の非核化から「北東アジア非核兵器地帯」設立へ

朝鮮半島（韓国・北朝鮮）の非核化について、実現の見通しが立ち、それに伴う制度化が進んでいけば、「朝鮮半島非核兵器地帯」の実現も決して不可能ではなくなる。「非核兵器地帯」の重要な要件の一つが、「消極的安全保証」、すなわち「核保有国が非核保有国に対し、核兵器での攻撃や威嚇を行わないこと」を法的拘束力をもって担保することである。北朝鮮が米国に求めているのもまさにこの点であり、ここが非核化の交渉の時点で、担保されないと、核兵器をあきらめることはしないだろう。もう一つの要件が「検証措置の制度化」であり、これは上記のように当然のことながら制度化されていなければ非核化は進まない。ということは、朝鮮半島の非核化は、米国・中国・ロシア・北朝鮮・韓国の5か国による「朝鮮半島非核兵器地帯」につなげていくことが可能となる。

RECNA が 2015 年に提唱した「北東アジア非核兵器地帯設立への包括的アプローチ」は、梅林宏道教授が提唱した「3 プラス 3」（北朝鮮、韓国、日本が非核兵器地帯、周辺の米国、ロシア、中国がその 3 か国に消極的安全保証を与える）の構想と、モートン・ハルペリン博士が提唱した「非核化を含めた北東アジアの包括的安全保障へのアプローチ」提言に基づいている<sup>4</sup>。朝鮮半島の非核化と朝鮮戦争の終結は、まさにその包括的アプローチの提言に沿ったものである。そして「非核兵器地帯化」が実現する見通しが立つのであれば、これに日本が参加することで、「3 プラス 3」は十分に実現可能と考えられる。逆に日本が参加しないと、

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<sup>4</sup> 長崎大学核兵器廃絶研究センター、「提言：北東アジア非核兵器地帯設立への包括的アプローチ」、2015 年 3 月。[http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal\\_J\\_honbun.pdf](http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/bd/files/Proposal_J_honbun.pdf)



在韓米軍の非核化検証の際、在日米軍が隠れ蓑になる恐れがある。となると、北朝鮮が朝鮮半島の非核化だけで満足しない恐れも出てくる。さらに、プルトニウムを大量に抱え、「潜在的核能力」の維持を公言する政治家もいるなか、日本に対する核武装への懸念もまた顕在化する恐れがある。

日本にとって、非核化プロセスへの不参加は単に現状維持ではなく、国際関係上も負の影響をもたらすことになる。逆に参加することで、日本は中・ロシア・北朝鮮からの脅威を理由とする「核の傘」から脱却することができる。そして、さらに「核兵器禁止条約」にも参加することができるのである。これこそが、被爆国日本がとるべき政策であり、この実現に向けて、全力を注ぐことが今求められているのだ。

**Towards Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ): Don't Miss This Opportunity**  
**北東アジア非核兵器地帯にむけて: この機会を逃すな**

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<http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja>



**「核の悪夢」から「歴史的対話」へ**  
**Nuclear Nightmare to Historic Dialogue**

 → 

2016年5月28日号 表紙  
<http://www.economist.com/archive/2016-05-28>

2018年6月16日号 表紙  
<http://www.economist.com/archive/2018-06-16>



**Historic Panmunjom Declaration (2018/04/27)**  
**RECNA Statement (2018/05/01)**  
**歴史的南北首脳会談の意義**

- End of Korean War and "Denuclearization": Specific steps need to be clarified.**  
 ・朝鮮戦争の終結と「非核化」の具体的な道筋が大きな焦点
- Early establishment of multilateral dialogue and Normalization of Japan-DPRK relationship**  
 ・朝鮮戦争の終結と「非核化」の具体的な道筋が大きな焦点
- Establishment of "crisis management" system between US and DPRK**  
 米朝でも危機管理システムの構築・維持を



Photo: Asahi Shimbun, "With Stars", 2018/04/27  
[http://www.asahi.com/photo/2018/04/27/star/2018042701011\\_1.jpg](http://www.asahi.com/photo/2018/04/27/star/2018042701011_1.jpg)

[http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/20180501011\\_1.jpg](http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/20180501011_1.jpg) [in Japanese]



**第3回南北首脳会談「9月平壤共同宣言」**  
**(2018/09/19) RECNA見解**  
**RECNA Statement on Pyongyang Declaration**

- 事実上の朝鮮戦争終結につながる合意**  
 ・ Agree to terminate the Korean War [in effect]
- ミサイル、非核化: 注目すべき成果と課題**  
 ・ North clarifies its intention to dismantle missile base/testing facilities in Yongbyon under international supervision and to dismantle nuclear related facilities in Yongbyon if US take appropriate measures.  
 ・ トンチンリ(東倉里)のミサイル発射台とエンジン試験場を関係国専門家の立ち会いの下で永久廃棄すると北朝鮮が明言したこと  
 ・ ヨンピョン(寧辺)の核施設については、「米朝が米朝共同声明の精神に沿い、相応の措置を取れば」、永久廃棄に足る考えがあること
- 米朝や他国の対応が課題**  
 ・ Need US and other countries' actions to move forward  
 ・ 実現のためには非核化合意の進展に応じて、北朝鮮に対する制裁措置の段階的な緩和も必要だろう。  
 ・ 朝鮮戦争の正式な終結と、ポスト冷戦時代における北東アジアの平和と安定のシステムづくりへ向けて、国際社会がどのように協力していけるかが重要な課題である。

[http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/20180919011\\_1.jpg](http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/20180919011_1.jpg)



**Historic Joint Statement by US and DPRK (2018/06/12)**  
**RECNA Statement (2018/06/13)**  
**歴史的米朝共同声明の意義**

- A Golden Opportunity to bring peace and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. Process should be made as "irreversible" one. Two important points:  
 ・ 千載一遇の好機

- Institutionalize Denuclearization Process 「非核化の制度化」**  
 ・ Step by step approach with reliable "verification" system to build trust 段階的な検証制度  
 ・ Each step should be an "irreversible" one 不可逆的
- Institutionalize peace process 「平和の制度化」**  
 ・ All related countries must join to establish peace regime in the region.  
 ・ 関係諸国が参加して、平和条約をめざすべき



Photo: Asahi Shimbun, "2018/06/13" [http://www.asahi.com/photo/2018/06/13/20180613011\\_1.jpg](http://www.asahi.com/photo/2018/06/13/20180613011_1.jpg)

[http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/20180613011\\_1.jpg](http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/20180613011_1.jpg) [in Japanese]



**朝鮮半島の非核化から北東アジア非核兵器地帯へ: 包括的アプローチ**

**A Comprehensive Approach towards a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ)**



[http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/Proposal\\_1.pdf](http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/jpn/ja/Proposal_1.pdf)



# "Comprehensive Framework Agreement(CFA) for the Denuclearization of Northeast Asia"

北東アジア非核兵器地帯設立への包括的アプローチ  
(2015年3月)

1. Declare to terminate the Korean War and provide for mutual non-aggression, friendship, and equal sovereignty among CFA state parties. 朝鮮戦争の戦争状態の終結を宣言
2. Assure equal rights to access all forms of energy including nuclear energy. エネルギーにアクセスする平等の権利
  - Establish a Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation Committee
3. Agree on a treaty to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ). 北東アジア非核兵器地帯条約締結
  - Obligated to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, while protect the right of signatory states for peaceful space exploration
4. Establish a permanent Northeast Asia Security Council 常設の北東アジア安全保障協議会を設置
  - To ensure implementation of the CFA and to serve as a platform for discussions involving various NEA security issues.



# NEA-NWFZ with Three plus Three Structure 「3+3」による北東アジア非核兵器地帯構想



A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ),  
A Possible Answer

## 非核兵器地帯は有力な選択肢

Three Basic Elements of A NWFZ (UNGA Res 3472 B, 1975)

### 非核兵器地帯の3つの重要な要素

1. Total Absence of Nuclear Weapons 核兵器が排除される
2. Establishment of International (Regional) System of Verification and Control 法的拘束力のある検証措置
3. Obligation of NWS to Provide Negative Security Assurances (NSA) 核兵器国による非核兵器国に対する核攻撃や威嚇を行わないことの義務付け (「消極的安全保証」(NSA)の供与)

A Regional Security System without  
depending upon Nuclear Weapons  
核の傘に頼らない安全保障の枠組み



## What should Japan do? 日本はどうする？

- "Korean Peninsular Nuclear Weapon Free Zone" is now considered very feasible.  
「朝鮮半島非核兵器地帯化」は十分に実現可能
- Then, if Japan does not join the NWFZ, what would happen?  
そうならば、もし日本が非核兵器地帯の参加しなければどうなるか？
  - Japan can be a cover for de-nuclearization of Korean Peninsular 在韓米軍の非核化検証の際、在日米軍が隠れ蓑になる。
  - With large plutonium stockpile, Japan's latent nuclear capability will become international concern more 日本の「潜在的核能力」への懸念が増す(プルトニウムの在庫量)
- Japan should support NWFZ concept and take initiatives to promote NEA-NWFZ, and shift its security policy to the one without dependent on nuclear umbrella
  - 日本は当然この非核兵器地帯構想を支持し、北東アジア非核兵器地帯にむけてイニシアティブをとるべき。そして、「核の傘」に頼らない安全保障政策に転換すべき。





## ENDING THE KOREAN WAR AND DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA:

Peter Hayes

Director, Nautilus Institute, Berkeley California

Professor Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University



Paper delivered to

Panel on Peace Building and Provision for Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

Nuclear Weapon-free Future of the North East Asia

Nagasaki Peace Hall November 16, 2018

At 6<sup>th</sup> Nagasaki Global Citizens Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

### Summary

This paper examines the changes swirling around and within the Korean peninsula that raise the possibility that not only the Korean peninsula but much of Northeast Asia could become nuclear weapons-free in the near future. The essay traces how this sudden shift from apparent high tension and the risk of war and even nuclear war emerged from a conjuncture of disparate trends that created political space for inter-Korean dialogue and US-DPRK presidential summitry. Moreover, the prospective actual reduction of military threat in inter-Korean relations could reduce hostility between the two Koreas, as well as between the United States and the DPRK, paving the way for removal of nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula. The possibility that the DPRK may actually dismantle and abandon nuclear weapons also poses a challenge to the great powers as to what regional security framework should be constructed. Ironically, these developments put the two Koreas in the driving seat, pushing the United States and China to come to terms with each other to bring about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. A critically important choice for the two Koreas is what institutional framework would be most robust to implement their nuclear free commitments. A fusion of a bilateral Korea-only with a full-fledged multilateral nuclear weapons-free zone is proposed as a way to move forward without encountering insurmountable geo-strategic obstacles. Many things can go wrong; but the author is optimistic that the two Koreas may substitute their combined efforts for American leadership, given that it is no longer capable of performing as an authoritative hegemon, and navigate their way to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue in the peninsula, thereby setting in motion the reduction of nuclear threat in the entire region.

### I. INTRODUCTION

Today we are closer than ever before to ending the Korean War. Doing so will open a new era based not on the absence of war due to the threat of military force and potentially mutual annihilation but

instead, a positive peace, based on constructive engagement that leads to increased communication, cooperation, and collaboration between former enemies in the Korean Peninsula.

We have arrived at this historic moment because of the passage of time. International legal scholars have argued that an armistice maintained long enough is not only a suspension of hostilities but may become the equivalent of a peace agreement despite there being no proclamation ending the war. It follows that the Korean War is no longer legally in effect, although the ensuing peace is cold and in many respects a negative peace sustained by deterrence and military threat not a positive peace based on reassurance and cooperation.

Moreover, one of the primary antagonists in the Korean War, the United States, suggests today that it would only act in self-defense in response to a North Korean attack, which is consistent with a form of “peace” existing as the status quo. A state could not justify going to war in Korea solely on a pre-existing state of technical war under the Armistice. Thus, a new decision based on actual imminent threats, and the military necessity and proportionality of the self-defense measures taken under article 51 of the UN Charter, would be needed by any party to resume the Korean War.

It is not difficult to formally end the Korean War. A political declaration suffices. A formal treaty with all the domestic implementation problems it would face in different countries is not legally necessary. And, continuation of the Armistice can be exploited to amend the role of UN Command so that it can facilitate inter-Korean conventional military arms control and disarmament measures, including mobilizing UNC allies to support this process for as long as judged desirable the two Koreas and the United States.<sup>5</sup>

This melting of the Korean glacier is due to the conjuncture of four disconnected trends. These are:

- I. The emergence of a “Kim Jong Un era” in the DPRK, including a) the consolidation of his power in the DPRK; b) his acquisition of sufficient nuclear weapons capacity to demonstrate his capacity to project credible nuclear threat at least to South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and parts of the United States, especially Guam and Alaska; and c) his conclusion that the DPRK must henceforth focus on economic reconstruction.
2. The rise of a progressive and pragmatic ROK leadership of President Moon Jae-In based on an extraordinary popular uprising against the corrupt and regressive presidency of Park Geun-Hye; and the amazingly skillful use of diplomacy combined with immense political courage in actively pursuing inter-Korean relationship building at many levels simultaneously while remaining in step with the United States.

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<sup>5</sup> The above analysis benefited from advice from former Judge Advocate General of Canada’s armed forces, Kenneth Watkins, email October 31, 2017. See also Patrick M. Norton, “NAPSNet Policy Forum Online #2 — Norton, “Ending the Korean Armistice””, NAPSNet Policy Forum, March 29, 1997, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/napsnet-policy-forum-online-2-norton-ending-the-korean-armistice/>

3. The increasing domestic pressure on US President Donald Trump and his personal instinct that he can deal with Kim Jong Un and achieve a foreign policy success while escalating to an ultra-hard line against Iran, thereby appealing to different sections of his base in the pending US presidential race.
4. China and Russia's disinclination to allow the United States to reassert its dominance in Northeast Asia by being the sole great power with effective influence over the two Koreas, thereby lending both Koreas effective leverage over their great power allies or partners.

A successful outcome—defined as the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—is not pre-ordained. Many things may go awry in one of more of these four driving force-fields that blocks ultimate realization of a peaceful and constructive outcome. It is even possible that missteps by these parties, especially by one or both of the two Koreas, may lead to resumed high tension and even kinetic conflict. However, what is most important is that the two Koreas are now firmly in control of this agenda; and while the external players retain enormous influence over their choices, neither Korea is obliged to accept external veto-power over their choice between peace and war, and nuclear-armed versus non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula.

Thus, for the first time in history, the two Koreas may come to terms with each other, making it impossible for third parties, including the United States to go to war in Korea.

This fact fundamentally transforms the meaning of nuclear threat in the Korean context; and makes it possible to envision regional security frameworks that facilitate the reduction of use of nuclear threat in relationships between the other nuclear and non-nuclear armed great powers in the region.

## II. NUCLEAR-FREE KOREAN PENINSULA

Today, the nuclear weapons of four states bear directly on the Korean Peninsula, namely, those of the DPRK, the United States, China, and Russia. Each of these relationships is nuclear-prone, either directly via a conflict relationship, or indirectly, via an American ally to which the United States extends nuclear deterrence—that is, to the ROK, Japan, and possibly Taiwan.

These conflict relationships are not simply dyadic, as they were for the most part during the Cold War when only a global strategic triangle involving the United States, China, and Russia was in play. Rather, each potential conflict directly or indirectly involves more than one nuclear weapons state, making the nuclear threat relationships and potential nuclear wars truels, or even quadruels. Thus, a US-DPRK nuclear war might also involve China or Russia; a Chinese-American nuclear war might also involve North Korea or Russia or both; and so on.

In this condition, nuclear weapons do not contribute to “stability,” there being no definition of strategic stability in a three or four-way nuclear standoff. Instead, the region is now afflicted by a high degree of strategic uncertainty and unpredictability—the more so since Japan now exerts its own peculiar form of nuclear threat in the form of its “technological deterrent,” and non-state actors are also potential entrants into the nuclear threat business.

At the same time, the United States has abdicated its nuclear hegemonic role, and the state of strategic deterrence is now one of flux and potentially based on *ad hoc* coalitions rather than long-term institutionalized alliances. The nuclear weapons states are all modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces, both globally, and within this region—including offshore and underwater, as well as expanding their nuclear-related infrastructure for command, control, communications and intelligence into space (the DPRK being the sole exception, reliant as it is on home-based national technical means). The global nuclear non-proliferation regime is under stress, with the NPT unravelling and under tremendous pressure from the nuclear prohibition treaty states—including many in the Asia-Pacific region—as well as internally fissured by the adamant rejection by the nuclear weapons states of obligation to disarm their nuclear weapons in a meaningful time horizon and the near-collapse of the nuclear power industry as a political-economic basis for non-nuclear weapons states to comply with the NPT regime.

In this nuclear dystopia, the adoption by the DPRK of a missile and nuclear test freeze and by the United States of a freeze on major US-ROK military exercise in the Korean peninsula was the first major step against this set of negative trends. Of course, as is well known, it is but the first step of perhaps fifty discrete steps that the DPRK, the United States, and the ROK must take to achieve a fully denuclearized—or nuclear weapons and threat-free—Korean peninsula.

A serious roadmap suggests that full denuclearization of the DPRK’s nascent nuclear force will take close to a decade, possibly longer.<sup>6</sup> There are many possible next steps. The DPRK itself has suggested that it might dismantle the Yongbyon facilities which would not only shutdown production and reprocessing of plutonium—the backbone of its nuclear weapons program—but also the facilities making long-range missiles, that is, missiles able to reach the United States. The former would be a major step in that this facility not only makes it possible to produce about one warhead’s

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<sup>6</sup> See Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Thomas Pickering, Leon Sigal, "GENERAL ROADMAP AND WORK PLAN FOR NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH NORTH KOREA", NAPSNet Special Reports, April 10, 2018, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/general-roadmap-and-work-plan-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-north-korea/> For a similar conclusion reached using a different method, see S. Hecker, R. Carlin, E. Serbin, “A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM,” May 30, 2018 at: <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/content/cisac-north-korea>

worth of plutonium a year in the thermal reactor at that site, but also hosts a range of other facilities that are essential to the production of thermonuclear weapons, especially of tritium.

Further down the path would be the declaration of the number and type of nuclear warheads built by the DPRK and a full inventory of fissile material for eventual verification, leading to the ultimate dismantlement and removal of these items and the return of the DPRK to the NPT-IAEA safeguards regime.

Assuming that some such sequencing of separate but simultaneous steps above are taken in tandem with US moves to lighten sanctions and establish diplomatic, humanitarian, cultural, and political ties is possible, in turn leading to major political progress in US-DPRK relations on the “peace front” by Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump at a second summit in 2019, what are the strategic choices to be made with regard to denuclearization?

The most important choice is whether the two Koreas opt for a renewed political denuclearization declaration that surpasses the 1992 declaration but like it, is only a political agreement; or instead, if they attempt to create a region-wide nuclear weapons-free zone following the precedents of such zones in many other regions, with the institutional constructs that are needed to implement such a zone.<sup>7</sup>

In principle, a bilateral-only zone has many advantages. Most important, it can be negotiated between only two states—the DPRK and the ROK—and would not require other states to be party to its scope or jurisdiction, although it would certainly call on the United States to provide the DPRK with negative security assurances that it would not attack the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons unless it or its allies were so attacked first. Such a negotiation can be done quickly, and once signed by the two Koreas, would become a fait accompli.

However, such a declaration would have limited force of law, for three reasons. First, it would not be following in the footsteps of the states in creating regional nuclear weapons free zones using the standard UN NWFZ treaty format.<sup>8</sup> Thus, it would forego contributing to or benefiting from

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<sup>7</sup> For an expanded analysis of the three pathways for a Korean nuclear-weapons free status, see Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Leon Sigal, "A KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE TREATY AND NUCLEAR EXTENDED DETERRENCE: OPTIONS FOR DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA", NAPSNet Special Reports, April 12, 2018, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-korean-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-treaty-and-nuclear-extended-deterrence-options-for-denuclearizing-the-korean-peninsula/>

<sup>8</sup> Ji-hyun Lee, “Assessing the idea of South Korea being a virtual NWFZ since the 1992 Joint Declaration for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” Nautilus Institute research workshop “Strong connections: Australia-Korea strategic relations – past, present and future” Seoul, 15-16 June, 2010, at: <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Lee-JI-hyun.pdf>

customary state practice in how such zones operate. Second, unless the two Koreas gave up their claims to be sovereign over the entire Korean peninsula at the same time, neither state will attribute a legally binding character to a mere declaration, given the implications that doing so would have in other domains. Third, it would not create a legally binding commitment from nuclear weapons states to guarantee that they would not attack the non-nuclear states that are party to such a declaration, only a political commitment to do so from the United States—and one that can be reversed overnight by a US president, or by a new president committed to overturning the policies of his or her predecessor. Thus, just as the 1992 denuclearization declaration failed quickly and was never verified by either party, a new bilateral political declaration is unlikely to provide sufficient support to even stand up, let alone carry the weight of the political and institutional requirements to effect the denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula in an irreversible, enduring manner.

The second approach is to attempt to create a full-fledged nuclear weapons free zone on the standard UN treaty model, but tailored to this region. This approach is the most desirable one in that it multilateralizes the process and the commitments, and provides methods and practices to solve many problems that are certain to crop up in the Korean context. These include how to arrange for the monitoring and verification of DPRK nuclear warhead dismantlement and weapons-grade fissile material removal; implementation of full-scope safeguards in the Korean peninsula; inspection and verification of the non-presence of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear weapons states party to a treaty; how to admit a state with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capability to a treaty which preclude its instant return to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; and how to arrange for symmetrical nuclear negative security assurances from all NPT-nuclear weapons states that are applied equally to all non-nuclear weapons states whose territory fall under the treaty, not just the DPRK. Partial coverage of territories of the nuclear weapons states themselves (such as of the US territory Puerto Rico under the Latin American NWFZ treaty) are also possible.

Conversely, such a treaty may take much time to negotiate given the asymmetries of interest and force structure between the nuclear weapons states in the region; and may also face obstinate opposition from some quarters—especially US allies in the region concerned about diminishing credibility of US nuclear extended deterrence, most importantly, from Japan and possibly from Australia. Thus, such a treaty may be optimal—but also may be too far a reach at a time when urgent solutions are needed to problems at hand in Korea.

Fortunately, a half-way house between these two options, the bilateral-only declaration and the multilateral NWFZ treaty, is possible. In this approach, the two Koreas would declare the peninsula to be nuclear weapons-free, but would do so using the standard UN treaty framework, and would call upon other non-nuclear weapons states to join the treaty. This could include immediately Mongolia; and in due course, Japan. It would of course be in Japan's strategic interest to do so because a NWFZ

treaty would transform China's current political no-first-use doctrine into a legally binding nuclear negative security assurance to non-nuclear weapons states in compliance with their obligations in a NWFZ-treaty.

From China's perspective, Japan adhering to a NWFZ-treaty would be a security benefit worth giving up any putative security gains from holding Japan at risk from its own nuclear threats, a game of indirect nuclear compellence it has long played against Japan in order to try to push back against the US-Japan alliance—especially as the alliance has become the bedrock in the western Pacific of US military power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Deepening Japan's non-nuclear commitment would be valuable to China's perception of its own security, and would be worth trading off against China's *de facto* acceptance of the legitimacy of US allied relationships built primarily on conventional power in the region, provided these are not used aggressively to threaten China itself.

Thus, rather than a Korean Denuclearization Declaration, the two Koreas should consider pursuing a Korean NWFZ treaty, and immediately initiate a multi-level dialogue about the pros and cons of such an arrangement in the region not only with other states, but also with cities, local governments, scholars, the mass media, and civil society organizations to create the ideational foundations for creating post-nuclear weapons security in the region.

Part of this dialogue should be a realistic appraisal of the desirability and plausibility of creating regional nuclear fuel cycle consortia that includes enrichment, power reactors, and spent fuel storage and disposal cooperative arrangements and provides the DPRK with economic and energy incentives to fully abandon its nuclear weapons program. This could be part of or a parallel agreement to the zone itself. Conversely, if regional energy security infrastructure are shown to be feasible and desirable, such as gas pipelines, long-distance transmission of electric power from renewable hydro, photovoltaic and solar thermal generators, micro-grids powered by renewables, harmonization of end use efficiency standards, and ecologically motivated greenhouse gas reduction and carbon sink reforestation programs financed by the Clean Development Mechanism, then these may prove more attractive to the DPRK than nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

### III. US-DPRK DIALOGUE

The roots of Trump's willingness to talk directly with Kim Jong Un precede his election. In fact, they derive from the utter failure of the Obama Administration to engage with Kim Jong Un after the February 2012 debacle known as the Leap Day Deal.<sup>9</sup> The collapse of this deal led directly to

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<sup>9</sup> On 29 February 2012, the United States and the DPRK announced the "leap day" agreement that the the former would send food aid in return for the North freezing uranium enrichment and

Obama's policy of strategic patience and rejection of Kim Jong Un as a viable negotiating partner. At least that was the excuse. A more charitable interpretation is that the Obama Administration only had the bandwidth to tackle one major conflict at a time (choosing to prioritize Iran over North Korea); and that Obama would have been politically crucified in Washington if he had entered into high-level talks with Kim Jong Un. Whether this was an act of political cowardice or a simple strategic calculation about the robustness of conventional deterrence in Korea, or both, Obama failed to resolve the North Korea issue, leaving it on the top of Trump's national security in-tray on the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office.

Trump's political instinct in almost any policy domain is to do Anything But Obama. He also favors "strong" leaders as a matter of personal psychology; and he relished the idea of meeting Kim Jong Un in the election campaign. Even as he gyrated to talking about Chinese removal of Kim (aka assassination) and other loose talk, Trump was careful to always keep open the prospect of talking with Kim. With time, it became clear that Trump was willing to overrule the entire US national security elite who opposed his policies of skepticism toward the putative ally, the ROK; and to abandon decades of keeping the DPRK leadership isolated from the United States. At the same time, he was all-too willing to use political rhetoric with inflammatory tweets and statements, and symbolic forces of display to signal willingness to go to war with the DPRK should it achieve long-range missile and nuclear warhead capability to strike the US homeland.

For his part, Kim Jong Un proved more than capable of extreme nuclear threats against the United States and its allies including the ROK, Japan, and Australia, including direct verbal threats, state orchestrated propaganda, and the testing of nuclear warheads and rockets. This threat rhetoric constituted a type of nuclear aggression that, when combined with Trump's extraordinary statements, increased the perceptions of other state leaders and their populations that the risk of war and nuclear war had increased dramatically in Korea. Some pundits stated that the risk of war and nuclear war had reached 50 percent (of what, over what time was never specified). Financial markets suggested that perceived risk of war by investors had increased from perhaps 0.1 to 1 percent per year—not enormous, but when multiplied by immense damages, still large enough to affect market behavior.

Having ramped up the risk of nuclear war, the two leaders began to search for ways to reduce it. Kim Jong Un sent a message via South Korea after successful inter-Korean Olympic diplomacy that he would like to meet with Trump. Trump responded positively, and within a few months, the two men shook hands at the Singapore Summit, issuing a two page statement afterwards that contained four key commitments, viz,

- i. To establish new US-DPRK relations

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missile testing, the return of IAEA inspectors to Yongbyon, and resumption of the six-party talks. The deal collapsed shortly after the DPRK launched a satellite using a space rocket that the United States claimed was precluded under the leap day agreement, a position that the DPRK held it never agreed to.



- ii. To build a lasting and stable peace regime in Korea
- iii. For the DPRK to “work toward” the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and
- iv. To recover and repatriate US POW/MIA remains.<sup>10</sup>

Ironically, this enormous step forward toward resolving a six decade old war was immediately declared vacuous by the bulk of Washington security analysts, for many on the basis of Anything But Trump. Months of arduous negotiations have ensued and the broad outline of a deal involving US-DPRK presidential declaration at their second summit that the war is over is becoming clear. The immediate result will be negotiations between the US and the DPRK as to which other parties must be signatories of an eventual formal agreement to end the Korean war—the candidates being the ROK (which is not a signatory to the Armistice) and China (without which no deal could ever be assured of lasting the test of time).

However, ending the Korean War is not a simple matter, even if Trump is willing to put ending the war on the same level as the US demand that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons capacity.

#### IV. ENDING THE KOREAN WAR AND OVERCOMING HOSTILITY

Although the Cold War can be ended by a mere political declaration, a negative peace has been built into entrenched security postures and institutional commitments that will not disappear overnight due to statements by political leaders. In reality, the lethal hostility between the United States, the ROK, and the DPRK—the primary antagonists to the Korean conflict at this time—must be overcome at many levels and in many dimensions before the fundamental insecurity that afflicting each party can be replaced with trust that the other side will not attack it militarily.

In this regard, the cutting edge of Korean denuclearization today is not actually what happens immediately with North Korean nuclear weapons, or how the US projects threat against the DPRK on a day to day basis.

Rather, it is the rate and magnitude of inter-Korean arms control and disarmament measures envisioned in the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the

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<sup>10</sup> Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, June 12, White House, at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>

Military Domain”<sup>11</sup> annexed to the September 2018 Pyeongyang Declaration between Kim Jong Un and Moon Jae-In that forms the foundation for further progress on the nuclear front. Although these first steps are preliminary and the framework still fragile, the scope and depth of possible inter-Korean military-military cooperation could—if implemented—reduce the perceived threat levels of war in Korea to much lower than in past decades. If matched by restoration of inter-Korean cultural and economic relations, especially the construction of major infrastructure in North Korea by South Korean chaebols with support from the ROK government, then the creation of joint assets of many kinds could make war between the two Koreas almost inconceivable within a few years.

In this operational arms control agreement, the two Koreas committed to substantial measures to reduce the risk of war in Korea. They pledged to “completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, including land, air, and sea that are the source of military tension and conflict” and to “cease various military exercises aimed at each other along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL)” after November 1, 2018, including “all artillery drills and field training exercises at the regiment level and above within 5km from the MDL.” Both sides are to “install covers on the barrels of coastal artilleries and ship guns,” as well as halt all-live fire and maritime maneuvers in designated maritime areas. The two Koreas have established an “Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee” and will consult with the other on issues including “large-scale military exercises... as well as reconnaissance activities against each other.”

They also undertake to install and operate direct “hotline” communication channels between the militaries, and to “devise substantive military measures to transform the DMZ into a peace zone” starting with withdrawal of “all guard posts within the DMZ” and demining sections of the DMZ. They also plan to commence a pilot missing-in-action remains recovery for Korean soldiers killed in the war, and to seek to establish a peace zone near the disputed maritime border on the western coast by taking “military measures to prevent accidental military clashes and ensure safe fishing activities by turning the area around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone” and “a pilot joint fishing zone in the West Sea” and “fully guarantee the safety of personnel and vessels.”

Of great importance, to demilitarize the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, the two Koreas are to establish a trilateral consultation body of the two Korean militaries and United Nations Command (UNC). The first trilateral meeting took place on October 9, 2018<sup>12</sup> and others steps such as

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<sup>11</sup> The September “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” is found at:

<https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Historic%20Panmunjom%20Declaration%20in%20the%20Military%20Domain.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> See D. Ji, ““No big difference” between South Korea, UNC on removal of DMZ guard posts: MND

reducing the guard posts are also underway. Almost all of these steps entail utilization of areas that transect or affect the areas that fall under the jurisdiction of UNC on the southern side of the DMZ. So long as the ROK maintains the existing command arrangements involving US Forces Korea-Combined Forces Command-UN Command in which the same American general wears three hats simultaneously, the trilateralization of these inter-Korean bilateral measures must conform to the political and military requirements of the US-ROK alliance. In effect, UNC can act as a brake on the pace of inter-Korean military arms control measures, and thereby calibrate its implementation to the extent to which the DPRK implements its denuclearization obligations from past history and commitments from the Singapore Communique and subsequent commitments in US-ROK and US-DPRK diplomatic channels.

Conversely, to the extent that the UNC facilitates these measures and reduces the actual tension and threat of war between the two Koreas, it also effectively reduces the DPRK's insecurity on the one hand, and the DPRK threat to the ROK and its allies, including the United States, on the other. In this convoluted and awkward manner, these bilateral and trilateral military-military arms control measures are laying the foundations for a post-war security system in the Korean peninsula that is a necessary condition for eliminating nuclear threat from the posture that each side has adopted to deter and in some instances, to compel the other for decades.

Should this tri-lateralization process succeed in reducing actual threatening offensive military postures and activities, then actual reduction of perceived hostility should follow. The DPRK has long held that reduction of US hostility toward the DPRK is the ultimate litmus test of its ability to abandon nuclear weapons as a basis for its national security.<sup>13</sup> If this approach is pursued, then the DPRK could shift from strategic adversary to a security partner of the United States,<sup>14</sup> and a realignment of great power relations in Northeast Asia would follow—posing a fundamental choice

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Defense ministry insists United Nations Command supports last week's DPRK-ROK military agreement," NKNews, September 27, 2018, at: <https://www.nknews.org/2018/09/no-big-difference-between-south-korea-unc-on-removal-of-dmz-guard-posts-mnd/> and Lee Min-hyung, "UNC, North Korean military discuss JSA disarmament, Korea Times, October 16, 2018, at: [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/356\\_257111.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/356_257111.html)

<sup>13</sup> Peter Hayes, "OVERCOMING US-DPRK HOSTILITY: The Missing Link between a Northeast Asian Comprehensive Security Settlement and Ending the Korean War", NAPSNet Special Reports, December 21, 2014, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/overcoming-us-dprk-hostility-the-missing-link-between-a-northeast-asian-comprehensive-security-settlement-and-ending-the-korean-war/>

<sup>14</sup> MORTON HALPERIN, PETER HAYES, THOMAS PICKERING, LEON SIGAL, PHILIP YUN, "FROM ENEMIES TO SECURITY PARTNERS: PATHWAYS TO DENUCLEARIZATION IN KOREA", NAPSNet Policy Forum, July 06, 2018, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/from-enemies-to-security-partners-pathways-to-denuclearization-in-korea/>

between collision and concert for the United States and China to make in constructing this new strategic landscape.

What hangs in the balance is whether the United States is willing to follow the lead of the two Koreas, the rapprochement of which is backed already by China and Russia. In one instance, UN Command blocked inter-Korean exploration of reconnecting their railroads across the DMZ. In others already mentioned above, it has facilitated the process. Whether it will quietly support the trilateral process whereby it shifts from its traditional solely partisan deterrence role against the DPRK to a pivotal deterrence role on behalf of both Koreas is the single most important question today that determines the eventual outcome of the Trump-Kim dialogue.

## V. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SETTLEMENT

In the previous section, I suggested that substantive and rapid progress in operational military arms control between the two Koreas was the foundation for overcoming US-DPRK hostility and the basis for removal of nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula.

The rate and magnitude of this inter-Korean process is also linked to the regional security system, however. Unless the United States and China cooperate to implement the rapprochement of the two Koreas, it is likely that they will reach a limit beyond which UN Command is unwilling to go without active Chinese support of the DPRK's decoupling of its security from and reduction of its *de facto* dependence on China for its ability to withstand US and allied pressure on it.

For this reason, it is critically important for all regional players, but above all, China and Japan, to support a comprehensive security strategy in Northeast Asia to resolve the Korean issue. In its original proposal articulated in 2011 by Morton Halperin,<sup>15</sup> the strategy has six, inter-locking essential elements:

### I. Set up a Six Party Northeast Asia Security Council.

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<sup>15</sup> Morton H. Halperin, "A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia", NAPSNet Special Reports, January 03, 2012, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-proposal-for-a-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-in-northeast-asia/>

Updated here: Morton H. Halperin, "A comprehensive agreement for security in Northeast Asia", NAPSNet Policy Forum, March 16, 2015, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/a-comprehensive-agreement-for-security-in-northeast-asia/>

2. End sanctions over time.
3. Declare non-hostility.
4. End the Korean Armistice; sign a peace treaty in some form.
5. Provide economic, energy aid to DPRK, especially that which benefits the whole region (that is, complete many types of energy, telecom, logistics, transport, mobility, trading, financial networks via the North Korean land-bridge from Eurasia to ROK and Japan).
6. Establish a regional nuclear weapons free-zone (NWFZ) in which to re-establish DPRK's non-nuclear commitment in a legally binding manner<sup>[3]</sup> and to provide a framework for its dismantlement; and to manage nuclear threat in the region in a manner that treats all parties, including North Korea, on an equal basis.

This approach was based on the following premises:

- The United States is a reliable and responsible provider of global and regional security.
- The United States is a sole supplier of the leadership needed to solve the North Korea issue.
- North Korea's fundamental strategy—to change US hostile policy to one that allows it to lessen dependence on China, improve its security, and survive as an independent state—remains the same under Kim Jong Un as his predecessors.
- The Six Party Talks is the only negotiation framework wherein all six parties could come together today given their respective frictions.

Each of these six elements is now in play, but the first—a regional security institution—is the least likely to be realized due to the US-China trade war that began in mid-2018. This development creates a critical deficit at this time when it is most needed in Korea. Moreover, the fact that the United States is in decline and no longer provides hegemonic leadership suggests that it is unlikely to do so any time in the near future, under Trump or a subsequent president.<sup>16</sup> Yet such cooperation remains imperative. As the author noted in 2017:

North Korea has become a pivot point for US-China relations. These two great powers must choose between increasingly competitive versus cooperative world orders. Unless the United States is careful, by default China will become the locally strongest military power, the United States increasingly will be offshore and disengaged, and North Korea will continue to act as a spoiler state projecting nuclear threats. For North Korea that includes the ability to attack the United States itself with nuclear weapons. The alternative is a more fluid cooperative-competitive and multipolar world with a strong element of US-Chinese concert that uses

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<sup>16</sup> See P. Hayes, , “Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony,” forthcoming in *Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 2018.

North Korea's dependency on China to block and then reverse its nuclear breakout. If they are jointly to resolve the North Korean threat, the North Korean issue demands that the United States and China make choices about the nature of their relationship that have implications well beyond the Korean Peninsula.<sup>17</sup>

It is worth exploring how this pivot point might affect the future geopolitical situation in East Asia. In 2013, the US National Intelligence Council presented a still-useful overview of four possible strategic futures for East Asia in 2030.<sup>18</sup> These were:

- i. A continuation of the **present order** that mixes rules-based cooperation and quiet competition within a regional framework structured around existing alignments sustained by US leadership.
- ii. A **balance-of-power order** of unconstrained great power competition fueled by dynamic shifts in relative power and a reduced US role.
- iii. A **consolidated regional order** in which an East Asian community develops along the lines of Europe's democratic peace, with China's political liberalization a precondition for such a regional evolution.
- iv. A **Sinocentric order** centered on Beijing that sustains a different kind of East Asian community on the basis of China's extension of a sphere of influence across the region.

These four overarching regional orders can be specified more concretely as shown in Table I which adds three bipolar possible orders to the NIC list of four orders.

Table I: **Possible Regional Orders 2030**

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**Multipolar:**

- cooperative-competitive (fluid multi-polarity, US strongest, *NK exists, dependent state*)
- competitive (China strongest, US offshore, disengaged, *NK exists, barely, unless US cuts deal as part of balancing*)

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<sup>17</sup> See Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Chung-in Moon, Thomas Pickering, Lee Sigal, "ENDING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR THREAT BY A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SETTLEMENT IN NORTHEAST ASIA", NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 26, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/ending-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat-by-a-comprehensive-security-settlement-in-northeast-asia/>

<sup>18</sup> From US National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030, Alternative Worlds*, pp. 75-76, at: <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends> See Peter Hayes, "Policy Forum – "Six Party Talks and Multilateral Security Cooperation"", NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 10, 2014, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/policy-forum-six-party-talks-and-multilateral-security-cooperation/>

- cooperative (multiple strong states in a liberal concert, liberalized China, with or without US, *NK reforms or collapses*)

#### **Bipolar:**

- competitive blocs led by US and China (Asian Cold War, *NK grows most*)
- China-led group vs other Asia-led groups (not US, *NK exists, vassal state*)
- Sino-US condominium (cooperative, but distinct spheres of influence, *NK exists*)

#### **Uni-polar:**

- Chinese primacy excluding the US (new Middle Kingdom, *NK exists, tributary state*)

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Source: D. Twining, "Global Trends 2030: Pathways for Asia's Strategic Future," December 10, 2012 at:

[http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/10/global\\_trends\\_2030\\_pathways\\_for\\_asia\\_s\\_strategic\\_future](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/10/global_trends_2030_pathways_for_asia_s_strategic_future)

and "Global Trends 2030: Scenarios for Asia's Strategic Future," December 11, 2012 at: [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/11/global\\_trends\\_2030\\_scenarios\\_for\\_asia\\_s\\_strategic\\_future](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/11/global_trends_2030_scenarios_for_asia_s_strategic_future)

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In each of these seven conceivable orders in 2030, the DPRK survives, either barely as a dependent state on China, or exploiting the space created by great power dynamics.

The exceptions are multipolar futures in which either the PRC is competing strongly with the United States and the United States is increasingly disengaged from forward deployment—and it cuts a deal with the DPRK to join a coalition that effectively contains China; or, the PRC has undergone a political transformation to a democratic state, and a regional order is constructed based on a concert of liberal, democratic states. In the former order, the ROK would also need to supply substantial support to the DPRK for its reconstruction and move out of China's orbit. In the latter order, it is possible that the DPRK reforms radically which leads to peaceful reunification, or it collapses internally and falls into the ROK's lap. Otherwise, in the other six multipolar, bipolar, and unipolar regional orders that the region could evolve into, the DPRK exists.

Thus, it seems we are at the cusp of a strategic choice for the two Koreas. The ROK appears to have concluded that it is prudent for the ROK to shape the strategic environment in which the DPRK makes its own strategic choices towards those regional orders that are most conducive to reducing and eliminating the DPRK nuclear threat, and to reducing and removing the threat of war from the Peninsula. Otherwise, if left to its own nuclear devices, by 2020 the DPRK could acquire a nuclear force of 1-200 nuclear weapons, and a missile force capable of delivering these weapons not only onto the ROK, but over intermediate range aimed at Japan, Guam, China, or Russia. This is not an

attractive prospect, not only because the DPRK would still not have a secure retaliatory capability against the threat of pre-emptive attack by the nuclear weapons states, creating an inherently unstable situation, but also because the ROK may proliferate its own nuclear force, creating an unstable nuclear standoff which might aptly be termed “mutual probable destruction.”<sup>19</sup>

The tradeoffs facing the two Koreas are many; the complexity immense; the difference between the resulting outcomes are profound. Korea's leaders today need the Wisdom of Sejong to navigate these reefs to a safe harbor for the two Koreas.

## VI. CONCLUSION

Faced with two giant powers scrapping over trade and other security issues such as disputed territories or regional seas, the two Koreas may elect to take charge of their own fate. To do so, each will have to become a tail wagging a giant dog. If both are committed irrevocably to irreversible rapprochement, then they will either exert sufficient pressure on their respective great power allies to bring about the requisite concert to support a peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict; or they will part ways with their allies to cut their own deals. In this manner, Koreans may become the architect of a comprehensive security structure in Northeast Asia; or they may reduce their dependence on great powers and present a more introspective and insular face to the external world—and one in which the way that they make common cause may be highly inconvenient to their neighbors or distant great powers.

There can be little doubt as to which of these futures would be the most likely to reduce and then eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the Korean peninsula and beyond. Equally, it would not be selfish for the two Koreas to put the fate of the Korean nation before that of the international community given the costs imposed upon it by the careless division of Korea at the end of World War II, with no regard to the aspirations of the Korean people for a post-colonial future free of the scourge of imperialism, war, and occupation.

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<sup>19</sup> P. Hayes, ““Mutual Probable Destruction”: Nuclear Next-Use in a Nuclear-Armed East Asia?”, *NAPSNet Policy Forum*, May 14, 2014, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/mutual-probable-destruction-nuclear-next-use-in-a-nuclear-armed-east-asia/>



## Peace-Building and Provision for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

By Angela Kane

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16 November 2018



Since I have recently come back from several months in the United States, I have decided to focus my remarks on the position of the United States and the initiative taken by President Trump to engage with the Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong Un.

I will look at background, the factors that should affect Trump's decision-making and also make some predictions on the way forward.

### Background

The efforts to limit North Korean nuclear capabilities go back decades: it was usually a process of one step forward, and two back. Why? The aim of the US (and other Western States) were the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, and this approach was also initially put forward by Trump and his National Security Adviser John Bolton.

Let us recall that in 2002, then US-President George W. Bush declared the "axis of evil": Iran, Iraq, and DPRK. As this was shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001, it was easy to rally the public with belligerent words.

*At that time, there was still a fragile agreement from 1994 that was restraining DPRK's efforts to develop NW, though the US had dragged its feet on several parts of the agreement. Similarly, while North Korea had ended plutonium production, they secretly went to Pakistan to acquire gas-centrifuge technology and equipment for uranium enrichment in order to produce fissile material for NW. The US caught them at it.*

*The DPRK also had grievances: they claimed that the US did not abide by the deal, as they never normalized relations with Pyongyang and then characterized the DPRK as part of the axis of evil.*

*So the agreement collapsed in mutual recriminations in 2002. In January 2003, DPRK withdrew from the NPT and resumed full-scale nuclear weapons-development efforts.*

*In the early 1990s, the US intelligence community had estimated that by 2000 the DPRK could be producing 150 kilograms of plutonium per year (enough for roughly 30 NW) and could have manufactured 100 NW by that time.*

*Instead, because of the negotiations, North Korea had no NW when George W. Bush came into office. The negotiations had not resumed until President Trump entered the scene.*

*Let us recall for a moment the facts: as the only country to have tested NW in this century, DPRK has carried out six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017.*

*(9 October 2006, 25 May 2009, 12 February 2013, 6 January 2016, 9 September 2016, 3 September 2017)*

*Also, as of November 2017, North Korea had carried out 117 strategic missile tests; the first was in 1984.*

#### *The DPRK – United Nations sanctions*

The Council first imposed sanctions on the DPRK through the adoption of resolution 1695 on 15 July 2006. Since then, it has adopted nine more resolutions expanding and strengthening the sanctions: S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006), S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009), S/RES/2087 (22 January 2013), S/RES/2270 (2 March 2016), S/RES/2356 (2 June 2017), S/RES/2371 (5 August 2017), S/RES/2375 (11 September 2017), S/RES/2397 (22 December 2017), and S/RES/2407 (21 March 2018). In spite of the strengthening of sanctions over the years, the DPRK has continued to develop its nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles in violation of the resolutions.

A rare high-level meeting on a country-specific, non-proliferation issue took place in the Security Council on 28 April 2017 when it discussed the denuclearization of the DPRK at a meeting chaired by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who said in his national statement that the time had come “to put new pressure on North Korea to abandon its dangerous path” (S/PV.7932). He urged the Council to act and said there was a need to work together to adopt a new approach.

This was followed by another ministerial-level meeting on 15 December 2017 chaired by Foreign Minister Kono of Japan who, in his concept note circulated prior to the meeting, suggested that the members focus on nuclear and missile development as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

Council dynamics on this issue have made it generally difficult to respond quickly to even major violations, with press statements often being the default action, and negotiations on more substantive outcomes frequently taking significant time. However, in response to missile tests increasing in frequency and a more powerful nuclear device being tested than in the past, the Council has adopted two resolutions within two months imposing expanded sanctions and new listings.

#### **Enter President Trump**

In his election campaign and during the first months of his Presidency, Mr. Trump repeatedly said

that he would not live with the threat of North Korea being a nuclear power and he promised that he would “solve” the problem once and for all, after being left “a mess” by his predecessors.

*Only recently, we learned that in March, Mr. Trump signed a directive outlining a strategy of pressure against North Korea that involved actions across a broad spectrum of government agencies and led to the use of military cyber-capabilities. As part of this campaign, US Cyber Command targeted hackers in North Korea’s military spy agency (the Reconnaissance General Bureau), by barraging their computer servers with traffic that choked off internet access.*

*The directive also instructed the Treasury Department to outline an escalating set of sanctions against North Korean entities and individuals, as well as foreigners who dealt with them. Those instructions are reflected in a steady stream of US and international sanctions in recent months.*

*This policy, however, was not made public at the time it was signed, as the US administration wanted to leave the door open for North Korea to sit down and talk. Yet North Korea continued to launch missiles and take other provocative actions, and gave no signals that it was ready for talks.*

In September 2017, Trump told the UN General Assembly that if “forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea”. He also tweeted that “Little Rocket Man” and DPRK’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho “won’t be around much longer”, after Ri told the GA that Trump’s threats had made Pyongyang’s “rockets’ visits to the entire US mainland inevitable”.

The following day Ri went even further: “Since the US declared on our country, we will have every right to make countermeasures, including the right to shoot down US strategic bombers even when they are not inside the airspace border or our country”.

While the statements coming out of North Korea are consistent, those of the US Administration are not. Then-Secretary Tillerson insisted that Kim Jong Un must give up all his weapons. In August last year, he argued that he must simply pause their NW testing. Trump’s national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, insisted that North Korea would have to agree to highly intrusive inspections to determine the whereabouts of its NW, and agree to ultimately plan to surrender its nuclear arsenal.

Let us remember that North Korea has never allowed inspectors far beyond its Yongbyon reactor facility. Let us also remember that the arsenal is now enshrined in North Korea’s Constitution as something no official could ever trade away.

Yet the US insists that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the ultimate goal, as this was something the two Koreas agreed on in 1992. Progress towards this goal, according to Secretary

Tillerson, would be “incremental”.

The year 2018 brought dramatic developments, starting with the Olympic diplomacy on the occasion of the Pyeongchang Games, followed by inter-Korean summits and then the mind-boggling agreement to hold a summit between President Trump and Leader Kim Jong Un, which took place in Singapore on 12 June 2018. What an amazing turnaround from just months earlier and the infantile language that had been batted back and forth.

Five hours of talk between Trump and Kim Jong Un, flags of both countries prominently flying, Kim Jong Un clearly enjoying the stature that he was given as seemingly a peer of the US president. A Joint Summit Statement was adopted that was widely analyzed – and criticized – for its vague language in the four points it contained:

1. *The US and the DPRK commit to establish new US-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the population of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity;*
2. *The US and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula;*
3. *Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;*
4. *The US and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MAI remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.*

What has happened in the four months since then?

- Remains of American POW/MIAs were repatriated from DPRK;
- The test site at Punggye-ri (a network of underground tunnels) was destroyed, according to North Korea, though no independent verification took place, the only observers were journalists;
- US-ROK military exercises were suspended;
- No rocket launches or nuclear testing in over a year;
- Three visits by US Secretary Pompeo to Pyongyang; another one is planned;
- High-level inter-Korean diplomacy, after a hiatus of eleven years, was re-started and rapidly intensified.

What else do we need to be aware of?

- Trump’s brinkmanship in 2017 seemed haphazard, impetuous and downright dangerous at times – but it did move the situation from a total stalemate to a politically dynamic process, though there is no discernible US strategy as to next steps.

- The language about complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (CIVD) is now replaced by the more general term “denuclearization talks”;
- After Pompeo’s visit in July, after which North Korea rejected the “gangster-like” demands he made, a trip planned for August was cancelled. Only after the inter-Korean summit re-kindled the peace process, an exchange of letters between Kim and Trump softened the tone. Trump tweeted: *“Kim Jong Un proclaims ‘unwavering faith’ in President Trump...this is a big and positive statement from North Korea...thank you, Chairman Kim. We will prove everyone wrong! There is nothing like good dialogue from people that like each other! Much better than before I took office.”*
- Trump went even further at a public rally at the end of September, saying that he and Leader Kim Jong Un “fell in love” because of Kim’s “beautiful letters”, but the reaction from Pyongyang was sobering: denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will not happen unless the US backs up its warm words with action.
- Still, preparations for a second Trump-Kim meeting – to take place around mid-November, after the US mid-term elections or possibly early next year – are being made, as Secretary Pompeo finished his trip to the region (during which he also visited Japan, China and South Korea) in early October.
- An announcement by Secretary Pompeo that North Korea would allow “foreign experts” to watch as North Korea shuts down key missile facilities was certainly welcome, and Secretary Pompeo said that “on the basis of these important commitments”, the US is “prepared to engage immediately in negotiations”.
- Now comes the fine print: Kim suggested that these (and other actions) would happen only if the US takes “reciprocal action”, yet there was no mention of deliverables: no first steps toward denuclearization, no inventory of all its nuclear weapons, its production and storage sites, its missiles and missile launchers, no schedule for dismantlement. Nor was there a list of items the North considers “reciprocal” from the US.
- Trump is clearly looking for a “win” regardless of content. He considers himself as the ultimate deal-maker and believes that previous US presidents were hoodwinked by both Iran and the DPRK; he already claims that “there is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea”.
- As to Chairman Kim, the summit meeting with President Trump legitimized him and his regime worldwide.
- Also, the lack of concessions demanded of Kim gave him room to manoeuvre and sidestep the difficult issues of denuclearization – and now the “asks” have to be made by the US negotiators; the political leverage of the summit meeting was not used effectively by Trump.
- Without the pressure, China and Russia are now calling for relaxation of sanctions, and Russia in particular has become flagrant in its disregard of sanctions.

## **The fall-out in US-ROK relations**

The last few months have shown a growing gap between Trump's goals and those of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. He and Chairman Kim have held three summit meetings where they sealed reconciliation deals and pushed their governments closer. There is even talk of Chairman Kim visiting Seoul later this year.

In an interview given to the BBC on 12 October, President Moon said it was only "a matter of time before the US and North Korea declare an end to their state of war", which is a demand the North has been repeatedly making. (*The war ended in 1953 with an armistice, no peace treaty was ever signed.*) He also said that he hoped European leaders would help him to mediate between Mr. Kim and President Trump if negotiations stalled. Considering the decades-long close political and military alliance between the US and South Korea, this is certainly a startling request.

The closer inter-Korean relations have emboldened North Korea to step up their demands, asking that US negotiators be more "realistic" on the deal sequencing, especially when it comes to normalization of relations and sanctions relief.

In the view of the US, the South Korean actions have not been helpful; I was even told by a senior US official that they had "undermined" the efforts of the US to make progress on denuclearization. Secretary Pompeo publicly expressed "discontent" with an inter-Korean military pact that was reached during the Moon-Kim summit in September. *The two Koreas agreed to halt military drills, set up a no-fly zone near the border and gradually remove landmines and guard posts within the Demilitarized Zone.*

Of course, the issue is not a bilateral or a trilateral one. China, Russia, Japan are all major players in the Korean Peninsula and their actions are closely watched. The deputy foreign ministers of China, North Korea and Russia issued a joint communiqué in early October reiterating the strong ties between the three countries and calling for a loosening of the sanctions against the DPRK. (*"Noting the important steps taken by the DPRK in the direction of denuclearization, the parties considered it necessary to start a timely review by the UN Security Council of the sanctions measures against the DPRK".*)

The situation is rapidly evolving: what we have witnessed is a "new normal" in the Korean Peninsula with the high-level talks between Moon and Kim. There has been high-level confidence-building and concrete steps agreed on – but this has not resulted in significant steps by North Korea to denuclearize.

What it has done is shift the discourse from denuclearization to other actions, and significant as they

are, they are taking away from the initial focus of the engagement. This also hampers the US negotiation strategy, as the involvement of other actors boosts the DPRK instead of forcing it to take concrete steps toward denuclearization.

### **Where does Japan fit in?**

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has clearly established a good relationship with President Trump, but there is now the risk that Japan is getting left behind on the sidelines, though Secretary Pompeo visited Tokyo three times during his trip to the region. The US has always played a stabilizing role in North-East Asia, supported by providing a nuclear umbrella as well as deploying thousands of US troops stationed in Korea and Japan. Unlike Europe, where we have a strong security pact (NATO), there is no equivalent multilateral structure in Asia, so withdrawing the US security presence would introduce a high level of uncertainty.

The continuity and predictability of US policy in Asia was also based on the importance of good trade and economic relations – yet President Trump has upended this equation as well, by pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and challenging China's behavior, imposing tariffs, accusing China of intellectual property theft and economic espionage.

When the Six-Party Talks were established, the format included the major players which had interests in the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, they were not successful and languished dormant for several years. Yet the format we have now is fragile: two bilateral processes (US-DPRK and RoK-DPRK) that do not always appear well-aligned at present.

While another Trump-Kim summit could inject energy into the process and be used to arrive at a defined roadmap, there is also the risk that it could all fall apart. And then what? After presidential summits, there is no Plan B. And with a US President who is inadequately prepared substantively, who admits to disliking detailed briefings and political detail, the risk for failure is strong. Critics believe that Kim's real intention is not to denuclearize but to use negotiations for a peace treaty that will drive out the nearly 30,000 American troops based in South Korea.

Of course, it is my sincere hope - which I know is widely shared – that the developments will go in a constructive and positive direction.

As they say in English: stay tuned.....

## **Audacious Imagination for Peace**

### **- Key to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia**

**Lee Tae-ho<sup>20</sup>**



With the April 27 Inter-Korean Summit at the Panmunjeom and the June 12 North Korea-U.S. Summit in Singapore, a great shift has begun in the ceasefire and military confrontation state of the Korean Peninsula. This shift is toward a “complete denuclearization” and a “permanent peace regime” on the Korean Peninsula, and a “new relationship” among the countries concerned.

### **1. Background of the shift**

#### **“Taking the wheel”**

Predicting such a dramatic development was not easy even at the end of 2017. President Moon Jae In created room for negotiations by reiterating time and again, including at South Korea's 2017 Liberation day celebrations, that there would be “no war on the Korean Peninsula,” saying “no one can make a decision on military actions on the Korean Peninsula without previous consent from South Korea.” Kim Jong-un, the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea suggested in his 2018 New Year's Address that “North and South Korea make the 2018 a history-making year that could be recognized as noteworthy in Korean history where the two Korea are not tied down to the past and can improve their icy relationship.” According to President Moon's description, Korean leaders “took hold of steering wheel” of the negotiation for the peace of Korean Peninsula.

#### **“The Trump's Model”**

On top of that, U.S. President Donald Trump, who intended to use “maximum pressure” as well as “maximum engagement,” responded with his own solution, opening up new possibility for a comprehensive negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea. President Trump thought the past

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governments' policies such as "strategic patience" or "regime change" had failed. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy 2017 and the Nuclear Posture Review 2018 define North Korea as a threat to the U.S., but do not specify the possibility of a preemptive nuclear attack on North Korea, unlike previous governments.

### **The Candlelight Revolution**

The shift in political climate on the Korean Peninsula has resulted from the candlelight revolution took place in South Korea in late 2016. The candlelight revolution has shown that citizens themselves have the capacity to address social challenges in a peaceful and democratic way. The security state, which has exaggerated the fears from the outside and forced people to endure power abuse and injustice in the name of national security, has lost its legitimacy in the process of the candlelight revolution. That is why transforming ceasefire state, in which the state of emergency has become as a rule for the past 70 years, to a permanent peace regime has inevitably become the most important issue of the Moon administration's public diplomacy. On the other hand, the candlelight revolution has helped strengthen the diplomatic capacity of the new administration, which has been launched in accordance with the people's interests, serving as a driving force to instigate cooperation from North Korea and the international community including the U.S. for peaceful resolution of issues on the Korean Peninsula.

## **2. Korean Peninsula After the April 27 South-North Korea Summit and the June 12 North Korea-U.S. Summit**

### **Routinized Inter-Korean Dialogue and Cooperation**

Through the Panmunjeom Declaration announced as a result of the April 27 South-North Korea Summit, the leaders of the two Koreas made clear that there would be no more war on the Korean Peninsula and a new era of peace began. The Panmunjeom Declaration consists of 3 parts : the development of the North and South Korea relationship, the building of military confidence, and the development of a peace regime in that order. What is most meaningful is the promise to hold summit meetings between the two leaders on a regular basis and open a direct hotline. The inter-Korean dialogue that has become more common serves as a minimum safety means to prevent the escalation

of the crisis caused by accidental situations, as well as a communication channel to frequently consult with each other about innumerable tasks.

### **“A New North Korea-U.S. Relationship”**

Following the April 27 Summit between the two Koreas, the first North Korea-U.S. Summit was held in Singapore on June 12. At that time, President Trump pledged to provide security assurance to North Korea, and the Chairman Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The two leaders agreed on four provisions, while admitting that building mutual trust would facilitate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The four provisions include the pledge to establish a new relation between North Korea and the U.S., efforts to build a permanent peace regime, reaffirmation of the April 27 Declaration and commitment to a complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and the repatriation of U.S. prisoners of war and remains of missing persons. Unlike expectations, the agreement between the U.S. and North Korea used expressions such as "close dialogue and negotiation", "mutual trust" and "intent to act" used rather than including detailed terms of agreement. Instead, it emphasized the importance of practice, such as "complete and rapid implementation" and "follow-up negotiations."

### **Attempts for a comprehensive solution**

The April 27 Panmunjeom Declaration is aimed at a comprehensive solution to problems on the Korean Peninsula. The declaration sets "a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through complete denuclearization" as one of the goals that must be achieved in the process of "establishing a permanent and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." The declaration speaks of the necessity of "step-by-step disarmament in line with a military confidence-building process," as well as "a complete denuclearization." The agreement is being implemented more concretely through the September 19 Pyeongyang Joint Statement and the Performance Agreement in the Military Sector in Accordance with the Panmunjeom Declaration, which are the results of the third summit between President Moon Jae-in and the Chairman Kim Jong-un.

As in the Declaration made by the South and North Korean leaders, the proceed of the agreement between North Korea and the U.S. is interesting. The agreement clearly stipulates that a comprehensive approach to the "establishment of a new North Korea-U.S. relationship" and the "building of a permanent peace regime" enables a "complete denuclearization." The attitude change

in the U.S. is particularly noteworthy. While abandoning its approach of give “meat” if North Korea gives up nuclear weapon, the U.S. clarified that the negotiations with North Korea are essentially related to the “improvement of relations” and are disarmament negotiations for peace related to the security assurance of the North Korean regime.

### **Preemptive Peace Actions and Threat Reduction Measures**

It is also distinguished from the past negotiations that the South and the North are preemptively implementing measures necessary for building trust. South Korea and the U.S. decided to put off Joint military exercises the Key Resolve Military Drill and the Foal Eagle Exercise by one month, which had been perceived as hurdles to initiating dialogue during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games. U.S. strategic assets, such as a nuclear carrier and a longrange strategic bomber, were not deployed in accordance with what North Korea had requested, thereby indirectly expressing South Korea’s and the US’s will for negotiations. It is noteworthy that President Trump himself called South Korea-U.S. joint drills “expensive, provocative war games setting a bad light during a good faith negotiation.”

On the other side, North Korea decided at the third plenary meeting of the 7th Worker’s Party Central Committee to halt conducting nuclear tests and test-firing intercontinental ballistic missiles” and dismantle “the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site” shortly before the summit meeting. In the wake of the September 19 Inter-Korean summit, Pyongyang said that “it will perpetually dismantle the nuclear facility in Yeongbyeon if the U.S. takes corresponding measures.”

In addition, the U.S. responded by expressing a willingness to defer joint military exercises with South Korea and actually postponed the Eulji Freedom Guardian Drill. It is noteworthy that President Trump himself called South Korea-U.S. joint drills “expensive, provocative war games setting a bad light during a good faith negotiation.” These preemptive measures have contributed to making the uncertain future of negotiations more optimistic.

### **3. Possibilities, Obstacles, and Direction of Resolution**

The direction for resolving the issues, agreed by the three countries is not much different from the

direction that civil society has consistently advocated<sup>21</sup>. However, there are a lot of negotiations and obstacles to be left to actually solve problems. The typical example is the second summit between the U.S. and North Korea, which was scheduled later this year but postponed to next year. The tug of war between the two countries continued over the process of North Korea's nuclear dismantlement and verification, lifting of sanctions on North Korea, and the declaration of a permanent ceasefire. In order for the ongoing negotiations to lead to the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, complete denuclearization, and sustainable development of relations among two Koreas and other neighboring countries, some of the following perception and approaches to practice are necessary. should be faithfully maintained.

### **Elimination of unilateralism and preemptive reduction of armaments**

First of all, South Korea and the U.S. should be alert to unilateral and subjective attitudes. and reflect on it we should change itself as well as contemplating how to change North Korea. While there are active debates over whether North Korea's will to denuclearization is genuine, there is a lack of discussions on what South Korea and the U.S. should give up in order to help North Korea give up its nuclear program. It is necessary to have an attitude of "putting yourself in the person's shoes" to respect the opponent and to examine problems from the opponent's standpoint. The most important

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<sup>21</sup> Prior to the summit meeting between North and South Korean leaders, a total of 16 civil and religious groups, including the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy suggested "the Four Principles for the Spring of Peace On the Korean Peninsula" on April 16. 4 principles are as follows: First, the South Korean government should find a comprehensive solution to turning the armistice system into a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and connect the normalization of the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. and Japan to the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons. Second, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be discussed within the paradigm of creating a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula or in Northeastern Asia. Third, the dialogue and cooperation between the authorities of North and South Korea should be institutionalized and extended and a variety of nongovernmental exchanges and cooperation should be guaranteed by establishing a continuously operational consultation body at a nongovernmental level. Fourth, a fundamental principle that any military activities in which the North, South, or the U.S. target one another must be halted for as long as the talks continue.

[http://www.peoplepower21.org/index.php?mid=English&document\\_srl=1560387&listStyle=list](http://www.peoplepower21.org/index.php?mid=English&document_srl=1560387&listStyle=list)

starting point is to recognize that like North Korea, the overwhelming military power of South Korea and the U.S. has threatened the opponent. South Korea has spent military expenditure higher than North Korea's total gross domestic product (GDP) every year for the past 30 years. This figure excludes the military expenditures of the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea. However, the Moon administration is still devising a defense plan to raise military spending by an annual average of 7.5 percent over the next five years from 2019 to 2023, while maintaining the aggressive military plans such as the three-axis system<sup>22</sup>. It is not convincing to further expand South Korean conventional arms, and at the same time, to demand North Korea give up nuclear weapons and missiles. Therefore, South Korea and the U.S. with military superiority should come up with a more proactive and initiating military reduction plan and put it into practice.

### **Consensus on nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia**

Second, discussions should be made in earnest on the final possible form of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, which all North and South Korea and the U.S. can identify. Complete denuclearization means the state that the nuclear threat to the Korean Peninsula is removed. This cannot be accomplished just by the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear weapons, and can be achieved by the disappearance of all military strategies depending on nuclear deterrent on and around the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear umbrella (extended deterrence) strategy on which South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, depend should be included agendas along with the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons. The "nuclear-free Korean Peninsula" mentioned in the April 27 Panmunjeon Declaration can only be realized through creating the nuclear free zone. In addition, the "security assurance to North Korea" mentioned in the June 12 North Korea-U.S. Summit is impossible without the removal of the nuclear umbrella. North Korea insisted in 2016 that "the U.S. Army, which has full control of the authority to use nuclear weapons in South Korea, be withdrawn." This has been paradoxically interpreted as North Korea's willingness to flexibly discuss the role of the U.S. Army if it gave up "its authority to use nuclear weapons." On the other hand, in the process of discussing the Korean Peninsula peace regime and the elimination of the nuclear threat, it is worth examining to urge the South and the North to preemptively join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Japan and neighboring nuclear powers to join the treaty by stages.

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<sup>22</sup> Three-axis system is consist of Kill Chain system, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPPR) system

## **Common Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia Based on Japan's Pacifist Constitution and the Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula**

Third, the dialogue for solving problems of the Korean Peninsula should be closely linked to efforts to alleviate military tensions in Northeast Asia and to establish a common security cooperation system. However, the issues to be solved for peace in the region are not just North Korean nuclear issues and military conflicts created around the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Another pressure trough of military conflicts is formed on the sea through issues of "dominium" and "freedom of navigation." The territorial disputes in this region, however, are a complex heritage from unfortunate history of imperialism, colonialism and world wars. In addition, the territorial disputes are deeply connected with the fundamental defects of the Treaty of San Francisco, which embodied the post-Cold War order in East Asia. Appealing to military means cannot address the territorial disputes and can even bring about serious disasters. Therefore, efforts to turn the armistice state of the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime should be made along with efforts to change the increasingly militarized Asian waters into a sea of peace and coexistence. In particular, efforts are essential to turn the strengthening militarism and the old military alliance structure in this region into an interdependent common security cooperation framework. In this regard, it is very worrisome that Japan's Peace Constitution, which is the basic premise of peace cooperation in East Asia, is in danger of being damaged by the name of "collective self-defense." The construction of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of Japan's Peace Constitution are key to the peaceful cooperation and prevention of armed conflicts in East Asia.

## **Imagination and optimism after the Cold War and reunification**

Fourth, it is necessary to exercise new imagination in order to escape stereotypes and taboos of the confrontational Cold War era. As already mentioned above, more than anything imaginable is happening in reality. Until now, antagonism and disbelief, military confrontation and oppression, which have been presented under the name of realism, have caused aggravation instead of solving problems. On the other hand, the more optimistic and peace-oriented approaches are proven effective. These approaches include comprehensive approaches, efforts to build trust, and preemptive peaceful actions. In the past, these approaches were misunderstood and criticized as overly naive and unrealistic, but now they have been proven as a very realistic and inevitable prescription to solve problems.

Changes are not happening only on the Korean Peninsula. Changes have also been detected in the South China Sea, which has been involved in conflicts for a long time. The countries concerned began negotiations this year with a single draft of a legally binding code of conduct in order to resolve these conflicts peacefully. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has taken into effect, is also a significant change.

The change in perception that peaceful coexistence directly leads to security is the key to bringing significant transition to the Korean Peninsula and this region. Now is the time for the governments and citizens of the countries concerned to imagine many possibilities and opportunities brought by peace and to demonstrate the optimistic will to definitely make those dreams a reality.

### **Changes driven not by security experts but by peace experts and citizens**

Finally, it is necessary to clarify that not only governments and “security experts” but also citizens are the key players in solving problems should act more boldly to resolve conflicts peacefully. Now, civic groups and researchers should speak more vigorously about the possibility and reality of peace based on peaceful means, arms reduction and common security, not based on nuclear weapons and military alliances. Now, peace experts, not security experts, should be able to work across borders. Now peace should be given opportunity.

## THE 6TH NAGASAKI GLOBAL CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### Workshop 1 'Progress in Peace Talks and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula – the Future of Northeast Asia without Nuclear Weapons'



Remarks by Anton Khlopkov, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies  
*November 16, 2018*

1. Significant progress in reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula has been achieved over the ten months to November 2018. Let us recall that only last December, the risk of military conflict was not only very high, but looked out of control. Massive joint U.S.-ROK military exercises were taking place in the region and the DPRK military forces were put on a heightened state of alert. Some of the foreign embassies in Pyongyang were working to improve emergency preparedness and seriously thinking about upgrading their bomb shelters, while some U.S. politicians were urging Pentagon to evacuate military families from South Korea and Japan.

There was also a risk to the XXIII Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang. I remember that period very well. I was planning a trip with my family to the Olympics. And in late December, by which time we had already made all the bookings, the idea of taking kids of school and pre-school age to a region that might be on the brink of a military crisis suddenly started to look questionable at best. After Chairman Kim Jong Un's 2018 New Year's Address and follow-on President Moon Jae-in diplomacy, the tensions subsided, and the Games proved a great success; we have enjoyed a lot with the Games.

2. Important steps were also made in 2018 **in the direction of the denuclearization** of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK has announced a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. Steps have been taken to render the nuclear test site in Punggye-ri inoperative. Following the Inter-Korean Summits, in the Panmunjom and Pyongyang declarations – as well as in the joint statements by President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un following the summit in Singapore – the parties reiterated the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As result of the Pyongyang Summit, the DPRK agreed to permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of international experts.

3. **Where are we today?** At this point, there are two main dialogue tracks, which are tightly connected. The first track is aimed at improving relations between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK. The second is aimed at achieving a détente between the United States and North Korea, as well as making progress towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It appears that the first-



track dialogue is making better progress; there have already been three meetings between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong Un.

The second track, meanwhile, is stagnating, despite the historic summit in Singapore. It is worth noting that the issue of denuclearization – which was previously channeled mainly through the USA-DPRK dialogue track at Pyongyang's own insistence – is now playing an increasingly prominent role on the agenda of inter-Korean meetings. A case in point is the Pyongyang Summit on September 18–20. In the declaration of that summit, Pyongyang expressed its willingness to dismantle permanently – on certain conditions – the nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. In the same document the two sides also agreed to cooperate closely in the process of pursuing complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In essence, the DPRK-ROK track has become the main engine of the progress in the dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. This owes much to President Moon Jae-in's policy on the DPRK.

**4. What next?** A rapid denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula clearly isn't a realistic possibility. In the short and medium term, the DPRK most likely will not abandon the nuclear capability which it has spent more than five decades building, and which the regime regards as a guarantee of its own survival.

Nevertheless, events in recent months have demonstrated that progress towards a denuclearization is possible – albeit at a slower pace than some might have hoped. All the main parties involved will need to show patience. The central principle of negotiations the parties must adopt is the principle of phased and reciprocal approach. That principle was used to a great effect in the Iranian nuclear talks.

I believe the principle of small steps or baby steps should dominate during the early phase of dialogue as an element of confidence building. The Joint Statement made at the Singapore summit contains a very important idea: mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

**5. What are the possibilities regarding confidence-building measures?** Speaking of the military side of things, the parties could set up a trilateral mechanism (DPRK, ROK, and USA) that would regulate military drills (both in the North and in the South) and ensure their transparency. These measures could be applied both to the national drills by the ROK and the DPRK forces, and to bilateral and/or multilateral exercises held in their territory and off their shores. Such a mechanism might include abolishing any drills within a certain swathe of territory on both sides of the demilitarized zone and coastline; inviting each other's observers to the drills; mutual briefings about

the details of the exercises; etc. The fact that the United States and South Korea have not conducted any joint drills on the Korean Peninsula in recent months is an important achievement.

6. As for the nuclear side of things, one of the first steps might include setting up a dialogue mechanism to produce an agreed definition of what exactly a “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” actually means. The term has often been used in joint documents, include the ones adopted earlier this year – but the parties very likely don’t interpret the term in the same way.

We are talking about a more comprehensive solution than simply achieving the DPRK’s nuclear disarmament. The same applies to verification measures, which should be applied on both sides of the Peninsula as part of its denuclearization.

7. I have already mentioned the need to use a phased and reciprocal approach in pursuing the next steps. We need to think about what the reciprocal measures might be should the DPRK prove willing to move forward. My personal impression is that there is a growing pressure in Pyongyang over the lack of “reciprocal”, compensatory steps by the other parties. Negotiations are a two-way street, and the reciprocal measures that would offer some benefits to North Korea should be stepped up. Otherwise, the whole process risks grinding to a halt, or even relapsing into another escalation any time now.

In this context, we should consider the possibility of using exemptions from the UNSC sanctions resolutions in order to implement some specific projects involving the DPRK. Such projects might include the Northern and Southern railway systems connection as the first step. Restart joint ROK-DPRK operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and easing restrictions on the use of North Korean labor force abroad could be next in the list.

8. Speaking of the format of the dialogue on formulating the next steps to reduce tensions and achieve progress towards denuclearization, we can use the experience of the Iranian nuclear talks, which proved to be successful. Multinational approach that includes the countries of the region and combines bilateral and multilateral tracks, as it was in the case of Iran negotiations, looks the most promising and sustainable one. Despite of the Trump Administration decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, I do believe the so-called ‘Iran deal’ is an exceptional example of the art of diplomacy.

As part of the talks in such a format on the Korean Peninsula we could also borrow from Iran negotiations such principles as mutual respect, reciprocity, and recognition of state sovereignty and security interests of all parties.

What is also important: the DPRK’s partners at the talks should not put forward impossible

conditions. They should not demand things that no sovereign state would ever accept, barring a military defeat.

At a certain stage, we should be also ready to reiterate North Korea's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy under the IAEA safeguards, as well as its right to peaceful space exploration under reasonable transparency measures.

The long term goal of this dialogue should be development of peace and security mechanisms in Northeast Asia.

And in conclusion I would like to remind that the Panmunjom Declaration also emphasizes the role of the international community support and cooperation in denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which creates a framework for all countries of the Northeast Asia, including Japan, to contribute to the process creatively and constructively.

**Statement by Dr. Enkhsaikhan at workshop 1 on Peace Building and Provision for Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula**

Nagasaki, Japan

16 November 2018



As a small country Mongolia follows the saying that a duck is tranquil when the lake is calm. Hence there is an interest in Mongolia to be proactive and try to contribute to promoting trust and predictability in Northeast Asia. It maintains close relations with the two Koreas: a traditional close relationship with the DPRK and is developing strategic relationship with the Republic of Korea.

***What can Mongolia contribute to trust and cooperation ?***

***General policy line***

It pursues a pragmatic foreign policy and promotes a good-neighborly policy with all the countries. With respect to its immediate two neighbors it pursues a balanced relations of good-neighborliness, non-alliance and neutrality in possible Sino-Russian disputes that do not affect Mongolia's vital interest. It has no territorial or border dispute nor major problems with the neighbors. In a broader sense, it tries to play a role of an impartial, non-threatening neutral state in good standing with them and other states. This is a huge plus for Mongolia.

Mongolia believes that all states, including small states can and should play their role in addressing common threats and challenges in this ever interconnected world. Role of Malta (Law of the Sea Conference), and Oman (in initiating direct US-Iran contacts that led in the end to JCPOA) are inspiring examples. In that spirit Mongolia is committed to be not only a consumer of regional security and stability, but also, to the extent possible, a contributor. Thus it promotes an active policy, especially at multilateral for a, including at the United Nations. It hosts the International Think Tank for Land Locked Developing Countries<sup>23</sup>. As part of the Paris agreement

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<sup>23</sup> Most of them are least developed countries with no free access to the seas and thus world markets. The think tank is to make studies and provide suggestions to its members how to address their geographical challenges. A land-locked country itself, it sees its role in this XXI century as transit service provider between Europe and Northeast Asia. To that end it is negotiating a more affordable transit services agreements with its neighbors.

on climate change it is speedily introducing renewable, i.e. sun and wind energy technology, especially in the vast Gobi desert area<sup>24</sup> with the goal of sharing in the energy with others.

Mongolia is also a state with a nuclear-weapon-free status that is recognized by the United Nations as contributing to regional confidence, predictability and stability. The P5 in their joint declaration of 2012 have pledged to Mongolia and in fact to themselves “to respect the status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it”, about which you all know well. Hence its territory of 1.5 mln sq. kilometer will be an area of stability and predictability.

Therefore it is not surprising that Mongolia calls for greater confidence building and dialogue among the states of the region and tries to contribute to this process. With that in mind in 2013 Mongolia initiated the so-called Ulaanbaatar Northeast Asian security dialogue (**UBD**) to promote confidence and cooperation, especially in soft or non-traditional security areas. It is an inclusive process (in this case representatives of both Koreas participate) in which scholars, experts and even some officials in their personal capacities take part to exchange views and discuss issues of common concern or interest. **Trustpolitik** is more effective coming from the state that enjoys trust and confidence of all the parties concerned. The annually held meetings of UBD contribute to confidence and understanding, and provide opportunity for the representatives to meet and talk, if not negotiate. The thematic areas of UBD are determined by mutual interest of the participants. Besides general exchange of views on the political situation and atmosphere, UBD focuses on regional economic, energy and infrastructure development issues. With each meeting, the number of interested participants is increasing.

***Mongolia's possible contribution could be:***

- Serve as a neutral venue for bilateral or trilateral unofficial or even official meetings; Mongolian representatives could play a role of a facilitator, if not mediator;
- Mongolia hosts CTBTO's certified primary seismic, infrasound and radionuclide stations and a noble gas detection system. This also can contribute to greater confidence regarding any nuclear weapon tests in the region. If need be, Mongolian experts can participate in monitoring or in some follow-up measures;
- During future talks on the verification mechanism, which would of course be inevitable, Mongolia can contribute to the discussions and later form part of the agreed verification mechanism regarding denuclearization. Its experts, that had worked as IAEA inspectors

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<sup>24</sup> This area has lots of wind and sunshine.

and have served as such in the Agency's verification missions to DPRK and Iran, can play a useful role;

- Mongolia would also be prepared to share its experience in turning the country into a state with internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-status to which the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) provide security assurances by having pledged to Mongolia and to each other to respect that status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it.
- Mongolia can also share its experience in making use of multilateral cooperation mechanism to promote not only its security, but also economic and social agenda. For example Mongolia's cooperation with the IAEA provides it with invaluable advice and assistance to make use of the Agency's expertise and the potential to prevent or fight cancer, increase food production and preservation, use nuclear technology for mining and other important areas, as well as to train nuclear specialists.
- Mongolia has expressed its readiness, on an informal basis, to work with the countries of the region to see if and how a NEA-NWFZ could be established. To that end Mongolia has organized and participated a number informal meetings to address the issue. This process can be continued at another level by focusing on concrete promising areas.
- Politically, it can also share its experience in making a successful simultaneous economic and political changes that prove to be effective;
- As fellow member of the Non-Aligned Movement, if need be, it can also work with the DPRK in addressing some of the latter's pressing issues, including, getting support for weakening of international sanctions or assisting it in greater involvement in international issues that affect its interests, including working with the IAEA, UN Specialized agencies and regional organizations.

***Possible role of Mongolian civil society:***

- Civil society's role is increasing today. Its voice, experience and influence are becoming an important factor at national levels and in international relations. Many civil society organizations have found their due place in their societies, while international civil society organizations, such as ICAN (2017)<sup>25</sup> has received Nobel Peace Prizes for their work and efforts. As international practice demonstrates, the civil society can play a unique role in raising issues, addressing them from perspectives that can be most useful. Close cooperation among region's civil society organizations can also produce positive results.
- In 2015, together with GPPAC Northeast Asian peer focal points and the regional secretariat, Blue Banner has launched a so-called Ulaanbaatar process (**UBP**) to create

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<sup>25</sup> Medecins sans frontiers (1990), the Pugwash conferences on Science and World Affairs (1995), IPPNW (1985) and Amnesty International (1977)

space for civil society organizations to exchange information and views on issues of common interest or concern and share their findings with the respective governments. The primary area of their attention so far has been the situation on and around the Korean peninsula. In doing so, as an inclusive process, UBD is expected to make use of its comparative advantage of raising and discussing issues in an informal atmosphere in search for possible solutions. In that sense it could serve as a lab for different ideas and approaches to issues. Thus last year UBP adopted a summary document on Korean peninsula related issues with which representatives of both Koreas, as well as of China, Japan, Russia, the U.S. and Mongolia have all agreed. In short a lowest yet jointly agreed formula was found. At that meeting Blue Banner has pointed for the need to recognize the DPRK as a de facto nuclear-weapon state and act accordingly, and invite its representatives in regional think tank meetings and joint projects.

- Last year UBP has published for the public a joint book entitled “Reflections on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: Perspectives from the Ulaanbaatar process” that captured diverse opinions, concerns and tensions and contradictions in the region by mid-2017. The chapters focused on regional security, vision for a NEA-NWFZ, on Korean peninsula security issues and their impact on regional stability as well as civil society dialogue and multi-track diplomacy in peacebuilding in the region. UBP believes that dissemination of different perspectives on issues of common concern and interest as well as sharing of ideas can serve as important sources for better understanding and promoting confidence.
- Though the representatives of the DPRK expressed interest in hosting UBP this year, however due to the its need to work out a general rule on issuing visas for Republic of Korean visitors, it was agreed to hold such a meeting in the near future.

## 分科会 2

### 被爆の継承 ヒバクシャの想いに学び・伝える

#### Workshop II

#### Carrying on the legacy of *hibakusha*

#### - learning from, and transmitting, the thoughts of nuclear victims

#### コーディネーター Coordinators

升本 由美子 Yumiko Masumoto	日本：福祉生活協同組合いきいきコープ理事長 Japan, Director, IkiIki Welfare Co-op
吉田 睦子 Mutsuko Yoshida	日本：(公財) 長崎平和推進協会国際交流部会長 Japan, Group Leader, International Exchange Group, Nagasaki Foundation for the Promotion of Peace

#### パネリスト Panelists

スーザン・サザード Susan Southard	アメリカ：作家・長崎平和特派員 USA, Author, Nagasaki : Life After Nuclear War, Nagasaki Peace Correspondent
キャサリン・サリバン Kathleen Sullivan	アメリカ：Hibakusha Stories ディレクター、国連軍縮部軍縮教育 アドバイザー、長崎平和特派員 USA, Director, Hibakusha Stories, Nagasaki Peace Correspondent, Education consultant to the United Nations office for Disarmament Affairs
門 隆 Takashi Kado	日本：被爆者 Japan, Hibakusha
山西 咲和 Sawa Yamanishi	日本：被爆三世 Japan, third generation Hibakusha



**2018 Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly**  
**for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**



**Presentation by Susan Southard**

Dr. Tomonaga, conference organizers, Yoshida-san, Masumoto-san, fellow panelists, and ladies and gentlemen,

I am so happy to be back in Nagasaki, a city I love so much.

It's an honor to participate in this conference on how we, Civil Society, can work for the next stage of nuclear disarmament after the adoption of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. While the treaty continues to gain support from nations throughout the world, we are also living in a volatile and dangerous political climate, and gatherings like these allow us to reenergize, learn from one another, and build new collaborations.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this particular panel on how to carry forward the stories of *hibakusha*, whose experiences are at the heart of our work to eliminate nuclear weapons throughout the world. Along with activism at every level of government and civil society, keeping *hibakusha* stories alive in public memory and awareness is critical to our efforts—and to history itself.

As the author of *Nagasaki: Life After Nuclear War*, my work in this field has taken place mostly in the United States, the country that dropped the atomic bombs on Japan. The country that, with Russia, has led the world in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. A country that resolutely refuses to consider the nuclear weapons ban treaty. A place where ground-level citizen support of the treaty is vital if we are to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

This is where I tell *hibakusha* stories.

As an American working in this field, today I'd like to tell you briefly about my book, give you a sense of how Americans respond to the book, and tell you some of the strategies I've utilized to help Americans think differently, and more deeply, about both the atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and our country's current nuclear weapons policies.

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*Nagasaki: Life After Nuclear War* was published in 2015 for the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the atomic bombings of Japan.

It tells the very personal stories of 5 *hibakusha*—all of whom were teenagers at the time of the bombing—and the unimaginable and enduring impact of nuclear war on them and the city over the next 70 years.

Since then, *Nagasaki* has been published in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Taiwan, and China. And I am happy to tell you that it will be published here in Japan by the summer of 2020.

I couldn't have written this book without the immense support from *hibakusha* and their families and so many others throughout Nagasaki who helped me in countless ways. I am eternally grateful.

As I wrote *Nagasaki*, I came to understand that for many people across the world, the historical image of the atomic bombings of Japan has been—and still is—a mushroom cloud rising high over Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Many people think of the bombings as abstract events of the distant past.

Further, in the United States today, many people still believe—very strongly—that dropping the bombs on Japan was the right thing to do. For the past 73 years, we've been told that the atomic bombings were an absolute military necessity: *That they ended the war and saved a million American lives*. I learned this as a child, and it's what most Americans are still taught today.

We are not taught about the complex factors involved in the U.S. decision to use the bombs, the connections—or lack thereof—between the atomic bombings and Japan's decision to surrender, or the ways in which our government put forth this official narrative to manipulate public opinion about the atomic bombings and our country's ongoing nuclear weapon development.

Even more importantly, though, the unquestioned belief—that the bombs ended the war and saved a million American lives—allows Americans to not look at the realities of these nuclear attacks: The reality, for example, that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were cities filled with civilians. And the reality of what happened to the hundreds of thousands of men, women and children beneath those mushroom clouds—in August 1945 and in the days, months, and decades that followed.

This lack of even basic knowledge about the bombings makes it easier for Americans— and people from other countries who are similarly uninformed—to believe what they are taught about

the bombings, and to accept their nations' nuclear weapons policies *without ever having to think about what these weapons do*.

This lack of knowledge allows people to believe that nuclear weapons are both rational and indispensable. This is heartbreaking to me, but it is the reality we face.

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*Hibakusha* stories play such a huge role in the movement to eliminate nuclear weapons because they offer people throughout the world the other side of the story.

I'm grateful to be a part of this movement. Since its publication, people in the United States and many other nations have read *Nagasaki*, and I've had the opportunity to speak across the United States and abroad. People's responses to the book have given me a clear sense of the huge amount of work we have to do to build widespread grass-roots support for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Let me start by saying that many people who have read *Nagasaki* or heard me speak are thoughtful and caring. They express deep empathy for *hibakusha* and feel profound regret for dropping the bombs.

But I've also received angry comments, emails, and letters from Americans who, with great vitriol, remind me about Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the mass atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in China, and the Japanese military's torture and killing of Allied POWs.

Many Americans have said to me—and I sincerely apologize for repeating these words, but I think it's important for us to understand these sentiments...Many Americans have said that the bombings were justified and that the Japanese deserved the nuclear attacks. They passionately defend the atomic bombings and believe that nuclear weapons keep us safe today. To them, these points of view make total sense.

Again, I apologize for repeating these offensive views, even more so for uttering them here in Nagasaki. I bring them to you so they can inform our approaches as we bring *hibakusha* stories to the world.

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For me, the question becomes: How do we get people—and nations—with these harsh and ill-informed perspectives to hear us? How do we change the minds of people who believe that nuclear

weapons are absolutely essential to our safety?

Social psychologists tell us that our individual values are greatly influenced by unconscious fears and desires that are not easily swayed by reason. So when we talk with people whose viewpoints are radically different from our own, it's rarely effective to offer correct historical facts as a means to change their minds.

Therefore, I start every presentation with *hibakusha* stories. Stories that are so powerful and easy to identify with that the atomic bombings are no longer abstract concepts. Stories that transport audiences across time and culture to a place where *hibakusha* are unique individuals with whom audiences feel a human connection.

This is hardly a new idea, but it's a valuable reminder that *hibakusha* stories resonate not only with already-sympathetic listeners; they can also touch—at least sometimes—those who defend and justify the atomic bombings. Even if their perceptions about the atomic bombings don't change right away, once people have heard *hibakusha* stories, they will not forget them.

That said, even as people are deeply moved by these stories, when it comes to the need for nuclear weapons today, many Americans still have deeply-ingrained fears about the dangers posed by our enemies. These fears—combined with a desire for superiority and our misconceptions about the atomic bombings and the value of nuclear deterrence—lead many Americans to strongly defend America's current nuclear policies. Consequently, they also reject—if they even know about it—the nuclear weapons ban treaty.

Massive shifts in perspective are needed and difficult to achieve. So, when I speak in the United States, after opening with powerful *hibakusha stories*, I help people think more deeply about the U.S. nuclear attacks on Japan and the urgent need to eliminate nuclear weapons today. There are three strategies I've used to do this.

The first strategy is to train audiences to listen across political divides. In the United States—and I'm wondering how it is in Japan—listening across our vast political differences seems almost nonexistent. This is a serious problem for our anti-nuclear efforts at the grass-roots level.

So now, some of my presentations include interactive exercises that train people with opposing beliefs to listen to and understand one another's views and the values that lie beneath them. We don't have to agree with each other or give up our own values to do this, but we do need to let go of our own sense of righteousness, at least for a little while. It's about listening to and understanding others

as we ourselves would like to be heard and understood.

These listening practices usually don't change people's views overnight, and I don't do them with extremists at either end of the political spectrum. But this work does open people to differing perspectives and sets the stage for civil dialogue on nuclear weapons, which makes it a valuable tool for our movement.

The second strategy is to acknowledge peoples' views about the bombings and then move to ethical considerations of nuclear weapons today. For example, when, as a defense of the atomic bombings, people angrily condemn Japan for its military aggressions and inhumane actions during the war, rather than argue that this isn't a reason to justify the atomic bombings, I first agree with them: *Yes, I say, Japan did commit these atrocities, and we rightfully condemn them.* This diffuses some of the tension right away.

I then tell my audiences—and most Americans don't know this—that during the war, the United States and its Allies bombed and incinerated all or part of 66 Japanese cities, killing, maiming, or irradiating almost 400,000 civilians. Adding this truth allows for a more complex view of this part of Pacific War history.

Because these facts coexist. One side is not more true—or more ethical—than the other. And neither absolves either country from responsibility for the unspeakable harm they caused to civilians of nations they called their enemies.

Moving forward, I ask people to think about how indiscriminately killing, injuring, and irradiating hundreds of thousands of civilians can *ever* be justified. In today's terms, we call that terrorism. Reframing nuclear weapons in this way guides Americans to reexamine our country's current policies.

To expand people's thinking on the nuclear weapons ban treaty, my third strategy is to talk with them about the dangers of our nuclear stockpiles and the flaws of nuclear deterrence as a policy of self-protection.

Everyone here may know this, but most people in the world haven't thought about the extreme dangers of even the existence of nuclear weapons—that whether by military order, accident, or an act of terrorism, we are now at extremely high risk for far worse humanitarian and environmental nuclear disasters than Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Most people don't realize that the only way to prevent such cataclysmic annihilation is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. No other measure can achieve this goal.

People's fears of their nation's enemies and their desire for self-protection are in many cases understandable. What's misdirected, however, is their belief that nuclear weapons are the answer to their fears. So I take time to break down the flaws of nuclear deterrence theory to illuminate the truth that nuclear weapons do not, in fact, provide the protection we desire. Some key points I include are:

- First, nuclear deterrence policies are intended to protect us—but in truth, they can't stop a nuclear attack; if they could, we wouldn't be worried about North Korea, Iran, or any other nation with nuclear weapons.
- Second, the success of nuclear deterrence requires technological invulnerability and rational decision makers, neither of which can be guaranteed.
- Third, the possession of nuclear weapons by one nation seems only to encourage the development of nuclear weapons by others.
- Finally, the most important flaw in our nuclear deterrence policies relate to ethical and moral considerations. That is, for nuclear deterrence to work, *each nation must be both committed to and believed by other nations to be committed to the mass murder, injury, and irradiation of huge civilian populations.*

I ask people: Is this what we as a nation are willing to commit to? Does this reflect our most deeply-held moral beliefs?

Using *hibakusha* stories to open people's hearts, and then implementing these three strategies—listening across political divides, examining the ethics of nuclear weapons, and confronting the myth of these weapons as self-protection—helps people rethink their points of view. My goal is to encourage people to find new and ethical ways to alleviate their fears and consider new policies that eliminate nuclear weapons across the globe.

\* \* \*

I close all of my talks with a story that brings us back to the *hibakusha* experience.

So today I'd like to tell you about Nagasaki *hibakusha* Wada Kōichi-san—and something he said to me a number of years ago that continues to inspire me today.

Wada-san was an 18-year-old streetcar driver at the time of the bombing. He is 91 now. During one of my interviews with him when he was in his mid-eighties, he told me that he still had nightmares of Hotarujaya Terminal crashing down on top of him.

If you can call *anything* about surviving nuclear war lucky, he was one of the lucky ones, because he suffered only minor injuries and mild radiation sickness—and all of his family members survived. Though his family evacuated after the bombing, Wada-san stayed in the city. He lit the match on his best friend's funeral pyre. Day after day, he served on rescue and recovery teams. And in November 1945, when seven streetcars resume services in Nagasaki, Wada-san drove the fourth one, thrilled to be a part of the city's recovery.

Sixty years after the bombing, Wada-san woke up every morning at 5:00 a.m., opened his bedroom window, and looked out at the expanse of the Urakami Valley. He marveled that the city before him, stretching all the way to the bay and beyond, was built out of those atomic ruins.

“One person can't do anything,” he said, “but if many people gather together, they can accomplish unimaginable things. If it's possible to rebuild this city out of nothing, why isn't it possible for us to eliminate war and nuclear weapons, to create peace? “We can't *not* do it!”

\* \* \*

In memory of the hundreds of thousands of *hibakusha* who died 73 years ago and in the years that followed, and in memory of the countless more *hibakusha* who faced the terrors of post-nuclear survival...May their courage, strength, and perseverance infuse us with these same qualities as we carry their stories forward.

May we take vision and inspiration, too, from the leaders and members of ICAN and the diplomats who led the nuclear weapons ban treaty to passage in the United Nations.

And, in solidarity with all *hibakusha* and activists past and present, may the strength, commitment, and vision of all of us here today manifest a turning point in human history...one that ensures that Nagasaki, where we are gathered, is the last atomic bombed city in history.

Thank you.

## **Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**

**Kathleen Sullivan, PhD**

### **Transmission of Atomic Bomb Experience**

**~ How to Learn and Propagate Hibakushas' Thought**



#### **Dedication**

I would like to dedicate my remarks this morning to my dear friends, Sakue Shimohira and Koichi Wada. In 2002, I came to Nagasaki for the first time invited by the Japanese Government as a demonstration of its commitment to implementing the 34 recommendations of the UN Study on Disarmament and Non Proliferation Education. I was invited to share interactive disarmament education workshops in high schools in Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Kochi.

Shimohira san and Wada san were asked to meet with me here in Nagasaki. We had an hour-long formal interview together for the media, and from there we spent the rest of that day, creating a bond through our shared commitment. I am most grateful for my long friendship with Shimohira san and Wada san.

Shimohira san was a 10 year old child on August 9<sup>th</sup>. She became orphaned by the bomb and has used her life energy ever since she was young, penning an essay in Dr. Nagai's book *Children of the Mushroom Cloud*, up to this very moment. By the looks of her diary, she often shares her testimony several times each day, reliving her pain to describe what nuclear weapons do and mean so that others can find the inspiration to act for abolition.

Wada san was a young train conductor, 18 years old on August 9<sup>th</sup>. He recalls seeing a dear friend horrifically die, whose last words, a teenager like himself, were "Why did I have to die like this? I did nothing wrong." For many years those words haunted Wada san. For many years he kept his pain to himself until he held one of his grandchildren in his arms for the first time — the memories flooded back and he decided to dedicate the remainder of his years to sharing his story.

Our memories are so much a part of who we are, and when we think about how to transmit hibakusha testimony for present and future generations, keeping the memories and the stories alive is the most critical factor.

In my presentation, I would like to share my thoughts on using the arts as an effective means to learn and propagate hibakusha testimony, to keep their memories and motivations alive.

#### **The art of storytelling**



Hibakusha Stories, the organization I have been honoured to work for over the last decade, is a project of Youth Arts New York, we use the arts to engage youth in building a peaceful and sustainable future. Over these years, we have brought hibakusha testimony into the schools and universities of more than 45,000 young people – primarily the international youth of New York City but also in Florida, Oklahoma and in various European countries as well as here in Japan.

We have also stewarded the hibakusha message within the UN, by organizing testimony sessions for UN tour guides so they can augment their message with the first hand-witness of the hibakusha. Together with Peace Boat, ICAN and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, we have supported hibakusha testimony at the United Nations through photo exhibitions, side events, special receptions with testimony and music, as well as interventions in First Committee and NPT disarmament fora and most recently during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Yet of all Hibakusha Stories activities our favourite place to be is in the auditoriums and classrooms, working directly with young people, bringing them face to face with living history through encounters with hibakusha themselves. And through these encounters we've engaged theatre arts, music, dance and fine arts to further their message. Here are a few highlights.

### **Theatre arts and kamishibai**

Students have participated in day-long interactive workshops to listen to testimony then work in small groups with NYC based playwrights to create and perform one act plays based on the life of the hibakusha whose testimony they listened to that day. Here is Hiroshima hibakusha Reiko Yamada working with high school students from Manhattan. This work was developed for Hibakusha Stories by Chiori Miyagawa, whose play "I have Been to Hiroshima Mon Amour" was inspired by meeting hibakusha through our project. Students have also produced series of Kamishibai, having heard hibakusha testimony and drawing their interpretations.

### **Animation**

Working together with London-based artist Amber Cooper-Davies, who uses cut paper and stop motion animation, we have produced *The Nuclear Age in Six Movements* illustrating the nuclear fuel chain together with hibakusha testimony and *If You Love This Planet* an animation of Setsuko Thurlow's speech the day the TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017. Amber's animations were originally commissioned for our concert at the New York Society for Ethical Culture....

### **With Love to Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Concert For Disarmament**

For the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we took our art out of the classroom and into the theatre itself by writing and producing WITH LOVE to Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Concert for Disarmament. It was an evening of music and spoken word hosted by

Clifton Truman Daniel, grandson of US President Harry S Truman, with remarks by the most beloved mayor on earth, Nagasaki's own, Tomihisa Taue. The concert was presented in six movements - Gratitude, The Manhattan Project, The Moment, The Bomb Today, The Power and the Waste and The Journey Towards Nuclear Guardianship - punctuated by Amber's animations. Music, art and poetry intermixed with testimony was the evening's theme. Nagasaki hibakusha Yasuaki Yamashita talked about the flowers that arose from the devastation and the hope they brought him and how he incorporates these delicate images in his own work as a painter and ceramicist. Setsuko Thurlow unfurled a banner with the names of over 300 classmates from Hiroshima Jogakuin Girls School who perished from the bomb. Shigeko Sasamori spoke of being a Hiroshima Maiden, brought to New York for reconstructive surgeries in 1955.

Of the many musical performances that evening, two stand out. Masaaki Tanokura, Concertmaster of the Osaka Philharmonic Orchestra, accompanied by his wife Tomoko Sawada on piano, played the hibaku Jogakuin Violin, a Russian violin that was rescued from the rubble of Hiroshima. And Nagasaki's own All Hibakusha Himawari Choir performed together with LaGuardia Arts High School vocal students an anthem to nuclear guardianship composed for our event by Brooklyn based singer-songwriter Jean Rohe.

One audience member remarked, "The concert last night was stunning and unforgettable. The choir of atomic bomb survivors gave me an experience that is hard to convey. The audience was deeply moved, but what was worth noting was the obvious emoting that the choir singers expressed. And to hear that they each individually raised the money to bring themselves to New York for their participation leaves me...well, speechless. And if that wasn't enough, to have them joined by the students from LaGuardia Arts High School just put the performance into the stratosphere. I left the event last night with a profound sense of gratitude."

The concert honored the achievements of all hibakusha who have spent a lifetime working for nuclear disarmament. In addition to the many hibakusha presenting and performing on stage, in the audience were a Delegation of Atomic Bomb Survivors from Nagasaki; Hibakusha Stories Fellow Reiko Yamada; Fukuoka Prefecture Mayor Soichiro Takashima; Terumi Tanaka, and Fujimori Toshiki of Hidankyo.

### **Fine arts**

Another art forward production for the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary year was Hibakusha Stories collaboration with Yoshiko Hayakawa, Takayuki Koderu and Yukinori Okamura of the Maruki Gallery to produce an exhibition of six Hiroshima Panels at Pioneer Works Center for Art and Innovation in Red Hook Brooklyn. Abstract expressionist masterworks sometimes referred to as the Guernica of Japan, the Hiroshima Panels were painted by husband and wife team Iri and Toshi Maruki over a 32-year period.

Unique and unprecedented in the world, they have been exhibited extensively throughout Japan and Europe, but have made precious few appearances in the United States. The exhibit also included a set of black and white posters of historic photographs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and artefacts from Nagasaki given to me by Sakue Shimohira. The 1986 Academy Award nominated *Hellfire: A Journey from Hiroshima* which captures the Marukis in their decades-long collaboration to create the Hiroshima Panels was screened on a continuous loop in a small black box theatre. The exhibition was seen by thousands of New Yorkers, and voted second best out of 10 for art installations throughout Brooklyn in 2015.

Eiko Otake, a Guggenheim and MacArthur fellow, performed with the works as part of her two year-long solo project *A Body in Places*. During the month long exhibition, Hibakusha Stories presented 7 full-day disarmament education programs to hundreds of high school and university students from the New York City metro area at Pioneer Works where they viewed the Hiroshima Panels and Nagasaki atomic bomb artifacts and heard the first hand witness of our long time collaborators, Setsuko Thurlow and Yasuaki Yamashita. During the day-long workshop students responded to the art, artefacts and testimony in words and drawings.

### **National Sawdust**

In October 2016 we produced the *Hiroshima Panels Project*, a collaboration between Guggenheim Fellow artist and filmmaker Cynthia Madansky, choreographer Eiko Otake, pianist Dan Tepfer, violinist Meg Okura and multi-reedist Sam Sadigursky — an immersive experience through music, art, dance and testimony at Brooklyn based performance venue National Sawdust. Again drawing on the power of the Maruki's masterworks, Cynthia made a film from footage of the Hiroshima Panels at Pioneer Works that Sam, Meg and Dan improvised to, and Eiko danced for. In attendance were 12 atomic bomb survivors who were in New York with Peace Boat's Global Hibakusha Voyage. In addition to the live improvisation in response to Cynthia's film of Eiko dancing to the Hiroshima Panels, two hibakusha travelling with Peace Boat shared their testimony and engaged an audience of 100 local high school students to learn more about current nuclear realities and be inspired to take action for disarmament.

### **The art of film-making**

Highlighting Shimohira san and Wada san's story, I made two films with Robert Richter *The Last Atomic Bomb* and *The Ultimate Wish: Ending the Nuclear Age*. Using film is one way to memorialize hibakusha testimony and the storytellers themselves. There are many excellent films about hibakusha that have been produced over many decades. As we create tools and dialogue around testimony transmission, let us create and keep a catalogue of films that highlight hibakusha testimony and host such a list on ICAN's website as a resource for students, researchers and educators. We could engage an educational campaign to learn through viewing and recommending

films for such a catalogue.

### **The art of writing**

Wada san's life is captured by the work of Susan Southard in her extraordinary, award-winning book *Nagasaki Life After Nuclear War*. I am honored to share this panel with Susan who has become my friend through our shared love of Nagasaki. Susan's book has been called "essential reading in our hyper-violent time". It is a gentle and searing document, important for all who work for nuclear abolition.

We say abolition because we draw strength from another abolition movement, the abolition of slavery. The abolition of slavery happened primarily because people woke up to the abhorrence, the absolute depravity of owning fellow human beings and forcing them to labour or die. Tragically, slavery still exists, though it has no place in a world of laws and ethics. Likewise the abolition of nuclear weapons – though we will continue to possess the knowledge of how to create them, and the memories of a world in which they were used — there should be no moral or ethical code, no system of laws that allow for their existence. And here we might mention the....

### **The art of diplomacy**

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is creating and bringing into force new legal norms that prohibit developing, testing, possessing, hosting, using, and threatening to use nuclear weapons. The treaty also contains positive obligations for states parties to assist in achieving its humanitarian aims, including the recognition of victims and survivors. The treaty recognizes hibakusha by name. And the Nobel Peace Prize for ICAN in 2017, for our "ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition" of nuclear weapons, was another way the hibakusha message has been brought to the world stage. Here Setsuko Thurlow makes her final preparations before representing all hibakusha in her Nobel Lecture on behalf of our campaign.

### **Photography as the art of messaging**

I have used many photos in this presentation, by photographers who dedicate their time and energy to nuclear abolition — Ari Beser, Paule Saviano, Janis Lewin and Robert Croonquist. There are many photos here at the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum that daily inform visitors. Without words so much can be said. So it is with this year's Holy Card of Pope Francis — "The Fruits of War" Few people outside of Nagasaki will understand that in 1945 the largest population of Catholics in all of Asia lived in what would be ground zero of the world's first plutonium bomb. Obscenely code-named Fat Man the bomb incinerated much of this city, with more than 70,000 primarily women, children and elderly were murdered by harnessing the most fundamental binding force of the universe and tearing it apart to unleash a radioactive hellfire on this city 73 years ago. The German poet Rainer Maria Rilke said "No feeling is final". From the

unexplainable/unimaginable suffering of the hibakusha to their inspiration, their motivation and action for a world without nuclear weapons, a world without war, is perhaps the greatest example of all arts — the art of love, the art of cultivating compassion.

### **Love as communication**

Inspiring our action for disarmament by connecting with who and what we love, recognizing the we could lose it all, as what happened right here in 1945, let us pause for a moment to reflect on those images of the faces and places, the music, the art and literature that gives our lives meaning. [Take two moments silence with the bell] Let us let this be the guiding force for our work to abolish nuclear weapons, and to safeguard our beautiful planet for ourselves and for future generations.

Thank you.

## 被爆者 門 隆



ご来場の皆様、こんにちは。

本日は、ようこそ。「歴史と異国情緒が残るロマンチックな街」長崎市へお越しいただき、ありがとうございます。

私は、「門 隆」（かど たかし）と申します。

漢字で書くと、名字は、入場門の門（もん）と書き、名前は、明治維新の英雄「せごどん」こと、西郷隆盛の隆（たか）と書きます。

年齢は、今月で 83 歳になります。

参考のために、これが後期高齢者医療保険証のカードで、もう一つが、被爆者健康手帳です。（会場で見せる）

これから話す内容が、いくらか前後するかも知りませんが、その時は、温かくお許しください。

今から戦時中の話になりますが、私は、実際に戦争を見てきました。  
色んなできごとが起こり、多くの体験をしてまいりました。

戦争は、なぜ起ったのだろう？・・・と。

今から 73 年前、当時、私は、9 歳で「磨屋国民学校」の 4 年生でした。

昭和 19 年末頃よりひんぱんに「警戒警報」「空襲警報」とサイレンが鳴り響き、昭和 20 年に入ると 1 日に 2 回や 3 回と空襲警報の連続でした。

私の住まいは、爆心地から 3.5Km 離れた市内の一番の繁華街の銅座町で、家族は 6 人。父は爆心地から 1.2Km の三菱兵器工場へ、一番上の兄は兵隊へ、姉は長崎県庁勤め、3 つ上の兄は爆心地から 600m 離れた「長崎商業学校」へ通っていました。

今、思い起こせば、1945 年（昭和 20 年）8 月 9 日 11 時 2 分は、どうしても忘れる事ができません。

その日は、朝からカンカン照りで、近くで「蟬」がミーン・ミーンと騒ぎ立て、私は、家の外で遊んでおりました。

その時です。飛行機の爆音が、聞こえた瞬間。

ピカッと「ピンクとブルー」の色をした光が、道路一面に広がり、1 秒後、バシッ・グァーアーンと大爆音が聞えました。

私は「何だろう？」と思いましたが、すぐ両手で「目・耳・鼻」をふさぎ、地面に伏せました。\*

私は、「すぐ近くに星が落ちてきた、ああ・ああ！」と思いました。

と申しますのも、夏休みに入る時「吉岡先生」から、星座の勉強途中で「残りは、9 月から又勉強しよう！」と言われました。

私は、伏せたまま、7・8 秒した後、立ち上がった、その瞬間！

ものすごい、もの凄い熱い風が、吹き荒れたかと思うと、ガチャン・ガチャン・バリ・バリ

とあっちこっちから物音が聞え、大人の大声で「逃げろ！逃げろ！」の叫び声。  
すぐ空を見上げると、ブリキのトタン、畳、ふとん、植木鉢と色んな物が宙を舞っていました。「こりゃ、危ない！」と思い、狭い路地へ駆け込みました。すると上からガラガラと屋根瓦が足元へ。もうその時、私は、身体が震えて、前に進めず、でした。  
その時、母が遠くから「隆（たかし）・隆（たかし）」と呼ぶ声が聞え、私は、ホッとした次第です。

「しっかりしなさい！すぐさま、防空壕へ逃げるけん、非常用のリックと防毒マスクを持ちなさい！」と、ひとまず、班別の小さな防空壕へ逃げよう。そこで、落ち着いたら、高台にある「仁田小学校」の片隅に町内の大きな、大きな防空壕へ、と順路は決まっていた。

防空壕の横穴は、3か所あり、薄暗い裸電球が1つの穴に3個、水道も竈（かまど）もあり、便利でした。

母と姉は、町内の用事で出かけており、私はとても不安でした。高台から街の方を見下ろすと、長崎県庁がジャンジャン燃えており、北の方へと広がっていました。外を眺めながらも、とても怖かった。

母と姉は、夜遅く防空壕へ帰って来ましたが、2人とも「シクシクと涙顔」で、「父と兄のことを心配しているんだなあ」と察しました。

母が、私に「明日早く、父と兄を探しに行くから、早く寝なさい。」と言ったので、床に就きました。

夜中（何時？）に起こされ、「隆（たかし）ちゃん、ほら、父ちゃんが帰ってきたばい。」と姉が、涙声で言います。

父を見てみたら、全身が白い布で頭から足の先までグルグル巻き、目・鼻の穴・口だけ見え、・・・私は「父ちゃん！父ちゃん！」と声をかけますが、時たま「ウーン・ウーン」と言うばかりでした。（後で分かったのですが、工場より5 Kmの道のりを、父を戸板に乗せ、5、6人で担いで来られたと聞きました。大変だったろうなと思いました。）

朝早く、母と僕の2人で、油木町の長崎商業学校へ兄を捜しに行く準備をし、父の看病は、姉にまかせて、出かけました。

途中、あちこちの家屋から煙でもうもうと立ち上り、長崎駅を過ぎた頃から、景色が、がらりと変わり、この世のとも思われない惨状でした。

誠に失礼な言葉ですが、死体があちこちと転がり、洋服は、ボロボロに焦げちぎれ、その顔は、ボウーまるでお化けのように見えたため、私は顔が真っ青になるありさまで、母は急に気分が悪く成り、その場にしゃがみこみ、「苦しい！苦しい！」と言い、「また、明日来よう」と言って帰宅しました。

自宅へ帰ると、すぐさま父のもとへ。しかし、父は息絶えて、もはや帰らぬ人となっていました。母は「せめて畳の上に寝かしたい。」と、近所の方をお願いして銅座町の自宅へ連れ帰り、その日の内に、近くの広場（現在の浜屋デパートの裏付近）で材木を井型に組み、それに寝かせて火葬いたしたしだいです。遺骨はバケツに入れました。

兄は、長崎商業学校からいまだに帰って来ません。母と姉は、「もうダメばいね。」と語り、疲れ果て、ヘトヘトでした。

翌朝、兄の友人で「築町の野中さん」と言う方が、自宅へ来られ、「照男君は、大火傷をして『水ば、水ば、』と言いましたから、学校内の池から、作業帽に一杯入れ飲ませて来ました。」と言っておられ、母は、涙ながら丁寧にお礼を言いました。私は、このことも、今も頭に残っています。

後日に分ったのですが、学校で亡くなった方は、合同で火葬をされたそうです。

その様な体験をした「私の少年時代」の思い出です。

そして、月日は流れ、私も成人を迎えて、「社会に親しみ」を見い出しながら、どうにか定年退職。退職後も7年間はアルバイトを続けました。

最近になって、「私に、何か平和に関することが出来るだろうか？」と思い立ち、友人から勧められて、内心少し躊躇しましたが、平和案内人としてボランティア活動をするようになりました。

これまで、老体に鞭打ち、長崎を訪れる方に原爆の遺跡を巡りながら、平和の大切さを伝えてきました。

私は、今でも、あの「むごたらしい」原爆の体験を、自分の子どもや孫たちに話していません。

でも、胸に秘めていたあの痛ましい、悲惨な被爆体験を後世に伝えなければ、風化してしまう。あの悲惨さを、知らない人々が、だんだん増えて来ていることを大いに憂いておりました。

戦争は、何だったのだろう？その本質を知り、「核兵器の廃絶」と「世界の恒久平和」を真剣に取り組むべきだと思い始めました。

そこで、「今からでも遅くない。」そう決心を持ち、被爆体験の「語り部」になって、血を吐くまで、「声を大（だい）」にして、語り継ぎたいと準備している次第です。

「戦争は、怖いぞう！恐ろしかあー！」

「ノーモア・ヒバクシャ、ノーモア・ナガサキ」

私は、そのために、死ぬまで頑張ります。

ご清聴、ありがとうございました。



## 被爆三世 山西咲和



- ・少し活動紹介
- ・平和大使になろうと思ったきっかけ
- ・祖母の話
- ・自分に何ができるのか（音楽でもなんでも）

みなさんこんにちは。第21代高校生平和大使を務めています、諫早高等学校2年の山西咲和です。今日は平和のために私たちができることは何か、みなさんと一緒に考えられたらと思います。よろしくお願いします。

はじめに私が行っている活動を紹介します。私は高校生一万人署名活動実行委員会のメンバーとともに、毎週日曜日に長崎駅前の高架広場で核兵器廃絶を求める署名活動を行っています。また、今日のような集会で活動報告をしたり、修学旅行で長崎を訪れた学生さんとの交流も行っています。日本で災害が起きた際には被災地復興支援募金活動を行い、先日の北海道地震の際にも募金活動で集まったお金を赤十字社に寄付しました。また、たくさんの方に活動を知ってもらうことを目的に署名リレーを行ったり、自分たちの意識向上のために定期的に学習会を開いています。

そして私は今年の夏にスイスにある国連欧州本部を訪問しました。そこでは一年間で集めた署名を提出し、たくさんの方の外交官の前で核兵器の非人道性、平和の大切さを訴えるスピーチをしました。

活動を始めて11ヶ月が経ちますが、これからなぜ私が平和大使になろうと思ったのか、そして活動を通して思ったことをお話ししたいと思います。

### 【きっかけ】

毎年長崎では夏に平和学習がありますよね。私は小学生の時は、夏が大嫌いでした。毎年被爆者の方のお話を聞いたり、原爆に関する映像を見たりするのは、小学生の私にとってはただただ怖いという印象しかありませんでした。被爆者の方のお話を聞いて、毎回号泣していました。夢にまで出てきて眠れなくなることもありました。でもなぜか、この話を避けてはいけないという気持ちがあって、本当は怖いから聞きたくないけれど、しっかり聞かなければと思っていました。小学4年生になって、総合学習の時間に戦時中の暮らしや、原爆の被害についてなどをグループで模造紙にまとめるという授業があったのですが、その時の担任の先生が、私が原爆の話を知っていると号泣することを知っていたので「未来の平和のために活動している人を調べてみたら？」と提案してくださり、私たちのグループはそのことについて調べました。その時にこの高校生平和大使の存在を知りました。小学4年生の私の目には、国内だけでなく、海外にも行って自分の思いや被爆者の思いを伝えている高校生のお兄さんお姉さんがとてもキラキラして写り、そんなお兄さんお姉さんに憧れて、原爆のことを自分でも調べるようになりました。そうしているうちにあることに気がつきました。あれ？だん

だん被爆証言を語りにきてくださる方が高齢化している？それに被爆当時の年齢が若い方ばかりになっていない？もしかしたら、被爆者が世界に一人もいない時代って思っていたよりもすぐ来るのではないか。そう思うと急に危機感を覚えました。被爆者がいない時代ってどんな世界になるのだろう。被爆の被害の実情を知る人がいなくなったらどうなるのだろう。もしかしたら、核兵器が使われてしまうかもしれない。73年前よりもはるかにひどい被害を受ける人が出てくるかもしれない。そんな風に、たくさんのことを想像しました。

私はいてもたってもいられなくなりました。今まで被爆者の方々が、差別や偏見、原爆後遺症と戦いながら、あの日の辛い体験を語ることで平和な生活を築いてくださった。だから、今度は他人任せにしないで、私が被爆者の方々から平和のバトンを受け継ごう。これからの世界を生きるのは私たちなのだから、決して他人事ではありません。私も何か自分がこれからの社会に少しでも貢献することができればと思い、自分にできる限りのことをしようと思って、平和大使になることを決めました。

### 【平和大使になって】

そして選考会に参加して、ありがたいことに平和大使にならせていただいたのですが、私は人前に立った経験がほとんどありませんでした。初めは、自分に何が伝えられるのかと、とても無力さを感じました。被爆者の方々の思いを受け継ぐといっても何ができるのだろうと、とても悩みました。でも、私は一番聞くべき被爆証言を聞いていないから、どこか他人事に受け止めてしまうのではないかと思います。その一番聞くべき被爆証言というのは、自分の祖母の被爆体験です。

### 【祖母の被爆証言】

私の祖母はとても明るくて、笑顔が素敵で、おしゃべりが大好きな人です。私もそんなおばあちゃんが大好きでした。でも、そんな祖母が、8月9日になると、ぐしゃっと顔を歪めて、今にも泣きそうな顔になるんです。いつもみない表情に、私は戸惑いを隠すことができず、いつの間にか私の中で「原爆の話は聞いちゃいけないんだ」と思うようになっていました。祖母を悲しい思いにさせてしまうのではないかと、聞く勇気もありませんでした。でも、一番身近な被爆者のことを知ろうともしないで、自分にできることがあるのかと思い、6月に初めて祖母の口から被爆体験を聞きました。

祖母は13歳の時に爆心地から3.5kmのところでは爆撃されています。祖母自身にも、祖母の家族にもけがはありませんでしたが、逃げる途中で、皮膚がただれた人を見たり、目が飛び出している人を見たり、首から上のない赤ちゃんを抱えたまま、佇んでいる女の人を見ている。私には想像もできませんが、13歳の少女にはあまりに衝撃的な光景だったと思います。また、翌日からは学校の友人の追悼式が毎日行われて、友達の死を知らされてただただ悲しかった、辛かった。と言っていました。最終的には、祖母の学年の半分の友人が亡くなったそうです。私はこの話を聞いて、言葉が出てきませんでした。認知症になってもあの日のことははっきり覚えていて、涙を浮かべながら話す祖母に、なんて言葉をかけたらいいかわかりませんでした。

でも、二度と祖母のような悲しい思いをする人を出してはいけなと、強く思いました。だからスイスの派遣でも祖母の話をできるだけ多くの人に伝えようと決め、機会にも恵まれて、祖母の被爆体験をもとにしたスピーチをすることができました。スピーチの後、たくさんの方に声をかけていただけて、改めて、伝えるということがとても大切なことなのだと実感しました。これからも多くの人に、祖母の被爆体験、そして、私の平和への思いをつたえていこうと思います。

### 【最後に】

今までの話を聞いて、中には「私にはそんなことできない」と思った方もいるのではないかと思います。自慢ではないですけど、よく友達から「咲和はすごいことやってるよね」と言われます。でも私はそうは思いません。だって、平和のために何かしようと思えば誰だってアクションを起こすことができるんです。私はそれがたまたま「平和大使になること」であったのであって、それだけでなく、音楽や、スポーツなど、様々なことから平和を目指すことができると思うんです。オリンピックもそうですよね。競技の最中にはライバルとして真剣に戦うけれど、閉会セレモニーの時には競い合った仲間としてセレモニーを楽しんでいます。テレビでその様子を見て、スポーツって人種も国境も超えて、みんなが一つになれるのだなと感じました。音楽だってそうです。音楽は人の心に響くものがあると思います。不思議な力を持っていて、落ち込んでいる時でも、音楽を聴いたり歌ったりすると自然と元気になれる気がします。それに、話す言語が違う人とでも歌うことができるので、音楽は人と人の心をつなげることもできるのだなと思います。笑顔だって万国共通ですよ。こんな風に、方法はたくさんあると思うんです。だから、身近なところからでもアクションを起こしてみませんか？平和は誰かが作ってくれるものではなくて、自分たちで作るものです。どんなに小さなことでもいいんです。一人一人が関心を持って、平和について考えることで、見えるものは変わってきます。今日からでも、明日からでも、何か自分にできることを探してみませんか？

今日は私の話を聞いてくださってありがとうございました。

この後も会場にいますので、何か聞きたいことがある方や、単純にお話ししたいという方はぜひ気軽に声をかけてください。

これで終わります。ありがとうございました。

## 分科会 4

### 核兵器なき世界の実現をめざす NPT体制と核兵器禁止条約の役割

#### Workshop IV

#### Achieving a world without nuclear weapons - the NPT framework and the role of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

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**The 6th Nagasaki Global Citizens' Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons**

**Workshop 4 Theme: How to Realize a Nuclear Weapon-free World**

**~NPT Regime and the Role of Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons~**

**18 November 2018**

**Our Divided World: The Quest for Nuclear Disarmament and the Growing Dangers of Wars Among Nuclear-Armed States**



**Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation, USA**

We are living in a time of extraordinary nuclear dangers. President Trump's announced intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is another sign of deepening crisis among the nuclear-armed States. Following the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, it imperils the entire structure of arms control and disarmament, including prospects for extension of the START Treaty which expires in 2021, and could lead to new, unpredictable rounds of arms racing.

Earlier this year the U.S. declared that it will no longer implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and will reimpose sanctions on Iran. This is a major blow to international governance and to peace and disarmament in the region and the world.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader who signed the INF Treaty with U.S. President Ronald Reagan in 1987 has warned: "The United States has in effect taken the initiative in destroying the entire system of international treaties and accords that served as the underlying foundation for peace and security following World War II."

In the early 1980's, U.S. deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles to western Europe stoked fears that Europe would serve as the battleground in a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war. It was this fear that mobilized a massive global anti-nuclear movement, leading to negotiation of the INF Treaty.

Yet following the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons fell off the public's radar screen. It was almost as if the planet itself breathed a huge sigh of relief. Most people believed that the threat of nuclear war had ended. But it hadn't.

Today, some 14,500 nuclear weapons, most an order of magnitude more powerful than the U.S. atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki— 92% held by the U.S. and Russia, continue to pose an intolerable threat to humanity.

Last month, President Trump, claiming that Russia has violated the INF Treaty, issued a threat to the entire world. Referring to the U.S. nuclear stockpile he warned: “Until people come to their senses, we will build it up. It’s a threat to whoever you want... it includes China, and it includes Russia, and it includes anybody else that wants to play that game.... We have more money than anybody else by far.... We’ll build it up until they come to their senses.”

On July 7, 2017, the majority of the world’s countries adopted a historic treaty to prohibit the possession, development, testing, use and *threat of use* of nuclear weapons. The vote, by 122 to 1, unambiguously demonstrated that most of the world has indeed come to its senses regarding nuclear weapons.

**But we stand at a nuclear crossroads, in a sharply divided world.** While the TPNW represents the total repudiation of nuclear weapons by most of the States that don’t possess them, all nine nuclear-armed States boycotted the negotiations, along with Japan, Australia, the ROK and all but one of the 28 NATO member states – all countries under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Following the vote, the U.S., France and the United Kingdom jointly declared: “We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to [the Treaty].”

Meanwhile, nuclear tensions have risen to levels not seen for decades.

While the Singapore and inter-Korean Summits appear to have greatly reduced immediate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, just last year, U.S. and DPRK leaders were making ominous threats and counter-threats of military strikes.

Fortunately, due largely to the skillful leadership and vision of ROK President Moon Jae-in, with strong grassroots support from the Candlelight Revolution, a new diplomatic opening has appeared. Hopefully the North-South and U.S.-DPRK Summits will lead to a diplomatic resolution of the 68-year crisis on the Korean Peninsula, including denuclearization on all sides. But the path ahead is very uncertain.

Derek Johnson of Global Zero has called today’s nuclear threat “an unprecedented moment in human history. The world has never faced so many nuclear flashpoints simultaneously.... all of the nuclear-armed states are tangled up in conflicts and crises that could catastrophically escalate at any moment.”

An alarming trend is the increased scale and tempo of war games by nuclear-armed states and their allies, including nuclear drills. In the last month, both Russia and NATO have conducted some of the largest military exercises since the end of the Cold War: in Russia’s case, with the participation of Chinese troops; in NATO’s case, with the participation of Sweden and Finland – two non-NATO

members. And risky close encounters between Russian and U.S./NATO forces have increased dramatically in the Baltic region and Syria.

In late September, amidst rising tensions, the U.S. flew two B-52 nuclear-capable bombers over disputed islands claimed by China. The bombers, escorted by Japanese fighter jets, flew near the Senkaku Islands which are controlled by Japan, but claimed by China. Just a week later a U.S. Navy destroyer narrowly avoided a collision with a Chinese warship in international waters in the Spratly Islands.

Donald Trump *entered* office with the U.S. poised to spend an estimated 1.2 trillion dollars over the next 30 years to maintain and modernize its nuclear bombs, warheads and delivery systems, and the infrastructure to sustain the nuclear enterprise indefinitely. This enormous estimate has already gone up to 1.7 trillion dollars and is growing.

Trump's Nuclear Posture Review, released in February, carries forward existing plans for the replacement and upgrading of submarine, land, and air-based nuclear forces, while adding a new sea-based cruise missile. It also calls for near-term deployment of low-yield warheads on submarine-based missiles. And it describes how nuclear weapons might be used in response to attacks of a non-nuclear nature, including cyber-attacks against critical U.S. infrastructure. This *anti-disarmament* program envisions U.S. reliance on extensive and diversified nuclear forces for decades to come.

Mirroring the U.S. stance, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a March 2018 speech, boasted about new "invincible" Russian nuclear weapons, and gave a detailed description, complete with video animations, of an array of new nuclear weapons delivery systems, including a nuclear-powered cruise missile and an underwater drone.

All of the nuclear armed states are engaged in nuclear weapons modernization programs.

U.S. national security policy has been remarkably consistent since 1945. "Deterrence," *the threatened use of nuclear weapons*, has been reaffirmed as the "cornerstone" of U.S. national security by every President, Republican or Democrat, since President Harry Truman, a Democrat, oversaw the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In October 2016, President Obama's UN Ambassador condemned the TPNW in the General Assembly: "Advocates of a ban treaty say it is open to all, but how can a state that relies on nuclear weapons for its security possibly join a negotiation meant to stigmatize and eliminate them".

We must keep both the promise of the TPNW *and* growing dangers of nuclear war fully in mind as we develop strategies to accomplish the urgent goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

The TPNW grew directly out of a long history of efforts by governments and civil society to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The 1970 NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the five original nuclear-armed States. Article VI spells out the disarmament obligation: **“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”**

In 1995, in connection with the NPT’s indefinite extension, the States parties reaffirmed their pledge to undertake **“the determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.”**

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, non-governmental organizations from around the world formed the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons – still going strong, which in its founding statement called upon all States to: “Initiate immediately and conclude negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.”

The Abolition 2000 Statement inspired an international consortium of lawyers, scientists, disarmament experts and activists, to draft a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) that prohibits the use, threat of use, possession, development, testing, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons and provides a phased program for their elimination under effective international control. The Model NWC was submitted to the UN by Costa Rica in 1997. It was updated in 2007, submitted to the UN by Costa Rica and Malaysia and circulated to member states as an official UN document.

In July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an historic advisory opinion on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court unanimously concluded: **“There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”** This is now the authoritative interpretation of Article VI of the NPT.

In response to the ICJ opinion, the UN General Assembly in 1996 adopted a resolution calling for early commencement of “multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,



transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.” The resolution has been adopted annually since, with a citation to the Model NWC added in 2007. This year’s resolution welcomes the adoption in 2017 of the TPNW.

The United States has introduced a proposal called “Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament”, arguing that unspecified conditions must be met in order for the international security environment to improve before disarmament can take place. But the U.S. has it backwards. I advocate an approach I’m calling “Creating the Conditions for International Peace and Human Security”, which envisions real progress on nuclear disarmament as contributing to international peace—relations among States, and human security—the universal, indivisible security of all people everywhere.

Implementing the NPT’s nearly 50-year old disarmament obligations would be an excellent way for the nuclear-armed States to start rebuilding mutual trust and confidence in the global order.

After a brief post-Cold War lull, with its missed opportunities for meaningful and irreversible disarmament progress, arms racing has resumed among the nuclear-armed states, this time mainly qualitative in nature. The accelerating cycle of replacing aging nuclear weapons systems with new ones—in some cases, with enhanced military capabilities, should cease. Instead, the cycle of retiring and dismantling nuclear warheads should accelerate. Concrete actions like this would create the conditions for negotiations on reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Both the U.S. and Russia accuse each other of violating the INF Treaty. Wherever the truth lies, the solution is not to pull out of the Treaty, but to redouble diplomatic efforts to resolve the allegations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that Russia is ready to renew dialogue with the U.S. According to Lavrov, negotiations must deal with all aspects of strategic stability including U.S. missile defense systems and should include serious dialogue aimed at preventing the militarization of space, a danger underlined by President Trump’s June announcement directing the U.S. Defense Department to establish a Space Force as a new branch of the U.S. Armed Forces.

In an October 22 statement, former U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz and former Senator Sam Nunn warned: “If the United States gives formal notice and withdraws from the [INF] Treaty in six months, a cascade of negative consequences for the United States, Europe and the world could be triggered..... Presidents Trump and Putin should follow through on their commitment at Helsinki last summer to begin a new dialogue on strategic stability focused on nuclear dangers.” Echoing Lavrov, they stated: “Broadening the aperture of engagement to include forward-deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons in and near Europe, missile defense, “prompt-strike” forces, cyber and space is also essential for reducing nuclear risks.”

It is unlikely that any of the other nuclear-armed powers will be willing to engage in negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons if the U.S. and Russia are abandoning arms control and moving in the opposite direction.

The international community must demand that the Trump Administration reverse its decision to leave the INF Treaty and engage in nuclear arms negotiations with Russia encompassing the full range of interconnected issues.

A viable international order requires the good-faith execution of agreements whether considered political or legal. It is therefore deeply disturbing that the U.S., a permanent member of the Security Council, has chosen to renounce its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to disregard a closely integrated legally-binding Security Council resolution. Civil society and states together should support the continuing implementation of the JCPOA. That is indeed the position of the JCPOA's other parties—the UK, France, Russia, China, Germany, the EU and, of course, Iran. However, in its General Assembly resolution this year, Japan did not even mention the JCPOA.

On the Korean peninsula, the potential exists for a solution linking peace, development, and disarmament. All efforts must be made to achieve that outcome. An essential element is the elimination of the DPRK's nuclear weapons and associated capabilities. But that must come in the context of ending reliance on nuclear weapons by all concerned parties in the region. One constructive step would be ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S., China, and the DPRK.

On October 22, China, France, Russia, the UK and the U.S. made a joint statement in the First Committee reaffirming their commitment to the NPT “in all its aspects” and claiming: “We are committed to working to make the international environment more conducive to progress on nuclear disarmament.” Remarkably, they added: “It is in this context that we reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.... The TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts and undermines the NPT.... We will not support, sign or ratify this treaty. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms”.

Even though they are edging ever closer to nuclear war with each other, the P-5 would rather band together to assert their right to possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons while denying them to other countries, than to actually implement their NPT disarmament obligations.

The nuclear-armed states and their allies and the non-nuclear states *must* find a way to start talking *with* each other – rather than *past* each other. One approach would be for the nuclear-dependent

states to acknowledge the TPNW as *strengthening* the NPT regime. The TPNW compellingly articulates principles and aspirations for a nuclear-weapons free world—a world which nuclear-dependent states *claim* to seek.

The TPNW's unambiguous prohibition of *threat of use* is an essential point for the peace movements and civil society in the nuclear-armed and nuclear-dependent states to highlight in our public education and advocacy. The ideology of nuclear deterrence *must* be delegitimized and stigmatized to make progress on abolishing nuclear weapons, and *our* task is to change the discourse – from the bottom up.

To achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons and a global society that is more fair, peaceful and ecologically sustainable, we will need to move from the irrational fear-based ideology of deterrence to the rational fear of an eventual nuclear weapon use, whether by accident, miscalculation or design. We will also need to stimulate a rational hope that security can be redefined in humanitarian and ecologically sustainable terms that will lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons and dramatic demilitarization, freeing up tremendous resources desperately needed to address universal human needs and protect the environment.

Nuclear disarmament should serve as the leading edge of a global trend toward demilitarization and redirection of resources to mitigate climate change and meet the Sustainable Development Goals.

## Speech – 6<sup>th</sup> Nagasaki Global Citizens Assembly

*Daniel Högsta*

**18 November 2018**



Thank you.

One of the speakers on Friday said that everyone who works on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should visit Nagasaki and Hiroshima to be reminded of the importance and urgency of the work that we do.

And that is so true. This is my first visit to Nagasaki. And there is a resilient spirit, an awareness and kindness here in all the people that I have met in just a short period of time.

So I want to sincerely thank Dr Tomonaga and all the organisers and the city of Nagasaki for the invitation to come here and participate at the citizens global assembly. It's been an eye-opening and inspiring couple of days for me. And I promise to take back this spirit to the ICAN HQ in Geneva.

I have been asked to speak about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and why ICAN believes it has the potential to be a game changer in nuclear disarmament. And why this very young Treaty has already made an impact even in just one year and a few months since its adoption at the United Nations in New York by 122 States.

I would like to say a few words on ICAN. I think most of you know the name, but perhaps it would be useful to say how we are set up.

So who is ICAN? Well, I see ICAN everywhere in this room. I see colleagues that I've known for a long time and some new people as well. It makes me very proud to see so many people here wearing the pin.

ICAN is a big family. We are a coalition of over 530 partner organisations in 100 countries, with several here in Japan.

I am part of the small staff team (only 7 people!). Our head office is in Geneva, but really the influence and the strength of ICAN lies in our partner organisations and the wider network of support that we enjoy around the world.

So what unites all of us in ICAN is our belief in a humanitarian-based approach to nuclear disarmament — an approach which places the human voice at the forefront — and the transformative nature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which I will speak about now.

[I believe that Professor Kurosawa did an excellent job on Friday explaining the current status of the politics around nuclear disarmament including the nature of stigmatisation and delegitimation, although I believe the treaty is contributing to both]

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What does the Treaty actually contain? I'm sure many of you have read it many many times, but maybe it will be useful to remind us.

- The Treaty prohibits its States parties from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, otherwise acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, transferring, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, and from allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed, installed or deployed in their territory. It also prohibits them from assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in any of these illegal activities.

- A State that possesses nuclear weapons may join the Treaty, so long as it agrees to destroy its weapons in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan. Similarly, a State that hosts another State's nuclear weapons in its territory may join, so long as it agrees to ensure their removal by a specified deadline.

- States parties must provide assistance to victims of the use and testing of nuclear weapons and take measures to remediate contaminated environments. The Treaty's preamble recognizes the unacceptable suffering that has resulted from nuclear weapon detonations around the world.

In short, it was a long, hard road to get to the TPNW. But I think all of us here and beyond who have worked for nuclear disarmament can be very proud of the result.

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The current status of Treaty as you have heard several times over the last couple days is that we have 69 signatures and 19 ratifications. As you know 50 ratifications are needed in order for the treaty to enter into force.

ICAN is always going to be impatient — civil society *should* always be impatient — but we are

content with the way things are going. The pace is equal to or faster when compared with other treaties on weapons of mass destruction.

But we also know that there is a lot of pressure from the nuclear armed states and their allies to stop progress on the TPNW — to prevent states from joining the treaty.

On the one hand we should definitely be concerned since this could seriously risk progress towards entry into force.

But if they are this angry about the treaty and so worried about it, we know also that we are on the right track.

So why are they so worried about this treaty? And why should we be so excited about it.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) stigmatises and delegitimizes nuclear weapons.

A major challenge to progress in nuclear disarmament has been that certain states believe they are morally and legally entitled to possess nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed states parties to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) routinely argue that the international community has given them a permanent right to possess nuclear weapons.

The purpose of the TPNW is to counteract this narrative. The message behind the TPNW is that the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons make such arms fundamentally illegitimate. There are no “good” or “responsible” nuclear-weapon states, but in contrast to the other classes of weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological), which have been banned by international treaties and are widely considered as grotesque and repugnant weapons, nuclear arms are frequently represented as instruments of power and prestige. The purpose of the TPNW, then, is to create the same moral stigma around nuclear weapons as currently exists around chemical and biological weapons. If this succeeds, future disarmament negotiations will stand a much greater chance of success.

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From a civil society perspective the value of the TPNW is not just in the fact that it corrects a legal anomaly. That’s good and long-overdue, but for us the greatest value of the treaty is the opportunities it creates for us, how it brings us closer to our goal of abolishing nuclear weapons.

So despite the fact that the Treaty has not yet entered into force, it's already having a noticeable impact on the politics (not yet policies) of Nuclear umbrella states.

I want to mention two ways in particular: actions with parliamentarians and divestment (banks and financial institutions not funding nuclear weapons anymore).

The TPNW has opened up new discussions at the parliamentary level. Primarily in European NATO countries. There have been parliamentary investigations about the TPNW in several countries in Europe, which means that several of these governments are being pressured to justify their position on nuclear weapons in the context of a new prohibition. The terms of the debate are fundamentally different now.

The work with divestment, which we call "Don't Bank on the Bomb", is also very exciting and shows the power that the treaty is already having. Just this year, the biggest pensions funds in both Norway and the Netherlands announced that they are no longer going to invest in companies that produce nuclear weapons. They cited the TPNW as a reason for doing this. That is a huge result for the treaty. It means that financial institutions are starting to assess the viability of their investments, and determining that nuclear weapons are not a good place to put their money. This is just the beginning.

We can't expect these things to change overnight. The interests in all umbrella countries runs very deep to say the least.

But what we also know is that politicians are susceptible to public opinion. Politicians also want to look good. Most politicians are afraid to be labeled as supportive of nuclear weapons. When more and more different voices keep asking them difficult questions, based on new

ICAN will continue to work with others to make sure that the stigma around nuclear weapons continues to grow and that the movement is broad-based and reflective of all different sections of society.

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A few words about the relationship between the NPT and the TPNW, since it's so often spoken about.

First and foremost, it is important to recall that for the States that negotiated the TPNW, the sanctity of the NPT was a top consideration. Indeed, it has often been said that the TPNW is a fulfilment of

Article IV of the NPT.

We should remember that the TPNW explicitly acknowledges and supports the NPT. A preambular paragraph dedicated to the NPT declares that the NPT is “the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime” and reaffirms that its “full and effective implementation” has “a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security”. That is an unequivocal endorsement.

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We are under no illusions about how difficult it will be. But for the first time all of us in this room and beyond that are working on nuclear disarmament will be doing so in the existence of a treaty which legally bans them. This is not something that can be ignored, even by the states that are right now saying that they are not going to join, including the nine nuclear weapon states. In certain practical and normative ways the treaty will impact them anyway, and this will only increase when the treaty enters into force upon its 50th ratification.

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In conclusion, I want to say thank you again to all of you the Citizens of Nagasaki and the Global Citizens of Nagasaki for reminding us why we do the work that we do. For reminding us always of the human voice which must always remain at the center of Nuclear disarmament work. To the Hibakusha in particular, those who are with us and those who are not able to be, thank you for being a shining light for our shared cause. You are truly the leaders of our movement.

So please keep doing the amazing work you are doing - from awareness-raising and education to research to advocacy to all the other creative ways that you bring forward the spirit of Nagasaki. The world needs your voice and your activism more than ever now.

It's an honour to be here among you. Thank you.



土岐 雅子


アメリカ：ミドルベリー国際大学院ジェームズ・マーティン不拡散研究所

**Masako Toki**

**USA, Research Associate and Project Manager, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey**



# 1



First of all, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the organizer of this amazing Assembly.


Thank you very much for the invitation.

I am very honored to have this opportunity.

In this session, we have already heard from excellent NPT and Ban Treaty experts.

So, I would like to focus my talk on the role of disarmament and nonproliferation education to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

# 2



Here is the outline of my talk.

I would like to start with why disarmament and nonproliferation education is important in making progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, and particularly the importance of understanding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Then, I would like to introduce our center's disarmament and nonproliferation education project for high school students, Critical Issues Forum, as a case study.

Then, I want to discuss recent initiatives that local governments across the United States are taking to endorse the Ban Treaty.

Particularly, I would like to highlight the city of Los Angeles legislative action because the high school students and teachers who have participated in our center's disarmament education project engaged in this initiative.

Then, I would like to conclude with the importance of youth engagement.



The title of this panel is “How to Realize a Nuclear Weapon-free World ~NPT Regime and the Role of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons~”

Building the stronger awareness of the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons among the public is essential to change the attitude of the governments.

And for that purpose, disarmament and nonproliferation education should play an important and essential role.


I want to touch upon how disarmament and nonproliferation education has been discussed in the context of the NPT And in the Ban Treaty Preamble.

Since the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2002, NPT documents have always included the importance of disarmament and nonproliferation education.

In the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, its action plan 22, states,

“All states are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the secretary general of the United Nations regarding the UN study on disarmament and nonproliferation education in order to advance the goals of the NPT in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”


# 4



The Ban Treaty's preamble states the importance of peace and disarmament education.

“Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty”

I think this “raising awareness” is the key in disarmament education.



The concept of the importance of education to achieve disarmament is not new.

About 16 years ago, the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2002.

The adoption of the UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, is marked as one of the most important achievements in the history of disarmament and nonproliferation education efforts.

Unfortunately, not so many people are aware of this event.

In the foreword by then Secretary General, Kofi Annan, he said

“...ignorance of the real dangers that do exist, especially the legacy of nuclear weapons inherited from the last century. Moreover, the companion of ignorance is complacency: what we know little about, we care little to do anything about.”

These words of wisdom 16 years ago is still very relevant, especially, in terms of understanding the actual impact of the use of the most devastating weapons, human beings invented.

**CNS** Center for Nonproliferation Studies

### Why Disarmament & Nonproliferation Education is Important

- Proliferation and potential use of WMD poses increasingly serious security threats
- Disarmament and Nonproliferation education is still scarce
- High school & college students do not have enough opportunities to learn about these topics
- Teach students how to think, not what to think. The importance of developing critical thinking skills



The slide features two images at the bottom. On the left is a world map titled 'WORLD NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE' showing the distribution of nuclear weapons by country. On the right is a photograph of a person wearing a white lab coat and a mask, working in a laboratory setting.

The problem of nuclear weapons has not diminished.

The catastrophic impact of the use of nuclear weapons is incomparable to any other weapons.

The risk of the use of nuclear weapons does exist.

However, many young people, especially, most high school students remain scarcely informed on these topics.

Education entails a profound mandate to solve a variety of problems our global society faces today.

The UN study also emphasizes that it is important to teach students how to think, rather than what to think in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament education.



Earlier this year in May, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres launched the monumental initiative to make progress towards disarmament.

In this important document, “Securing our common future: An agenda for disarmament”, he included numerous action-oriented items.

In this divided dangerous world with more complex arms race, Secretary General emphasized the importance of dialogue.

Among many important items, he also highlighted more education and training opportunities should be established, especially to empower young people to be a force for change and disarmament.

In October, the Secretary General also issued implementation plan for the agenda.

**CNS** Center for Nonproliferation Studies

**Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education is important. But underutilized.**

- “Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name. It is the most effective form of defense spending there is.”  
- Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the United Nations
- “Despite periodic appeals, education remains an underutilized tool for promoting peace, disarmament and nonproliferation. – William Potter, CNS Director



Kofi Annan, Former Secretary General of the UN



William Potter, CNS Director

While education is essential to accomplish nuclear disarmament, the role for that purpose is largely underestimated.

Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan once said

“Education is quite simply peace building by another name, it is the most effective form of defense spending there is.”

He encouraged us to strengthen disarmament education when he was a secretary general.

Our center’s director Dr. Potter was at that time, a UN Secretary general’s advisor for disarmament matters. Dr. Potter urged in his paper to the Secretary General,

“Despite periodic appeals, education remains an underutilized tool for promoting peace, disarmament and nonproliferation”





Disarmament and nonproliferation education requires interdisciplinary approaches.

I would like to emphasize the importance of learning the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons.


Particularly, learning from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, atomic bomb survivors are essential.

I think it should be the basis, starting point of disarmament and nonproliferation education.

Despite the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons, and some efforts by the UN to address that aspect, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were not at the core of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation discussions for many years.

However, since 2010, mainly because the NPT Review conference final document included the wording of “catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons”, this humanitarian initiative reshaped the nuclear disarmament debates with strong support by some countries and civil society organizations.

Bringing the humanitarian discussion to the nuclear disarmament discourse is essential.



Raising awareness, especially among young generations, on the risk of nuclear weapons, and the real humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, is the key to study nuclear issues.

As one of our nonproliferation and disarmament education activities at our center, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, I coordinate the Critical Issues Forum, CIF, one of our center's flagship Nonproliferation and disarmament educational outreach programs for high school students and teachers.

Currently high schools from the United States, Japan, and Russia are participating in the Critical Issues Forum.

High school students normally do not have an sufficient opportunity to study nonproliferation and disarmament issues.

I also want to emphasize the important role of teachers.

With dedicated and enthusiastic high school teachers, students have always completed amazing and creative projects.

This unique program was designed to empower high school students to understand weapons of mass destruction (WMD), disarmament and nonproliferation issues.

The program aims to develop these young generations' analytical and critical thinking skills.

The program also empowers these future leaders to develop informed opinions, and think critically about crucial and timely international security issues and encourages them to share this awareness within their communities.



Every year, CIF selects a different and very timely topic.

In 2015, the CIF project held the conference in Hiroshima for the first time, to commemorate the 70th year of remembrance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

For the 2016 conference in Monterey, Former US defense Secretary , Dr. William Perry joined the high school students from Japan, Russia and around the US, and spent an entire day to discuss the importance of nuclear disarmament.

In 2017, the conference was held in Nagasaki and I am still grateful for all the people who supported the conference in Nagasaki.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization executive secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo flew all the way from Vienna, Austria to give a keynote speech, and encourage participants.

# 12



The most recent conference was held in Monterey.

One of the keynote speakers was Susan Southard, the author of Nagasaki. And I am so happy to hear her excellent talk yesterday.

Students discussed the treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Achievements, Aspirations, and Challenges Ahead.

They presented this timely topic by researching the background and inception of the Ban Treaty, as well as by investigating the different views to the treaty and trying to find common ground.

Students investigated how or if the Ban Treaty will contribute to accomplishing the goal of peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons.

# 13

**CNS**

**The importance of learning what happened under the Mushroom Cloud**

"The stories of those who were beneath the mushroom clouds can transform our generalized perceptions of nuclear war into visceral human experience."  
- Susan Southard, Author of "Nagasaki: Life after Nuclear War"

A powerful and unflinching account of the enduring impact of nuclear war, told through the stories of those who survived.

Winner: James A. Green Award for Best Book  
1. National Book Award

**NAGASAKI**  
Life after Nuclear War

Keynote speaker for the CIF 2018 conference

We are particularly fortunate that the conference was able to welcome Ms. Susan Southard, as a keynote speaker for the conference in Monterey.

And I am so happy to see her again here in Nagasaki.

I thought it would be very important for these young high school students to try to empathize the suffering of Hibakusha by listening Susan's story.

Susan's words in the preface of the book, Nagasaki, so beautifully and eloquently states the importance of empathy .

"The stories of those who were beneath the mushroom clouds can transform our generalized perceptions of nuclear war into visceral human experience."

this is the feeling I want more young generations, around the world to share.



**CNS**

**Post-spring conference activities**

- Objective: Each school is expected to present what they have learned to their school community, community at large, and/or local government
- With the vision to encourage youth to exercise civic engagement and become local leaders who raise awareness, and in some cases champion for a world free of nuclear weapons
- Creative ways students have presented their findings:
  - School-to-school presentations
  - Podcast episode
  - Public symposiums and seminars
  - Local news media coverage
  - Presentations at civic meetings and school boards

We believe that it is so important for each school that participates in the CIF project to reach out to local community, local governments.

Therefore, after the spring conference, each school is expected to present what they have learned to their school community.

Exercising civic engagement is also important part of disarmament and nonproliferation education.

CNS



### Youth as change agents

**Dr. Olga Mohan High School in Los Angeles, CA -**

- Created “Nuclear Free Schools”
- Worked with other local civil society groups to advocate for the adoption of LA city resolution in support of the Ban Treaty
- Aug 8, 2018, the City of Los Angeles, CA voted to approve a resolution which called upon the U.S. to enter the Ban treaty



One of the most active high schools in the CIF project, Dr. Olga Mohan High School in Los Angeles, CA, launched “Nuclear Free Schools”

In addition to nuclear disarmament activities for the CIF, the school started working with local civil society groups, such as Physicians for Social Responsibility in LA.

As part of a larger grassroots movement, students and teachers from Dr. Olga Mohan HS stood alongside various civil society organizations before the LA city council to advocate for the adoption of city resolution in support of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.

On August 8, 2018, the Los Angeles City Council voted to approve a resolution that urges the U.S. to embrace the Nuclear weapons ban treaty among other important nuclear risk reduction measures.

CIF participant Edgar Lopez testified in favor of the LA city council resolution, stated “nuclear weapons threaten all of humanity, which is something that the youth worldwide have recognized. They’ve acted to get influential cities like Los Angeles to act and get political leaders to listen, and this can be that time.”

# 16



These photos are students from Dr. Olga Mohan HS and teacher, LA City council member, The American Society of Hiroshima Nagasaki A bomb survivors, and other local civic society members.

It is important to expand the network of nuclear disarmament among educational institutes, civil society groups, and local governments.





In addition to Los Angeles, around the U.S. many local governments have taken initiative to enact resolutions that support the Ban treaty and urge their national government to support the Ban Treaty.

On August 28, 2018, California state voted to support the Ban Treaty.

The resolution called on the US government to embrace the Ban Treaty.

California is the most populous state in the United States, and now the fifth largest economy in the world. (after US, China, Japan, Germany) So, this is significant.

In addition, on June 11, 2018, the US conference of mayors adopted a resolution calling for among other things, the US to embrace the Ban treaty as a welcome step towards negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on the achievement and permanent maintenance of a world free of nuclear arms..”

Furthermore, all across the country, more cities are supporting the similar resolutions.



The process to establish these local and state government resolutions is not simple, it requires a cyclical process of advocacy and raising awareness.

If we want to change policy, or to have impact on the policy making process, it is essential to change public opinion.

Therefore it is essential to raise public awareness of the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons and catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

This certainly requires educational activities, including public education.

With increased awareness people, such as these advocacy groups, come together before city councils and other public forums to lead the dialogue about the threat of nuclear weapons to all of humanity. They express their concern as citizens of their respective cities, and champion for the necessary policies to create change.

And their work does not end there.

Changing and/or creating new local policy might inform the general public but what happens too often is the mainstream news media does not emphasize this important feat.

So it is the tireless and passionate efforts of these groups, especially youth, who continue to educate and advocate for a nuclear weapons free world.

United Nations Secretary-General's Initiative for Disarmament Education

## The Path to a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: For Youth to Inherit

- “It is easier for students to learn the logic of nuclear deterrence than to learn to discard the myths that keep nuclear weapons in place. But education can help to refute the claim that nuclear disarmament is utopian.”  
- Ban Ki-Moon, Jan 2013, in Monterey, CA
- “...we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them (nuclear weapons). We may not realize this goal in my lifetime, but persistent effort can roll back the possibility of catastrophe. We can chart a course that leads to the destruction of these stockpiles.”  
- President Obama, May 2016, in Hiroshima



To accomplish the goals of a world free of nuclear weapons requires long term perspectives.

Therefore, it is essential for young people to inherit this task.

Education is the essential tool to raise such capable and committed young generations who can work for that goal.


When former United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon made his major disarmament education speech at the MIIS in 2013, he said “Education can help the world to build a global culture of peace that rejects all WMD as illegitimate and immoral, it is easier for students to learn the logic of nuclear deterrence than to learn to discard the myths that keep nuclear weapons in place... but education can help to refute the claim that nuclear disarmament is utopian.”

This statement supports the idea that education can help stigmatize nuclear weapons and strengthen norm against nuclear weapons.

President Obama visited Hiroshima as a first incumbent president.

He often said in his disarmament speech, that a nuclear weapons free world may not be realized in his life time.

Therefore, for these youths to inherit this daunting task, education to clearly learn the actual impact of the use of nuclear weapons is essential.





The youth of the world should become fully aware of how dangerous nuclear weapons are to their future, and start to work actively to reduce the risk to eliminate such weapons.

The Hibakusha recollections help to demystify nuclear weapons, and remove any euphoria or sanitization about the use of nuclear weapons. This can be done through education.

To accomplish the goals of peace and security in a world free of nuclear weapons, we need to overcome the tendency in our mindset to keep with the status quo.

Education will empower young generations, and they can be a source of positive change with their innovative and creative ideas.

As a strong believer in the power of education for making progress toward a nuclear weapons free world, I believe that youth education in the field of nuclear disarmament is the key to make progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons



United Nations  
Secretary-General's Panel of Experts

## Thank you very much for your attention!

- For more information please visit the CNS website at
  - [Nonproliferation.org](http://Nonproliferation.org)
  - <http://sites.miiis.edu/criticalissuesforum/>
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