Workshop T
Rethinking the Nuclear Umbrella
-The Responsibility of Nuclear-Dependent Non-Nuclear Countries-

Coordinators

Hiromichi Umebayashi
(Japan, Special Advisor, Peace Depot)
Regina Hagen
(Germany, Abolition 2000)
Panelists
Henrik Salander
(Sweden, Chair, Middle Powers Initiative)
Yi Kiho
(Korea, Coordinator in Korea, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament)
Alyn Ware
(New Zealand, International Peace Bureau)
Tadashi Inuzuka
(Japan, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament)
Keiko Nakamura
(Japan, Secretary General, Peace Depot)
Hiromichi Umebayashi and I, Regina Hagen, were the coordinators of Workshop I, under the title of "Rethinking the Nuclear Umbrella -Responsibility of Nuclear-Dependent Non-Nuclear Countries-".


Henrik Salander
The topic of Workshop I was the "nuclear umbrella" and the way in which dependent countries plan on preventing or advancing nuclear disarmament. Ambassador Salander from Sweden started out by defining extended nuclear deterrence as nuclear security guarantees extended from the United States to other countries such as NATO allies, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and others. The nuclear umbrella has two components in order to be credible: the technical, that is the "hardware", but also the political. It is an open question to what kind of threats extended deterrence pertains. To a nuclear attack only? Or also to others such as biological or conventional ones? The panel was in agreement that the nuclear umbrella has probably prevented many countries from developing their own nuclear weapons capabilities, and has thus helped to limit the numbers of nuclear weapons countries.

However, the drawback to this is that the purported security dependence of the states under the nuclear umbrella now provides the United States with one rationale for maintaining safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenals, and therefore is an obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

One case in point is Germany, where 20 nuclear bombs are still deployed. I am reported that this arrangement is covered by the so-called "Strategic Concept" of NATO. Germany has now announced that it asks for withdrawal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany. At least one other nuclear-sharing country in Europe is supporting such withdrawal. And it is believed that the others would not oppose. Withdrawal would dramatically extend the effectually existing nuclear weapons-free zone across central and eastern Europe. It might also open the path to negotiations between the United States
and Russia on disarmament of their tactical nuclear arms.


Yi Kiho
The Republic of Korea has no formal nuclear-sharing arrangement with the United States, but is under its umbrella. Yi Kiho elucidated the three-fold character of the relations South Korea has in East Asia and beyond. It is a relationship of states; of capital, that means trade; and of civil society. In all these spheres, the main partners of South Korea are Japan, China, and the United States. A lot of multilateral agreements are already in place in East Asia, among them is GPPAC, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. A new component in this tightly knit network would be a nuclear weapons-free zone between Japan and Korea.


Keiko Nakamura
Keiko Nakamura from Japan pointed out that both the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear-dependent states share a similar mindset: they are stuck in Cold War thinking. The U.S. should be aware of the major security dilemma: the more one country expands its military power, the more its adversaries will attempt to strengthen their own military power in turn. Peace Depot has in the past years advocated a "3+3"proposal under which North Korea, South Korea, and Japan would create a nuclear weapons-free zone, and China, Russia, and the United States would agree to respect it.


Alyn Ware
Establishment of such a nuclear weapons-free zone creates a sophisticated machinery for negotiations and consultations, an important means to build up trust among the participants. In support of such an approach, Alyn Ware from New Zealand questioned the viability of the extended deterrence concept for meeting global security needs. Alyn used the image of "Spaceship Earth," as proposed by Buckminster Fuller. "When we view the earth as a spaceship," Alyn asked, "would it really make sense to try to militarily protect its individual compartments? It makes more sense to protect it as a whole." New Zealand is a good example of the positive role which states that turn their back on the nuclear umbrella can play in promoting disarmament. The country helped to negotiate a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Pacific. It helped to establish the New Agenda Coalition. And it helped to bring the nuclear weapons issue to the International Court of Justice in 1996. Signals from allied countries to U.S. President Barack Obama that they don't consider the nuclear umbrella as crucial for their security, which helped the United States administration to count a cause for the renewal of the U.S. arsenal.


Tadashi Inuzuka
Taking up this thought, Senator Inuzuka from Japan pointed to the importance of parliamentarians' involvement in the discussion. He also said that the letters sent by Japan's Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is highly welcome, and the letter signed by 200 Japanese parliamentarians supporting a change in nuclear policy will hopefully also make an impact.

Generally, it was the idea that rather than perpetuate the war system, which was a discussion and response to Henrik Salander's proposal that maybe an extended conventional deterrence could replace the nuclear one and would be more credible. In response to this both the panelists and people from the floor suggested that rather than to perpetuate the war system and the militarism, we must find ways out and create a good circle of nuclear and conventional disarmament, rather than continue with the current vicious circle.