Speech by NGO Representative
Yi Kiho
Korea, Coordinator in Korea, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, Director of Nautilus ARI

Good afternoon, my name is Yi Kiho, from Korea. For the members of the Organizing Committee, I would like to express my words of thanks in organizing this Global Citizens� Assembly. Well, it is really a great honor for me to give a speech here and I'm really happy to deliver my speech not only as a neighbor country person, Korean, but also as a kind of East Asian citizen, and so I think this will be a really great opportunity to share a Nagasaki message for denuclearization. And, my focus usually has two things: one is about, I' like to tell you about the Korean situation and the context concerning this abolition of nuclear weapons. And the other one is a suggestion from our Nautilus ARI about nuclear weapon-free zones. Well, this year 2010 has a very special meaning in South Korea. We mark 100 years since colonization by Japan, this year. And, we also mark 60 years since the Korean War. And 60 years has a special meaning in northeast Asian countries. In Japanese, kanreki , is a kind of "rebirth". So from the Korean War, how can we really rebirth again toward denuclearization or disarmament? And, third, we also mark 30 years� anniversary from the Kwangju Demonstration. Probably in Japan, I think Kwangju is called Koushuu. It was a kind of a civil war against military dictatorship in 1980, in May. And at the same time, we mark 10 years� anniversary since 2000, the North-South Korean first summit meeting for peace. So this year has really a special meaning. From those anniversaries, we would like to ask some questions again. For example, from the experience of colonialization, what is a state? What is a nation-state? Well, today especially, I'm very surprised and impressed because. . .before my coming this morning here, I thought this is a kind of citizens' meeting or conference. However, from the government, especially the department of foreign policy, and Nagasaki Prefecture, and Nagasaki City mayor also came here and congratulated such kind of thing. And at the same time, not only such kind of government bureaus, but also many religious leaders came here and students also came here, so it was, to me, very impressive. . .for a very focused, one single issue, so many statures can be together toward such kind of thing. It was very impressive to me. So, the first question was about how can we restructure about the future state, or a peaceful state instead of a war state? And second, from the war, Korean War I mean, we would like to rethink again about what is security? Well, nowadays usually people say about human security instead of military security, or national security, but what is really, really secure for people's happiness? So that is the second issue. And third one, from the Korean civil war against the military dictatorship, we would like to think about, again, what is democratization? What is real democracy? And finally, between North and South Korea's 10 years' anniversary, what really can the Korean Peninsula contribute to build up regional peace in this area? So I think these questions will be a kind of some new challenges for coming this year already, 2010 came. So my story will start here. So this year, 2010, in South Korea marks, as I already told you, both the 10th anniversary of the June 15th Joint Declaration for Peace, and the 60th anniversary of the June 25th war. One celebrates war, the other one celebrates peace, at the same time. And, however, some people who celebrate war don't celebrate the peace, and the people who celebrate the war do not want to memorize about the peace. So there are so many spectrums in South Korea now, I could say. So, in this context, many South Korean people think that a strong military alliance with the U.S., and even with the nuclear umbrella, are necessary for security. For example, just after North Korea's first nuclear bomb test on October 9, 2006, Korean newspapers surveyed public opinion under the que"yes" . . How much percentage do you think?. . . is 53 percent, more than half. So we can attribute this response to a list, to two responses: one, the memory of the Korean War, which was strongly reinforced by the government ideology, helped convince people that military security including nuclear weapons and a strong alliance with the U.S. is really essential. That is very much deeply involved in Korean psychology from the lessons of the Korean War. We could say that is still kind of recognition of the Cold War system. The other is that people forget, or do not know, that among the nuclear victims in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, more than 10 percent of them were Koreans. And many of them were forced to move and work for the Pacific War. So such kind of some things about the message from Nagasaki or the war experience is not much delivered to South Korean people. Not much noticed yet. Such historical experiences and memories are the reason that Korean people do not much pay attention to nuclear weapons as a serious issue affecting their lives. However, we have hope in South Korea still, so, don't worry too much about it. However, in South Korea, there is a growing number of people who support peace over any form of violence. And people are also gradually moving away from the Cold War framework, which requires an enemy and always positions the state as the main actor, and decisive actor. So, how to dismantle the Cold War, a recognition is really important in South Korea. However, the young generation....and probably you already know that last year or several years ago there were many Korean candle demonstrations in front of the city hall, most of them are very volunteer young people, who'd like to insist on such kind of peace, and there's some happiness, very small one. So we could say that there are some very liberal and peace-loving new generation is also growing. So this is kind of some background of the Korean situation. From here, concerning nuclear challenges, I' like to discuss three issues here. One is about nuclear weapons. The second one is extending the nuclear deterrence. And finally is nuclear reprocessing. I think concerning nuclear challenges, these three issues are really critical issues in South Korea. First, in Korea, when you talk about the abolition of nuclear weapons, the discussion usually, or mostly, or almost always focuses on North Korea's nuclear weapons development. South Korea, along with the United States and Japan and other countries, has been trying for over 15 years to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons through a combination of carrots and sticks. At the same time, however, these states rely on extended nuclear deterrence from the United States to protect them against North Korea. This only serves to reinforce the importance of nuclear weapons as a means of preserving security and, thus, this makes it less likely, not more, that North Korea will peacefully give up its nuclear weapons. So, to break out of this stalemate, South Korea and Japan need to move away from the situation, on the one hand calling for North Korea and other states to abolish their nuclear weapons, while, on the other hand, they continue to rely on American nuclear weapons for their own security. So instead, we proposed that the two countries consider the establishment of a Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. When I mention about Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, this is very easy to think, because if you just think about the six-party talks, the countries who do not have nuclear weapons is manifestly South Korea and Japan. So people, when I just mention about South Korea and Japan, a nuclear weapon-free zone, people think it seems very fresh. It is very natural but seems very fresh. Why do you think it seems like very fresh? Because it was very hard to think of some military cooperation between South Korea and Japan, because we usually have a kind of cooperation through the U.S.A., and the U.S.A. usually, and always, has some initiative to coordinate such a kind of trial of military cooperation. However, there is one more thing that I have to think about. Creating such a zone would present challenges on a number of fronts. Not least of these would be the relationship between the civilian nuclear fuel cycle and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. South Korea is currently looking not only to expand its own nuclear power program but to become a major exporter of nuclear power plants to other countries. As you already know, one month ago, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak made a big deal with UAE, United Emirate countries, to sell about nuclear power plants. And there are some more stories about it. However, under the U.S.-South Korean nuclear agreement, South Korea is banned, is prohibited, from operating enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Lately, many government officials and commentators have been calling for lifting this ban, this prohibition, when the current agreement with the U.S. expires in 2014. South Korea is, thus, unlikely to agree to join a nuclear weapons-free zone agreement with Japan that locks in the current inequality under which Japan has built a stockpile of several tons of separated plutonium. Therefore, the nuclear fuel cycle issue will need to be addressed in a cooperative manner that prevents the region from becoming awash in a sea of plutonium. So, if I could say once again about the suggestion of the bilateral nuclear weapons-free zone between Korea and Japan, well, this concept is very easy to think, but people usually do not think because there is a kind of some. . . the memory left of more than 100 years, and some nationalism, so this is a new concept. Once if this is realized, it could solve a number of linked and intractable security problems in northeast Asia at the same time. This includes the need to respond to North Korea's nuclear breakout without undermining the global abolition policy announced by President Obama, which is really an ideal but not so much realistic. The need for South Korea and Japan to deepen their non-nuclear commitment, given regional nuclear threats on the one hand, reduced credibility of U.S. nuclear extended deterrence on the other. And the need for Japan and South Korean cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle and space assess activities to increase trust and build confidence, and thereby lay the foundations for a comprehensive security mechanism and a long-term regional security institution. If we just think about this Korea-Japan nuclear weapons-free zone, we could think, why we suggested it, there is some reason. This is because of two assumptions: one is that animosity between the two countries precludes such cooperation; and the other one is that security is assured by bilateral nuclear extended deterrence from the United States on the other. So if we just realize this kind of bilateral nuclear weapons-free zone, of course we could have some more effective prohibition of development, manufacturing, control , possession, testing, stationing, or transporting of any kind of nuclear explosive device for any purpose. And, also, we can have effective verification of compliance. And third, we can also have clear, defined boundaries to realize it, and if we could do that, a legally binding commitment to the zone by the nuclear weapons states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zone parties. Well, concerning this suggestion. . . when I just explained this suggestion among Korean National Assembly members, their response was "this sounds good," but still they worry about much the extended deterrence, even though it is nuclear extended deterrence or, a conventional weapons deterrence, they were much worried about it. And the other one is about, then, what will happen in North Korea and in China? So such kinds of questions will be our task to develop. So this is some suggestion why the cooperation between Japan and South Korea is essentially necessary to realize such kind of nuclear weapons-free zone in this area. And at the same time, as already many people mentioned, I think not only the governmental level, but also the civil society -- local to local, person to person -- such kind of cooperation is really, really essential and without such kind of cooperation, I think it is really difficult to actualize the nuclear weapons-free zone in this area. So, I would like to build such kind of transformational, civil society initiative on nuclear weapon-free zone through this Nagasaki conference, and at the same time, I would like to share the Nagasaki message with the Korean people. Thank you very much.