Keynote Speech
Henrik Salander
Sweden, Chair, Middle Powers Initiative

Dear Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tsuchiyama, dear Dignitaries, Dear fellow panelists, dear participants, I have never been to Nagasaki before. It moves me deeply to be in this city where one of the two atomic weapons ever used in anger was dropped on defenseless civilians. In New York and Geneva, in NPT meetings, I have met several times with representatives of hibakusha, the victims and their organizations, which has given me unforgettable experiences. But to be here, finally, in Nagasaki, will give me a deeper understanding of what I try to do, and I am very grateful for this invitation. This conference has a focused and well-conceived agenda. Both plenary sessions and workshops are treating the crucial topics that we need to reflect on. The panelists guarantee that we will have lively exchanges of views, also diverging ones, as it should be when tackling very difficult subjects. Here, I will touch upon some of them, necessarily briefly. I will start with an issue occupying us in the very near term, and then try to widen the perspective. The most immediate problem is the NPT Review Conference, starting in less than three months from now. I say this because I am afraid, already now, that many of us attach too optimistic expectations to the Review Conference. Quite soon we may have to handle a crushing disappointment. If so, we have to do it well, and to look ahead again, with result-oriented optimism. Since nuclear weapons are the only invention that can destroy mankind completely and instantly, governments have created instruments to control it. The most important, by far, of these instruments is the NPT. This is a big part of the explanation why one tends to think of the NPT as being in perpetual crisis. This may be partly true � but still the Treaty hangs on, decade after decade, and has refused to disintegrate, as has sometimes been predicted. In the NPT review of 2000, states parties went in with low expectations, having recently experienced the disaster in the Unites States'senate about the test-ban, the quarrel about the ABM treaty, and the India/Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. But surprisingly, the Review Conference produced a consensus document, including the thirteen practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. The success turned out to be short-lived, but the agreements are still valid, though unfulfilled. In 2005, expectations were also low, because of US unilateralism, the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, and retreats from the agreements of the 2000 conference. But again the result was surprising, this time coming out worse than anticipated. The level of governmental unwillingness and destructive diplomacy was even higher than most had feared. As NPT parties we have learned to live even with that. Cynicism abounds, but at the same time hope has grown, especially after the change of administration in Washington. Hope had been awakened already by the Wall Street Journal articles by the four US statesmen. Then, ten months ago, we were given tangible and realistic new hope by the speech in Prague by President Obama. Consequently, we have attached great importance to the upcoming NPT review, often reiterating that another failure will mean the death of the NPT. Now is the time to turn the tide and to fulfill the NPT; so it is said. We say this because we want so much out of the treaty. That's very understandable. However, the truth is that there are no criteria against which we can measure success or failure of the conferences. We don't even know what a consensus agreement is worth. The two documents from 1995 and 2000, decided by consensus and containing lots of important benchmarks and agreements, have been left by the roadside, their promises unfulfilled and broken. Therefore, we don't know whether it's good to get a consensus document that most governments don't like. Is it better or worse to crash a conference, for a delegation or a group that does not get what it wants? Are principled positions better in the long run, even with failed conferences and no agreements, than pragmatic and practical compromises? Nobody knows. We don't even know whether these compromises will be adhered to or not. So when one hears that expectations are high for a successful outcome in May, the background often is that the bar for judging this has been set so low, because of the many years of frustration. That may be a good starting-point. On the other hand, would a failure be disastrous? My answer is: perhaps not in the short term, but probably in the longer. At the very least, an NPT review failure would make all multilateral approaches to the nuclear regime so much more difficult to manage-and not only disarmament, but also including the two most pressing non-proliferation problems, you know which ones I mean. Given all this uncertainty, I still believe that states parties must try to reach an outcome with which they feel they can live for some time, which is perceived as largely representative and which is not promptly ignored or reinterpreted, as after 2000. How can this be done? Well, let me define it as a change of direction. By this I mean an outcome which is not "business as usual" but which prepares steps towards truly fulfilling the NPT. It is not possible today to say exactly what such an agreement coming May would look like. It's not like in 1995, when an all-or-nothing decision on the extension of the treaty had to be taken, because it was mandatory. This time it may be more like a fork in the road. One road leads to continued sleepwalking into something that may turn out to be a nuclear nightmare; at the very least a world containing many more nuclear-weapon states than today. The other road leads slowly but steadily towards the prohibition of nuclear weapons. One or the other of these roads will be chosen, not necessarily already in the Review Conference in May, but quite soon. We are not talking about decades here-rather about a few years at the most. And both roads cannot be taken, only one. The choice may very well determine the future of mankind. When I say change of direction, I am fully aware that the coming review will most probably not decide upon drastic changes, for example the start of actual negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons. But it must demonstrate that states parties are willing to take their full responsibility to uphold the treaty. The ICNND, the commission chaired by ministers Kawaguchi and Evans, has given us some very sensible descriptions of what potential elements of an agreement could be. Some minimums are required, in my view. The nuclear five must clarify what kind or kinds of multilateral processes they are willing to undertake. They got the desired indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 after giving pledges regarding both systematic and progressive efforts in the direction of disarmament, and regarding the Middle East. Five years later, there had been backward movement on the nuclear test-ban and close to nothing on the rest of the bargain. In 2000, concessions were again made by the nuclear five. Now ten years later, the test-ban and the FMCT have yielded nothing at all, whereas progress on disarmament is debatable, at best. There have been cuts in numbers of deployed weapons, but not on a scale which is of any significance for non-nuclear-weapon states. If fissile material negotiations are not started, and progress not made on entry-into-force of the test-ban, this amounts to continued breaking of political pledges made fifteen years ago in a legal document -an unusually important document, because of the very controversial indefinite extension of the treaty. Given this background, it is deeply worrying that there are active efforts in the United States to tie test-ban treaty ratification to commitments to new warheads and production facilities, based on the rationale of maintaining reliable weapons without testing. This means that one goal, which has been sold for decades as valuable currency, might be met by breaking another, the diminishing role of nuclear weapons, agreed as a serious ambition in 2000. It is equally worrying that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva seems to be unable to break its inactivity and start negotiating. In a similar way as when promises about a test-ban and an FMCT were necessary in 1995 to make the NPT sustainable, it is today necessary to at least start preparing for a prohibition of nuclear weapons through a convention or a set of reinforcing instruments, in order to obtain the benefits of non-proliferation and of a sustainable NPT. If nuclear-weapon states are to realize the goal they themselves have set up as the most important -that no more states obtain nuclear weapons-hen they must be seen starting to prepare for a convention, since that is the only credible way of fulfilling the NPT in the longer run. They must take tangible steps if they are to enjoy continued benefits from the NPT. The Middle East situation has presented enormous problems for NPT parties since 1995. Somewhat surprisingly, in last year7s preparatory committee some ideas could be formulated, like a special coordinator or a future special conference on the topic. More ambitious efforts, like steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, are of course very difficult at present. But there are intermediate stages that might be analyzed, like the Blix Commission's proposal to freeze proliferation-sensitive fuel-cycle activities in the region. It is very clear, though, that there will be no successful outcome of the NPT review in May without an agreement specifically on the Middle East. But it is equally clear that NPT review conferences will not be the forum where the solution to the terrible problems in the region will be found. The so-called "systematic and progressive efforts" were reawakened in 2000 and resulted in an important heritage, the thirteen steps. How to treat them in May is a challenge with many unknowns-not only how much the Obama administration's actual positions are changed when it comes down to the detail, but also how much Russia, France and China will try to hold back regarding new-and old- Article VI-related recommendations, guidelines and decisions. A few of the thirteen steps are overtaken by events, quite naturally, but taken together they cannot be rolled back or thrown away. A credible way of renewing and updating them must be found. This will be much up to the nuclear-weapon states, which will be put in a corner if they themselves do not propose reformulations of some of the commitments and pledges, making them relevant for today and possible to fulfil in a measurable way. Equally important, and in a sense new since 1995 and 2000, is the "diminishing role" of nuclear weapons. In 2000, the diminishing role was formulated as one of several sub-steps under step 9, somehow mellowed by the umbrella formulations about "international stability" and "undiminished security for all". In this year's conference, some clear expression is needed of what the ambitions are of the nuclear-weapon states to downgrade their reliance on nuclear weapons. In the case of the United States and the Obama administration, this will make the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, expected in about three weeks from now, a decisive reference point. That is why it is so important that the cynical doctrine concepts of counterforce and counter-value are not kept in it, as parts of nuclear doctrine. The good side of all of this is that we now have what we asked for: United States leadership. We asked for it because it's clear to most of us that only US leadership can create the conditions for starting on the road to zero nuclear weapons. And President Obama has made that clear. He even recognized the moral responsibility of the United States to act and lead, as the only power to have used a nuclear weapon. This is a great statement, generating hope and promise. The next test of it will come when the Nuclear Posture Review is published. The review and its successors must recognize the new situation and make a new calculus of the balance between status quo risks and the difficulties of the road to zero. We must understand that the countering forces to President Obama's vision will be strong and very sophisticated, both in the United States and in other countries. And these forces have inertia and inactivity on their side. As citizens and civil society, therefore, we must sharpen our arguments and our activities. What is it that we want in the shorter term? We want several steps, which will be the future building blocks of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Without the steps, this vision will not be seen as possible-and without the vision, the steps will not be seen as fair or urgent, as the four statesmen rightly stated in their Wall Street Journal articles. These building blocks are nothing new. The most obvious are: verified deep reductions by US and Russia, including stored weapons, with legally binding instruments; a negotiated fissile material production stop; and getting the test-ban into force. Let me call these consensus steps-agreed but not realized, since fifteen years. There are a number of other steps that are equally necessary but also not sufficient, and which do not yet meet with consensus. Like the first three, they have been analyzed by the Middle Powers Initiative in our briefing papers, and identified as priorities in our Article VI Forums. Examples are: negative security assurances-multilateral regulation of the fuel cycle -de-alerting of launch-ready weapons-no-first use pledges-and improved governance of the NPT itself, as a process and a treaty. These too, as you know, have been around for decades and proposed in UN resolutions, in the thirteen steps, by the Canberra Commission, the Blix Commission and the ICNND, the Model Convention, in the Wall Street Journal articles, by the UN Secretary-General fifteen months ago and by President Obama in Prague. These proposals and packages are similar to one another not because of lack of originality but because they are the natural first steps for securing confidence and restoring the bargain between nuclear possessors and non-possessors. It is noticeable that the package outlined by the UN Secretary-General in five points differs somewhat from the others. He went further than governments, holding up the possibility of a strongly verified nuclear weapons convention, or a framework of interlocking instruments. He elevated the convention from a slightly utopian idea to a logical instrument for strengthening the security of nations. It suddenly came to represent the combination of the vision and the steps. It is often said that work on a nuclear weapons convention is premature. But more seldom is added what would make time ripe for such work. I believe that preparation for, and even negotiation of, a convention can proceed in parallel with, and in fact stimulate, preparation and negotiation of other measures. The ICNND put it well when it said that it is not too early to start now on further refining and developing the concepts in the model convention, making its provisions as workable and realistic as possible. In the meantime, the steps must be negotiated-and taken. The concept of deterrence, so misused and so misunderstood, is of crucial importance when states are to start their serious analysis of the road to zero. I will save that topic for tomorrow's workshop. Let me instead turn briefly to the role of civil society, NGO's and citizens. It has been proven since decades back that civil society can play an influential and important role in nuclear weapons issues. It was confirmed last year in the big NGO conference in Mexico City which made an input to Security Council members before the Summit on nuclear weapons in September. The Secretary-General has also lent his authority to this approach, as has parliaments and governments -for example, Swedish Review Conference delegations normally contain civil society representatives. There has for years been some desperation among many of us, based on the fact that nuclear weapons, differently from in the 1980's for example, have not been in the forefront of political and ethical debate. I can feel this changing. I see incredibly well-informed and active representatives of civil society working closer with like-minded governments and researchers and once again putting nuclear weapons near the top of the international agenda. As citizens and NGO's, perhaps the time has come for us to speculate or brainstorm about unconventional processes-new vehicles for civil society to channel energies into. Could, for example, ideas from the landmine and cluster munitions processes be borrowed and used in nuclear disarmament, developing momentum by preparatory conferences, urging on later government talks? I can myself see arguments against that being realistic for the time being, trained as I was as a diplomat to be sceptical about all uncontrollable things. But perhaps it should not be dismissed without civil society thinking thoroughly about it. The organisation I am chairing, the Middle Powers Initiative, is one example of the diverse roles that governments and NGO's play, in that it is sponsored by and works with eight global NGO's active in nuclear disarmament, and with very public roles, but itself working more behind the scenes with diplomats and governments. We issue analytical papers and briefing material and arrange off-the-record forums where negotiators can explore ideas and discuss options without being constrained by formal instructions from their ministers. Many NGO' are more visible than the MPI, but we strongly believe also in our type of more discreet efforts. Let me give just one example of incredibly productive NGO work: the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. Three of MPI's sponsoring organisations � the International Physicians, the Association of Lawyers and the Network of Engineers and Scientists � have collaborated on the most detailed investigation so far into what's required by a nuclear weapons convention, in "Securing Our Survival", which tackles the crucial problems: enforcement -the international security system- the problem of breakouts-deterrence\ verification- nuclear knowledge and reversibility -and economic aspects. I know that negotiators and diplomats often think of a convention as something that takes away focus from more immediate steps. I thought so myself. It's understandable, because even the first steps will require years of negotiations. But the draft convention has a role already today. It leads directly to the central issues, and helps to focus thinking about the steps after the packages that governments agree upon. I am deeply grateful to the MPI partners for their work, which is of lasting value. What is now missing is that governments make the pursuit of a convention their own project. I want to clarify here that the MPI will not push positions of its own regarding a nuclear weapons convention or any other solution to the nuclear weapons problem. We concentrate on helping non-nuclear-weapon states push theirs. MPI can only be a pathfinder, who can be of some assistance in illuminating the path. But governments must of course walk the path themselves. Although we have different roles, governments and NGO's may now finally be able to embark together upon a project which may be the greatest in the history of mankind-the elimination of nuclear weapons. I regard civil society as the "hot line" of governments and politicians to the often forgotten part of the nuclear weapons dilemma, namely the ethical dimension. Mankind must reach enough moral maturity to rid itself of the self-invented means of destroying itself. The nuclear weapons era must be a parenthesis in the evolution of mankind. Thank you.